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Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was largely carried out by a small (3000 fighters), skilled, and brutal army, causing severe harm to innocent civilians in settlements and IDF camps in the Gaza area. Hamas succeeded in surprising Israel in a big way and thus achieved many hours in which its fighters operated in the field almost without interruption and counter-reaction or while fighting against Israeli forces that were small in number and with an amount of ammunition that usually had no chance of winning. The Israeli response against the Hamas forces was carried out by the IDF, the Israel Police, the Israel Security Agency, quick reaction forces in localities and many brave citizens. Naturally, since this is a type of war, all the state security agencies in Israel have already carried out initial investigations in order to derive lessons that they must apply in the future. Although the tendency to think that the attack characteristics of the Hamas organization are mainly related to the field of actions and responsibilities of the state security agencies, there is an obligation to carry out a process of learning lessons for the civilian security sector in Israel as well, with a thorough knowledge of the adversary’s actions and the response – a process that will examine in depth issues such as the working assumptions in the context of [civilian] security, the definition of threats, knowing the adversary and his/her capabilities, the level of preparedness in the ability to detect and react, safeguarding the lives of employees and civilians, cooperation with friendly forces and even medicine. The events of October 7- 23 should send every CEO and/or security manager on duty to perform the following actions:

 

To know the reasons for the success of the Hamas organization against Israel:

Perpetrating a strategic thinking deception over the last few years that caused the leadership in Israel to think that Hamas does not intend to carry out actions beyond firing rockets at Israeli settlements and that the results of the Israeli response in all its response operations created a strong deterrent against it.

Hamas gathered high-quality intelligence on the capabilities of the IDF in the south, on all the IDF bases and the various settlements in the Gaza area, and on the technological and physical response capabilities, all with the help of the information published on social media and media networks in Israel, Gazan workers who worked inside the settlements, diversionary operations within the border fence, and information received from Iran.

Hamas planned and organized the attack for over a year with a high compartmentalization ability within the organization until shortly before the time of execution and perfect compartmentalization against the Israeli intelligence capabilities. Carrying out training and preparations in the field in a way that appeared to Israel as “just” another routine training of the organization.

An operational and professional action plan that succeeded beyond expectations thanks to its adaptation to the intelligence gathered, a strategy that included intensive rocket fire to get the soldiers in the camps and the civilians in the settlements into the security rooms for a longer time than usual and a diversion for the operation to breach the fence barrier, breaching the fence barrier by engineering tools and explosive charges in about 30 different places, the entry and initial attack by fighters riding motorcycles, widening the holes in the fence for entry and attack by fighters riding vans and at the end the entry of a hateful mob hungry for revenge.

Operational planning resulted in the creation of a clear advantage in the number of fighters and in the amount of weapons against the Israeli reaction forces.

Choosing a time for the attack early in the morning on a Saturday when Israel was celebrating Simchat Torah.

 

Knowing how the Israeli forces in the settlements, bases, and in the field responded:

It took time for the quick reaction forces in the settlements and IDF camps to understand that this was a combined attack of missile fire and infantry.

Factually, a standby force that managed to come to its senses quickly and created a determined response by shooting at the terrorists prevented them from entering the settlements and even made them retreat back.

An entrance complex that includes a massive electric console gate was able to primarily delay the entry of the terrorists into the settlements.

Fighting as a team while demonstrating personal courage, determination to win, creativity in combat, and willingness to go to the end caused the opponent many losses and in some settlements even subdued the attackers.

In fact, the quick-reaction forces found themselves fighting the enemy alone for long hours without receiving assistance from reinforcements.

 

A re-examination of the working security assumptions that determine the strategy of the organization, company, business, etc. in regards to the attributed threat and its adaptation to the current and future situation of the State of Israel regarding criminal and terroristic attacks. The Hamas attack on October 7-23 clearly illuminated the price that can be paid because of an excessive “infatuation” with assumptions. An examination of the working assumptions should be carried out at least once a year or immediately when an emergency occurs.

 

The derivation of the threats from the security work assumptions that include the threats defined by the guiding agencies and/or threats that are relevant and specific to the security object. A professional analysis must be performed from the point of view of the attacker in order to know and understand well the capabilities of the criminal or terroristic adversary and above all to be able to detail how each threat can be realized in the entire security object. It is important to understand the risk of any threat when the security object is open during operating hours and houses employees and visitors or when it is closed and without people inside.

 

Extreme threats are defined as a “black swan” and the belief that an event of this type can occur at any given time and without prior warning and the level of damage it can cause especially where it is placed in risk management. The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, proved unequivocally that it is worth believing that an extreme event can really occur and that the result cannot be devastating to the point of a real threat to the continued existence of the security object.

 

The realization of the responsibility of the license holder and/or the CEO to perform security after the stage of defining the threats will be reflected in the definition of a budget that will allow the recruitment of a professional security manager or an external security consultant, and the maintenance of security as will be defined in the designated security portfolio. I think that the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 significantly reduced those who would say that a certain threat, especially an extremist threat, would not materialize in their area of ​​responsibility.

 

Defining the operational response to all the established threats, including a response to an extreme threat:  The response must include the ability to detect the threat, classify the threat, and activate a quick and determined response. We understood that the longer the response, the greater the damage. Detection can be carried out by a physical force/team and/or by technological means. The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, proved that failure to detect the realization of the threat causes a significant delay in a determined and effective response to achieve deterrence and cannot prevent the beginning of the damage and that as a general rule, one must not rely on the detection array that is solely based on technological means.

 

Choosing physical and technological measures that are suitable for the characteristics of the area, for the sectors that must be closed or monitored, and that these will indeed be the best response to the threats. One of the key lessons in the context of the physical measures from October 7 to October 2023 is the importance of installing a massive, electric entrance gate along the perimeter fence line and installing iron doors and/or roller blinds at the entrances to buildings that can be closed by close or remote control and will be an obstacle that will delay the enemy’s progress inside. A great many security managers fail in choosing the right technological means mainly due to a lack of professional knowledge in the field, therefore it is important to remember that the greatness of a person is that he/she knows how to define what he does not know how to do and is skilled in using professionals for this purpose.

 

The personnel and their readiness to deal with all threats, including extreme threats: Guided agencies recruit security personnel in accordance with the standard required of them, while, in contrast, non-guided entities have to decide for themselves what the level and scope of security personnel will be and in accordance with what the law allows them in this matter. In both acquaintances, there is an obligation to ensure that the security personnel are professional and skilled at such a level that they can detect the realization of a threat and react accordingly. The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, proved that a quick and determined response against the enemy succeeds in stopping him/her and even driving him/her away.

The role of the employees and visitors at the security object: The section on responding to threats in the security portfolio must include reference to the employees and visitors who will be at the security object during an attack by the adversary. This means that it is necessary to guide the employees to carry out preventive behavior and to behave in the event of an emergency and to define a team of employees as security trustees who will perform actions in the event of an emergency, to place security signage at the security object that will be accessible and visible to visitors and to guide the security personnel to perform actions to protect them. According to the characteristics of the area and the existing structures in the security object, [defensive] rings must be defined for the fortification of the security personnel, the workers, and the visitors, where each ring will have the ability to react decisively against the enemy’s attack.

 

Friendly forces: Precisely because on October 7, 2023, the reinforcement forces were very late in arriving to fight against the enemy, there is an obligation to define and recognize who the allied forces are for reinforcements in the sector of the security object, what is the mission and operational capacity of each force, how long will it take each force to reach the security object and how will the integration be carried out to him in the field. It is important to carry out periodic coordination with all the allied forces and at least joint training once a year.

 

Medicine: Medical preparedness can save human lives in the field, so it is necessary to decide what level of medical measures will be placed at the security object, and this depends on its location and the number of workers and visitors staying there at any given time. Today, the basic medical level includes first aid kits and defibrillators. It is important to know where is the nearest hospital and the routes to get there.

 

In summary:

To our great regret, we learned in the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, what price is paid for “falling in love” with working assumptions related to the adversary and threats from it, failure to detect the threat in time, lack of preparedness at the level of response and delay in the arrival of allied forces for reinforcements. We learned that one must not underestimate the opponent at any stage and certainly one must not decide that the opponent has transformed from being an opponent to a saintly person – the fact that the opponent does not attack does not mean that he or she is not preparing to attack. Whoever is defined as an adversary will always prepare himself or herself for an attack and carry it out at the time, place, and method of action that suits him or her – obviously he or she will act when he or she thinks that the security target is weak and vulnerable. To increase the chance of early detection of the threat materializing and to be able to produce a quick and effective response, the security plan must be implemented perfectly over time. The Hamas attack on the 7th of October 2023 determined that those who think that an extreme event cannot occur in their sector will find themselves surprised and will pay a heavy and irreparably high price for it.

 

Remember, that “security should be maintained” with the belief that any threat can materialize, including an extreme threat!!!

 

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak survived at least six assassination attempts during his tenure. The assassination attempt that took place in Ethiopia on June 26, 1995, is the most famous and the most dangerous of all the attempts he experienced because President Mubarak left Egypt for the summit conference of the Organization of African Unity held in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa and he almost never returned alive. In the other five attempts, the Egyptian intelligence and security forces the president’s security managed to prevent the assassin from reaching the stage of execution, in contrast to the assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in which the assassin’s opponent realized the execution stage and shot at the president’s convoy. There are countries in the world, such as Egypt, where the leader (president or prime minister) is targeted by hostile elements during the entire term of office. The same parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, will try to assassinate the leader again and again until they succeed.

 

The attacker’s viewpoint- the preparatory actions of the Muslim Brotherhood to carry out the assassination:

The Muslim Brotherhood decided to try to assassinate President Mubarak one more time. After the organization failed in all attempts to assassinate Mubarak on Egyptian soil, its leaders realized that the security circles around the president in Egypt were very strong and almost impenetrable, so a decision was made to try to assassinate Mubarak outside of Egyptian soil. The organization’s intelligence gathering revealed that Mubarak was planning an official trip to Ethiopia on June 26, 1995, and decided to begin planning another assassination attempt. The organization worked to recruit collaborators from organizations and officials from at least one other country outside of Ethiopia that shares the interest in assassinating Mubarak (Mubarak claimed it was Sudan) and other factors in Ethiopia itself. The collection of information about Mubarak’s planned trip included the location of the airport in Addis Ababa, locating the routes of travel that allow departure from the airport, and marking necessary transitions on the possible routes. With reference to the route and the point on the route where the assassination attempt was carried out, it can be assumed that the Muslim Brotherhood organization had early and reliable information about the arrival time of the president’s plane at Addis Ababa airport and the route of travel from there to the first destination of the visit. The organization had existing information about the fact that Mubarak was traveling in an armored Mercedes-type vehicle and that the full convoy included a front vehicle and a rear security vehicle. Analyzing all the information, the Muslim Brotherhood realized that Mubarak’s security level outside of Egyptian soil was significantly lower and therefore the chance of success in the assassination attempt was higher.

 

The Assassination Plan:

To succeed in an assassination, the assassin’s adversary’s chosen course of action must match the available reliable information. The Muslim Brotherhood decided to assassinate Mubarak during his ride in the armored vehicle, so they had to choose means of warfare that could stop the vehicle’s journey and even penetrate the level of its armor – the means of warfare chosen included rifles and RPGs. It was decided that in order to increase the chance of hitting the vehicle accurately, it is better that the shooting be carried out when the vehicle is stationary, therefore the course of action included marking a suitable point on the exit route from the airport where the convoy is supposed to travel relatively slowly and there are residential buildings on the sides of the road. In order to deal with the security vehicle accompanying the president and including a number of armed security personnel, it was decided that the assassination would be carried out by at least 8-9 operatives. Five days before the date of the assassination, June 26, 1995, the organization rented a house located near the point on the axis where it was planned to carry out the assassination and used it to store all the weapons and to organize the assassins for the execution phase.

The final plan stipulated that one of the assassins’ vehicles would block the convoy at a designated point on the route and immediately after that the assassins would open fire at the front vehicle and another vehicle with more assassins would arrive on the way to the President’s vehicle and shoot at it and at the escort vehicle in which the President’s security personnel were traveling.

Photos of Mubarak arriving at the airport, the armored vehicle, and the weapons that the assassins chose:

 

June 26, 1995 – The execution of the assassination:

President Mubarak’s plane landed at the Addis Ababa airport in the early hours of the morning. The president’s security unit was already ready for reception, including the president’s armored vehicle that is flown almost everywhere he goes outside of Egyptian soil. All the participants in the reception were already standing in an orderly manner next to the stairs. The front door of the plane opened and President Mubarak got out and started going down the stairs. He shook hands with all those who greeted him and entered the armored car. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa who accompanied President Mubarak got into the front car and the security personnel got into the rear escort car. The President’s motorcade started driving towards the place where the conference was held. After about a hundred meters of driving on the axis, a blue pickup truck appeared in front of the vehicle in front, hit it, and blocked it. The President’s motorcade had to stop in its place. At least 3 assassins got out of the blue car and started shooting at the front car and the president’s car. At the same time, another vehicle of the assassins maneuvered towards the president’s vehicle, and at least 5-6 more assassins also started shooting at the president’s vehicle and the rear security vehicle. The assassins opened a powerful barrage of fire that put the level of protection of the President’s vehicle to a real test. The president’s security guards quickly exited from the rear escort vehicle and began returning fire at the assassins. President Mubarak instructed his driver to turn around and return to the airport. The driver reacted quickly and began a maneuver and a fast drive that took President Mubarak away from the assassination site. The assassins who were not hit by the security guards stopped shooting and retreated.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Discovered details and the result of the assassination attempt:

President Mubarak announced after the assassination that the person who carried out the assassination attempt was the Muslim Brotherhood with the help of elements from Sudan and Ethiopia who had a common interest in ending his term as president of Egypt in an unnatural way.

The assassination operation was carried out by about nine armed assassins who used two vehicles as planned. The barrage of fire that was fired mainly at the President’s vehicle included about five hundred rifle bullets. The assassins did not fire an RPG during the attack.

The local security forces located the assassins’ rented house and found inside a suitcase containing 2 RPG launchers and other guns.

At least one bullet hit the windshield of the armored Mercedes but did not penetrate its armor.

At least three assassins were killed during the attack.

Three local police officers accompanying the convoy were killed.

President Hosni Mubarak was not harmed in the assassination attempt and returned to Egypt on his plane and thus was again saved from one of the assassination attempts that occurred against him during his tenure.

 

The principles of close protection that prevented President Mubarak from being harmed:

An armored vehicle:  The use of an armored vehicle with a level of protection that succeeds in preventing the penetration of rifle bullets and even more, constitutes a central defensive security ring in protecting the life of the principal. The armored Mercedes saved the life of President Mubarak.

The principal’s driver: a professional and operational driver who knew how to react quickly shortly after the beginning of the assassination, will manage to get the president out of the threat zone and in combination with the armored vehicle will save his life. President Mubarak’s driver did not lose his cool, reacted quickly and decisively, and saved the president’s life.

The structure of the convoy: The convoy of a president who has been through several assassination attempts should have more security vehicles with an emphasis on adding a front security vehicle. The fact that the driver of the president’s car was careful to keep a tactical distance from the vehicle in front allowed him to maneuver the vehicle backward and make a quick trip back to the airport. The rear escort vehicle with the security personnel is positioned correctly and allows the security team to detect the beginning of the attack, quickly unload from the vehicle, and respond by shooting at the assassins.

The advance vehicle: Nowadays close protection units make sure to send an advance vehicle before the personal convoy whose job it is to detect anomalies on the planned route of travel long enough before the security convoy passes. President Mubarak’s security unit did not send a vehicle to do an advance on the route.

 

To summarize:

An organization like the Muslim Brotherhood is capable of planning a high-level assassination operation, and so it was in the assassination attempt in question. The organization’s only mistake was thinking that rifle bullets would penetrate the armor level of the armored vehicle. Interestingly, although the organization armed itself with RPG launchers they were not actually used – it is possible that the quick reaction of the president’s security guards prevented an RPG from being fired at the armored vehicle. There is no doubt that the organization correctly understood that the president’s security level outside of Egypt is significantly lower. President Mubarak’s armored vehicle and driver saved his life. The president’s bodyguards responded with great professionalism and courage undoubtedly made it difficult for the assassins to complete the mission successfully and even caused their rapid retreat.

 

Remember that security should be maintained everywhere and at any time!!!

 

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On Saturday, April 15, 2023, a 24-year-old assassin attempted to assassinate Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida by throwing an explosive device planted inside a pipe. The footage of the moment of the assassination attempt and camera reconstruction provided rare documentation in which the assassin is clearly seen positioning himself in the crowd, reaching a distance of about 10 meters from the prime minister’s location, and throwing the bomb toward him. One of the Prime Minister’s close protection specialists recognized the charge and its fall to the ground, managed to move it away, and carried out an evacuation operation from the hands of the Prime Minister just before the charge exploded.

A news report reviewing the event:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myCqoNo2oug

This is an assassination attempt that takes place about nine months after the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and it seems that the Japanese close protection unit did not act to change the operational mindset of the Prime Minister’s security and still allows his participation in election events open to the general public without going through a screening process that would make it difficult for a potential assassin to approach the Prime Minister, and thus prevent the introduction of weapons that can be used to harm him.
The current security concept of the Japanese close protection unit puts the array of close protection specialists around the Prime Minister in need of repeatedly dealing with assassins who manage to get close to an effective and dangerous distance without knowing whether they will succeed in the mission of protecting his life. The events of the assassination of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in which the security system around him failed to prevent the assassin from firing from a medium range that hit him with fatal shots that killed him, and the current assassination in which one of the close protection specialists managed to prevent Prime Minister Fumio Kishida from being injured, prove that this is a kind of bet on who will win the next assassination attempt, the close protection specialist or the assassin. There is no doubt that the security concept of the Japanese close protection unit places every prime minister under its responsibility in clear and immediate danger.
Here is the footage of the moment when the explosive charge was thrown at the Prime Minister proving the fact that when an unfiltered audience is allowed to reach a short distance from where the principal is, the potential assassin takes advantage of this while realizing that his chances of success in carrying out the assassination are very high:

As a security expert, on the one hand, I admire and praise the quick action of the close protection specialist, which included the identification of the explosive charge, its quick removal, and the determined evacuation of the Prime Minister, which undoubtedly saved him from injury and even possible death, and on the other hand, I do not understand how a close protection unit that has already experienced an assassination of a prime minister continues to work according to a security concept that does not include an audience security screening process. In fact, in the field of close protection, the close protection specialist who is right next to the principal is the last ring that separates the potential assassin from the principal, therefore when the concept of security is based on only one security ring, it is about giving a distinct advantage to the assassin and creating a complex and very difficult professional challenge for the close protection specialists. Following the current assassination attempt on the Japanese Prime Minister, the Japanese government has announced that it will conduct a professional review of the country’s concept of personal security.
The following photo that documents the trajectory of the explosive charge toward the Prime Minister is the best proof in my professional opinion:

There are close protection units such as in Israel and the United States that were able to draw lessons from assassination attempts against prime ministers and presidents that led to an improvement and even a major change in the concept of close protection, and all this to do as much as possible so as not to fail again in dealing with the potential assassin. The security concept of these units includes several rings that combine a response against the existing threats from the adversary. All security rings in this concept are based on professional analysis from the attacker’s viewpoint, which also includes learning from assassination attempt events that occurred in various countries around the world. Those who look at these units from the side can get the impression that this is panic and professional exaggeration and sometimes even as a concept that does not manage risks at all, but for those who are involved in the field of close protection it is clear that the reason for this concept is the acceptance of responsibility for the life of a person chosen for a central public position whose violation can cause loss of life and even influence what is happening in the country.

In conclusion:
The subject of risk management also exists in the field of close protection, but unlike other fields, its significance is a determination of how much one is willing to put one’s personality at risk of harm and how much one is willing to absorb and deal with the consequences when the person is indeed harmed and even dies, therefore it is not possible to determine unequivocally which security concept is better or more suitable for personal protection. In the end, every country conducts itself in risk management including the field of personal security.

Remember, that security should be maintained with full awareness and understanding of risk management!!!

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Wednesday, March 1, 2023, late in the afternoon, the Prime Minister’s wife is staying at a hair salon in Madinah Square in Tel Aviv. Israel is in a state of disagreement and agreement regarding the legal reform that the government decided to promote and carry out. The citizens opposed to the reform go on demonstrations.

At 19:30 it started to be announced on social networks and WhatsApp groups that the Prime Minister’s wife is at a hair salon at 22 H. Bayer St., Tel Aviv. According to the publications, following the announcement that was distributed, over a thousand protesters arrived in front of the barber shop and started protesting against the reform and against the Prime Minister’s wife who was still staying at the barber shop.

The prime minister’s wife is routinely secured by 2-3 bodyguards and apparently the same was the case with her security during her stay at the hair salon. After the arrival of a relatively large number of protesters, in the first stage security was increased with the police force, and in the second stage when it was decided to evacuate the Prime Minister’s wife from the barbershop, security was increased with security guards and armored vehicles of the Personal Security Unit of the General Security Service.

The event ended with the successful evacuation of the Prime Minister’s wife from the barbershop not only because the initial security force will be significantly increased with these additional and skilled forces but mainly because the protesters did not go into an offensive and violent phase.

A video documenting the demonstration and the evacuation phase from the barbershop:

Personal security includes the ability to deal with various threats, most of which include an adversary using an actual, visible means of attack. Incidents of assassination attempts from the past indicate that it is usually one assassin with one means of an attack who acts from a personal or nationalistic motive trying to change reality. When it comes to the security of a person who is not a prime minister, a security level of 2-3 security guards can be a professional and effective response to an opponent who will try to assassinate a person, on the other hand, what effective response can those security guards give when dealing with a crowd of angry protesters who decide to move from an orderly demonstration to an aggressive demonstration? Factually, if the protesters at a barbershop in Tel Aviv had decided to act violently, including bursting into the barbershop, no security guard and no policeman could have prevented it.

It is enough to look at the behavior of demonstrators in past events in the world, such as the behavior of citizens who demonstrated on Capitol Hill in Washington, USA and citizens in France who during the last week demonstrated against pension reform, and citizens in Sri Lanka who decided to demonstrate against the bad economic situation.

The headlines and the photographic documentation of the demonstrations in Sri Lanka leave no room for doubt regarding the fact that almost nothing can be done against the threat of an angry mob rushing forward:

“The President of Sri Lanka fled his home after crowds of protesters took him over. Protesters from around the country came to the capital Colombo to demand that the president resign and took over, among other things, his residence and office.”

A video documenting the abilities of a crowd of angry protesters:

The incident experienced by the Prime Minister’s wife at a salon in Tel Aviv is not surprising and is not unusual on a global scale because similar incidents in which citizens discovered that a personality was staying in a public place and came to it to protest occurred in several countries such as Canada where citizens demonstrated against the Prime Minister while he was in a restaurant:

And Australia where citizens demonstrated against the prime minister:

What does the threat of a mob of angry protesters look like?

An angry crowd of protesters resembles in its characteristics a herd of animals in the wild that decides to start running as a result of a sense of danger or for any other reason. You can’t stop and you can’t control a herd that rushes forward. The only ones who can stop this herd are himself or rather those who have been defined as leaders in it. Those who watched the video of the protests in Sri Lanka saw that many citizens could break into buildings, break through barriers, pass the defense line of security forces, burn, break, smash, vandalize, overturn vehicles, and even harm people, especially those who try to stop them.

What is the difference between one opponent who decides to become a personality assassin and many citizens who decide to protest against a personality?

One adversary can choose to be in one place with one means of attack at a certain point in time and if he is not detected before execution, he will probably succeed in carrying out one attack action that will last until he is stopped by the security forces. One opponent could avoid an attack because he felt a strong deterrent from the opposite security force.

Thousands or tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of citizens who gather together to demonstrate against a personality produce a common offensive and powerful force that can destroy and trample anything that stands in its way. Unlike a single opponent, a crowd of protesters will not only not be deterred by the actions of the security forces but may decide to worsen their behavior as a result. A crowd of protesters will behave and act according to the herd principle sometimes without thinking in real time about their actions and the serious consequences. Any peaceful demonstration can easily turn into a violent demonstration, it is enough for a number of demonstrators to decide to escalate the protest actions so that others will join them.

What is the response of a personal security system in a situation of a demonstration against a person?

As a general rule, when a demonstration becomes violent and the citizens who participate in it rush forward, the security forces, including the personal security system, do not have the ability to prevent the progress and its destructive results, therefore, as a general rule, the best answer against protesting citizens is not to allow the person to stay near the demonstration, in order to prevent Any chance of reaching a situation where the demonstration becomes violent when the personality is near it.

Despite this, the decision whether or not to allow the personality to stay near the demonstration will depend on the characteristics of the facility where the personality is staying, the reasons for the demonstration, the characteristics of the period, and the number of demonstrators.

When choosing a response against protesters, one must not think in the direction of who is stronger and/or rely on the fact that the security forces are armed and the protesters are not, and of course, one must not think that security actions that affect the single opponent will have the same effect on a crowd of protesters.

One or two personal security guards with all the means at their disposal during the work will never be able to prevent a crowd of protesters from reaching the personnel and the same is true in the case of an additional security force that will come to reinforce to try and assist in the confrontation. As long as the number of demonstrators is significantly greater than the number of forces security, it will not be possible to prevent access to the personality.

The incident at the barbershop in Tel Aviv took place at a time that is defined as very sensitive in advance and it is clear that the security guards who secured the Prime Minister’s wife at the beginning knew this and therefore when they saw the first protesters arrive at the front of the salon and realized that the location of the Prime Minister’s wife had been circulated on social media, they had to order her immediate evacuation from the barbershop. When they did not do this and the number of demonstrators kept increasing, it is likely that the security guards realized that they could no longer evacuate the Prime Minister’s wife by themselves and therefore they did the right thing when they asked for reinforcements of the police force. Later, the head of the Shin Bet did the right thing when he decided to send a force of security guards with armored vehicles of the Personal Security Unit of the General Security Service so that they could evacuate the Prime Minister’s wife from the barber shop unharmed.

 

In conclusion:

To this day, citizens who have come together to demonstrate against a personality have ended up forcing the personality to resign or flee and even leave the country and seek asylum in another country. I am not aware of any demonstrators who have reached a personality and physically harmed him/her, and despite this it is important to remember that as long as the personality remains near the demonstration, the decision whether to do so is only on the side of the demonstrators without anyone being able to prevent it from them. The unequivocal conclusion in the context of a threat from demonstrators against a person is that the best answer to ensure his/her safety is to evacuate him/her ahead of time from proximity to the demonstrators, thereby eliminating the possibility of reaching a state of physical friction with them. If the demonstrators at the barbershop in Tel Aviv had decided to escalate their violent behavior against the prime minister’s wife, the security forces around her would not have been able to prevent them from reaching her and God forbid harming her.

Remember, “that security must be maintained” while taking any action to prevent physical friction from protesters!!!

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

A change in the attributed threats, advanced technologies, and especially the severe personnel crisis obliges the guiding agencies to make adjustments to the operating methods of the security entities.

The security profession was built based on an age-old fact that says that in the world, including in Israel, there are good and innocent people and in contrast, there are bad people whose purpose is to hurt others. The bad people are divided into two categories, those who carry out hostile terroristic activities and those who carry out criminal acts. The good side realized very quickly that to survive it must carry out defensive and offensive operations against the bad side. Governmental agencies such as the SHABAK and the police took the responsibility for public security within the country and the IDF and the Mossad have been given responsibility for maintaining the security of the country and the public from threats on the borders and outside the country.
At the individual level, many citizens understood and decided to protect themselves and according to their ability protected their private homes, cars, workplaces, and more.
As there was an increase in the number of terroristic and criminal operations, which made it difficult for the state entities to meet the many tasks, they realized that there was a need to find additional solutions to deal with the day-to-day issues. The use of governmental and civilian security guards was one of the immediate solutions that improved the ability to respond physically by making it possible to place a security guard in more and more facilities. Reality has determined that there will be no situation where the bad people will disappear from the world and certainly not in Israel, and hence it is a constant conflict that obliges the Israel Police primarily to legally and professionally regulate the civilian security industry and the terroristic and criminal adversaries to improve their operational capacity. It is clear to everyone that it will always be the security personnel against the adversary when most of the time they operate on parallel tracks and occasionally meet. The adversary will determine the type of threat, the time of action (when they meet), and the means of how they meet. The security guard is required to be operationally ready 24/7. The best person will win.
The rapid changes that the adversary does require the security forces to adapt to reality, to be up-to-date, to adopt technological capabilities, and to find solutions to the difficulty in recruiting professional personnel. All these and others require us to carry out an examination and change in the operational concept.

Dealing with the enemy requires the security forces to be up-to-date
The more the security forces become familiar with the reality and make sure to be up-to-date, the greater their chance of success in dealing with terroristic and criminal adversaries. This is not an easy task that requires all the security forces, especially those who are also defined as guiding entities, to be constantly connected to what is happening on the ground to be able to recognize and catch up to the adversary’s rate of progress and the progress of the technological means. Up-to-dateness is a cross-process issue because it affects each and every step, from determining the working assumptions, formulating the attributed threats, writing the operational concept, formulating the list of threats relevant to the security object, choosing the security response and also the professional training and the training for the security guards at the endpoint, those who carry out the operational work in the field. In addition to this, the security entities must ensure that all those involved in the work in the different circles, such as external consultants, companies, and suppliers are up-to-date and speak the same up-to-date professional language. Anyone who will participate in the process as a full-fledged employee or as a service provider and will not be up-to-date with regards to professional knowledge can find themselves unsuitable and worse, in their recommendations they can cause security gaps and operational damage which, in meeting with the adversary, can be devastating to the point of endangering lives.

The technology is integrated into the security response
Security technology is advancing and improving a lot and it seems that the main reason for this is the large investment of most technology companies in research and development. In today’s news, many companies are introducing new and improved products with technological capability, some of which already know how to do what the person forgot to do in the various security tasks. Analytics software with algorithms that make the camera capable of locating, detecting, identifying, and sending alerts in real time. Access control systems that incorporate conditions for a single, unambiguous entry approval, that if it is not met, the gate and/or door will not be opened.
Hovering devices that are connected to the means of location and detection, take to the air automatically, reach the threat sector in a short time, provide a real-time backward image and even allow for announcements to be made.
In addition to this, the drones know how to perform routine scans in the security area in accordance with the predetermined plan. Technological progress makes a great many products strong and reliable and as time goes by, succeeds in convincing more and more security officials that in certain tasks it has notable advantages compared to using personnel, and these can be relied on over time. On the one hand, it is very easy to “fall in love” with the technological system because they do not tire, complain, and make demands like human personnel, and on the other hand, it is mandatory to select these technologies through an operational and professional examination process so that it is 100% suitable for the required response to the threat.
Whoever chooses a technological means without an operational and professional process and even decides to replace personnel, not only will not improve the level of security response against the threats relevant to the security object of one’s responsibility, but their decisions will cause substantial gaps in the security system that will give the adversary a clear advantage in dealing with the security array. As a matter of fact, technological measures integrated into civilian and state security systems cannot, at the end of an operational process, stop the adversary from advancing to the target, therefore, at present, there must be a correct and balanced combination between the use of human personnel and technologies, one that manages to correctly combine the advantages and disadvantages of manpower and the technological means and produce from both of these the best response.

The difficulty in recruiting personnel for the security profession
Recruiting personnel who pass all the tests established as admission requirements for the security profession is directly affected by the changing reality that is first of all related to changes in the labor market and the personality characteristics of the current generations. Success or failure in recruitment will be determined according to the ability of the various security forces to get to know the current generation of recruits and the other offers that the labor market offers them.
The policymakers of the working conditions and especially the salary for the various positions in the security profession are obliged to make it attractive compared to other professions, otherwise, no one will want to work, and worse, those who do will do so as a last resort. Since the security guard is responsible for human life and can find himself making a fateful decision in certain situations, it is absolutely forbidden to recruit people into the security profession as a last resort. Everything in life has a reason, and so does the fact that the security forces, mainly civilians, have difficulty recruiting personnel for the various security positions.
The reasons for the situation are familiar and known, therefore the relevant parties have to decide whether they have a real desire to adapt the conditions to the current labor market and then succeed in recruiting suitable personnel according to the need, or leave the situation as it is and compromise on the level of recruitment. The reality in recent years is more suitable for the second part of the sentence. It can be determined with certainty that there is a direct connection between the dismal situation in recruiting white manpower and the advancement of technology that is beginning to partially replace it. Many technology companies have recognized the distress in recruitment and produce a technological solution that integrates or replaces human personnel. The policy that is established regarding recruitment will directly affect the operational concept which will have to include a professional combination of technology and personnel which can mean that it will be necessary to recruit fewer employees and thanks to this the terms of employment can improve and come very close to the current conditions in the labor market. Every sane person understands that a good decision must be made one hour before an event. Postponing making a decision and continuing with the current situation gives the adversary a greater chance of winning.

The attributed threats – a central and important element in the formulation of the security policy
Just before wanting to change the security concept, one must remember that it is affected by the attributed threat, the work assumptions, and the risk surveys, and hence the determination of attributed threats by the security entities has become a central and important element in the process of regulating the security profession.
The attributed threats are determined according to the adversary’s and determine for all those involved in the security profession the starting point in the analysis of the threats to the object of their responsibility. The operational and professional progress of the adversary has taught the various security entities that it is not enough to define an attribution threat once and that it is necessary to examine it and update it every time anew.
As time passes, the methods of action of the terroristic and criminal adversary improve and renew in terms of courage, determination, planning, creativity, professionalism, and technological means. it turns out that the adversary studies the other side well and above all knows how to identify its strengths and weaknesses and accordingly finds new ways of acting in order to win. In almost every investigation of a terror or criminal incident, the improvement in the adversary is immediately recognized in all stages of the operational process or only in the technological field. In certain incidents, it is revealed that the level of technological means possessed by the adversary does not fall behind that of any state security entity, which indicates that it has no problem finding advanced technology on the free market such as night vision devices and drones and even paying a lot of money for them. The terror incident that took place in Kfar Qasem in which the terrorist called the police telling a story of an imaginary incident of domestic violence in order to draw police officers into an ambush indicates the boldness, planning, and creativity of the terroristic adversary who understood and recognized that a police officer who comes to deal with incidents of this type usually does not come prepared for a combat incident. Incidents of theft from secure facilities in which it turns out that the adversary used drones that allow the monitoring of the area in real-time testify to the technological progress of the criminal adversary. Periodic examination of the attributed threats causes the security entities to be better connected to the changing reality and above all makes them up-to-date.

Summary – a change is required in the operational concept
In the constant confrontation between security personnel and the adversary, those who do not adapt themselves to the changing reality and those who delay in making decisions that change an existing situation will lose greatly. A great many past terror and criminal events prove this assertion.
The issues reviewed in the article lead to one clear conclusion – the entities that guide security in Israel must make an urgent change in the existing operating concept. The explanations for this are the ongoing difficulty in recruiting suitable personnel for the security profession and the advancement of technological products that seem to be able to bring a solution that bridges the professional gaps in the field.
In accordance with the regulatory process of writing security procedures, the operating concept is written only after the attribution threat has been formulated, the working assumptions have been determined and a risk survey has been written and this itself forms the basis for writing the security portfolio and the procedures. It is the responsibility of all the guiding entities to make decisions based on a process that includes all of the above steps and that is done by professionals with up-to-date knowledge that allows an analysis to be performed that is closest to reality and above all to the capabilities of the potential adversary, that is, seeing from the attacker’s viewpoint. The process must include all the technological issues that also require the use of professionals in the field at the highest level and this is to avoid as many as possible mistakes in choosing a technology that is not suitable for the characteristics of the task and the required response.

There is no doubt that the year 2023 begins with the news that the change in the existing operating concept can and should be carried out as part of the following professional formula:

Security = Methodology + the human factor + technology

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Discipline will determine whether a security guard and/or security team will succeed or fail in dealing with the potential adversary and is therefore considered a central and important cornerstone in the security profession, more so than motivation and professional talent. In the security profession, as well as in other professions, the cornerstone of discipline includes self-discipline, team discipline, and organizational discipline. A large number of security events ended in failure against the opponent due to a discipline problem and not due to a problem of lack of professional knowledge or motivation. Are the security guards in Israel not disciplined? Are they less disciplined than security guards in other countries? Is the security guard in Israel aware of the heavy personal and general price that can result from a lack of discipline? Those who concur with these questions should know that there is light at the end of the tunnel because discipline is not defined as a trait but a habit that can be strengthened.

The first step must be the recognition of the dictionary definition of discipline:

Discipline is an action, a form of behavior, or a set of rules that a group of people or individuals follow, sometimes against their natural inclination, for a certain purpose.

It is possible to differentiate between self-discipline – in which a person accepts or imposes discipline on himself, and group discipline, in which the group imposes discipline on the individual, in different ways, such as punishment.

Discipline comes from the root word in Hebrew which means to listen. That is, listening internally to the voice of a person’s essence with one’s self, for a balanced and attentive action, coordinated with common sense and the heart.

Organizational discipline is a discipline that exists in the organization and is intended to serve the goals of the organization.

Usually, organizational discipline consists of both discipline that individuals in the organization impose on themselves, and discipline that the organization imposes on the individuals in it.

Military discipline – in the military, discipline exists to impose a code of conduct and orderly values, as well as to enforce a hierarchical chain of command among the soldiers. “Discipline is the backbone of every military entity and is based on duty, self-control, and self-respect. It adds strength to the spirit of the soldier and its power to curb fear and fatigue. Discipline has a positive effect on the spirit of the soldiers by increasing the efficiency of the execution of tasks, the ability to execute them, and esprit de corps. “Discipline cannot be chosen or contravened.”

Discipline is an important and inseparable element of our daily routine. There are two main approaches to discipline:

The first approach states: the person has an ideal, is autonomous, and has a healthy and positive relationship with life, who will learn and work out of free choice and out of aspiration for self-realization. Therefore, with this approach, there is no need at all for discipline and external boundaries, the “internal police officer” of the person will be able to distinguish between good and bad.

The second approach is contradictory: the main role of education, including professional education, is to transfer the accumulated knowledge, values, and customary norms from generation to generation. Here discipline is necessary for the development of the professional security guard, the trainer or the security manager is supposed to command the security guard how to behave when they have the means to impose their will on him or her, therefore in this approach discipline is necessary, because “the outside police officer” is the one who decides and determines.

I believe that discipline is a process to control order by helping the security guard discover and understand his or her self-worth and professional value, the security guard ultimately understands the benefit of obeying logical laws and procedures, as well as the responsibility assigned to him or from which the responsibility for his actions is derived.

 

I think that the second approach, which also includes military discipline, is very suitable for the characteristics of the security profession in Israel, and therefore if I were an actual security manager, I would choose to manage the security team under my responsibility with a discipline that is compatible with, and certainly close to, military discipline, which is most likely going to be contradictory to the Israeli mindset and more appropriate to the Chinese police officers in the picture who emanate discipline from head to toe – visibly, in order, with precision, with pride and with reference to the profession. I would convey to my security team a clear and sharp message that there will be no compromises in the matter of discipline while carrying out actions that build awareness of the advantages and achievements that discipline brings to the individual, the team, and the organization. I would persuade my security team that discipline will increase the chance of success in dealing with the potential opponent and writes the following sentence in large letters on a wall:

“Discipline – understanding that there is someone above me. There is authority. There is an obligation to a higher authority, there is an obligation to respond, and therefore I must perform. Period. This is a worldview that every security guard should have.”

Discipline in the security profession is of utmost importance to ensure the proper operation of the object of security and is a necessary condition for the full and efficient performance of the tasks assigned to the security guard and/or the security team. Managers, security managers, shift supervisors, and security guards alike are ordered to maintain discipline and compliance with the security portfolio and procedures and to adhere to them.

Discipline is inherent in all areas of work in security, from the training phase and later in the practical work phase, and it cannot be chosen, separated, and contravened – the sole security guard must act with high self-discipline that will be reflected in reference to the profession, punctuality, learning to expand professional knowledge and maximum accuracy in the performance of tasks based on the instructions and procedures. A team of security guards must strike the right balance between self-discipline and team discipline while protecting and supporting each other.

The security manager is responsible for enforcing discipline. The shift supervisor’s role is to assist the security manager in maintaining discipline among the security guards.

The security manager and the shift supervisor are obliged to set an example and make sure that they themselves conduct themselves at the same level of discipline that is required of the security guards.

There is an interesting phenomenon that indicates that there is a sharp drop in the level of discipline, especially among the security guards who only a short time ago served in the IDF, which, as mentioned, is considered an organization that believes in and depends on the level of discipline. In this transition from military service to civilian work, the security guards allow themselves to drop in the level of self-discipline and the level of team discipline. I think that this decrease is made possible mainly because the requirement of discipline and its enforcement is not sharp and clear enough, not in the security manager, shift manager, and security guard training schools. Because of this, all those in charge arrive at the various security systems with a low level of discipline that does not match the characteristics of their role in civilian security. Suppose the security manager does not demand and does not act towards the adoption of iron discipline. In that case, the security guards will continue to conduct themselves with a lack of discipline that will undoubtedly lead them and possibly the security system to failure.
A security guard without discipline will not be able to locate the adversary in time and will not be able to prevent him or her from acting and carrying out his or her malicious plan. A security system without discipline will not be able to fulfill its responsibilities. In order for the security guard to conduct him or herself and work with high self- and team discipline at any given moment, in any task assigned to him or her, including during professional training sessions, and in any situation when he or she works alone or in a team, there is an obligation to demand and instill discipline over time and without compromise.
Lack of discipline will create opportunities for the potential adversary to act and will place the security guard in a position of failure.

Remember, that “security should be maintained” with iron discipline!!!

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

27 years have passed since that evening on November 4, 1995, an evening when the citizen Yigal Amir succeeded in assassinating the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with the help of a gun in his possession and two precise and deadly bullets fired from a distance of 30 cm from the Prime Minister’s back. For the past 8 years, I have been lecturing on the assassination of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to many graduates and students. In between lectures I find myself understanding more and more what happened to us and can supply better and more correct explanations. This year I was selected to head a professional debate where I was asked to talk about the period before November 4, 1995, when I functioned as a close protection specialist and try to explain the reasons for the failure and whether they are related to the characteristics and conduct of the close protection unit in the years before the assassination.

The Israel Security Agency’s close protection unit was established in 1958 as a lesson from an incident in which an Israeli citizen threw a grenade inside the Knesset plenum while it was housed in Beit Frumin. From then until November 4, 1995, the unit developed in accordance with the need for personnel and the consolidation of the security concept based on the fact that in all those years it was not required to deal with a real threat to any of the security objects that were its responsibility, including the prime minister. As mentioned, the professional discourse presented me with an intellectual challenge in searching for the question of whether the reason or reasons for the failure to secure the Prime Minister originated in the years before the assassination:

About the unit before the assassination:

A close protection unit is an operational unit with over 30 years of routine operational experience consisting of a normative structure tree that includes a unit head, department managers, branch heads, commanders, and close protection specialists. There is a clear division between the unit’s headquarters and the employees in the field, with the layer of commanders functioning as a link between them. There is respect on the part of the close protection specialists towards the commanders and managers at the headquarters. Recruitment to the unit took place in accordance with a defined and orderly process where everyone who successfully completes it undergoes general and specialized professional training in the field of close protection. Anyone who successfully completes the training is accepted into the unit and undergoes a process of initiation and overlap by an older close protection specialist. A close protection specialist in the unit is sent on personal security missions where he is responsible for screening the crowd with the help of increasing female soldiers, performing an anti-sabotage scan, supervising, picking up the principal, and integrating into his actual security until departure. The operational work, with an emphasis on the work in the prime minister’s team, is carried out in a professional process that includes a preliminary briefing, command and control, and a summary for the purpose of learning lessons. All the close protection specialists perform the tasks very seriously and in accordance with what was learned in the professional training and defined in the concept of security and the various mission portfolios.

Confidence:

After about 37 years of operational work in which no real adversary appeared, it would be very logical to understand the sense of self-confidence that prevailed among the unit managers, commanders and close protection specialists. On the one hand, there is no doubt that it is important for a unit to conduct itself operationally with a sense of self-confidence that the actions carried out in the field are correct and respond to the relevant threats, and on the other hand, the feeling of self-confidence must not turn into arrogance and arrogance and even thinking that you are the best in the world.

I remember very well that among the close protection specialists there was professional self-confidence but neither bragging nor arrogance, therefore I am sure that the feeling of security is not the reason for the failure to prevent the assassination.

Working assumptions:

The central working assumption from the moment the unit was established until November 4, 1995, was that “an Israeli-born Jew will not harm a Jew”, will not harm a state personality, and certainly not the head of the government. A job assignment that made the management level truly believe that an Israeli-born Jew would not assassinate the Prime Minister and passed from them to the level of commanders and close protection specialists in the field. The strong belief was translated by the close protection specialists in the field into an almost immediate clearing of anyone who seemed to fit the job description. This does not mean that the close protection specialists do not look at all those who approach the Prime Minister, but it is possible that the work environment causes the look to be different and less operationally stressful.

Yigal Amir proved that the main work premise of the service and within it the close protection unit was fundamentally wrong and did not correspond to the fact that in the past Israeli-born Jews harmed other Israeli-born Jews and certainly does not correspond to everything that happened in Israel in the months before November 4, 1995.

There is no doubt that the mistaken assumption of work is one of the main reasons for the failure to prevent the assassination of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin mainly because it created a mistaken belief and influenced what was defined in the unit’s security concept.

The security concept:

The close protection unit worked on the basis of a professional and clear security concept that defined that as a general rule the prime minister would be secured by a commander and four close protection specialists, would travel in an unarmored vehicle, and would be able to meet almost any person on the street or at events without undergoing identification and a security check at such a level that it would be possible to know what his or her intentions are and whether he or she is carrying weapons. The security concept was based on the belief that every close protection specialist in the unit received all the professional knowledge and tools required in order to successfully overcome anyone who would act to harm the prime minister.

Here too, Yigal Amir proved that in general, the security concept of the close protection unit was fundamentally wrong, and in particular the thinking that the armed close protection specialist would always succeed in defeating the opponent.

I am sure that the mistaken perception of security was also a major reason for the failure to prevent the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Supervision and Control:

The Shamgar Committee found that the head of the service was not sufficiently involved in the activities of the close protection unit and, as part of this, did not supervise or visit the extent desired in order to know if there were professional gaps in its activity. The supervision and control within the unit over the work of the close protection specialists in the field was also not sufficiently defined, orderly and professional and it seems that in general the various close protection specialists were sent to carry out the security tasks with full faith that they would always perform it to the best of their ability and without gaps, a “fire and forget” style of operation.

Since the failure to supervise and control the action in the field prevents the detection of professional gaps and does not allow the layer of close protection specialists to be heard, it is clear that this has a part in the reason for the failure to prevent the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The attacker’s viewpoint and detecting exceptions:

Seeing from the attacker’s viewpoint was a professional field that did not exist in the security concept of the close protection unit and therefore was not studied in the professional training. The implication of this was that the close protection specialist in the field did not know how to think from the point of view of the attacker and did not know how to professionally detect exceptions in the threat sector.

This professional gap was one of the main reasons why Yigal Amir stood for about 40 minutes near close protection specialists who actually saw him but did not define him as an anomaly in the section and thus allowed him to safely arrive at the point of time and the meeting with the Prime Minister that suited the execution of a precise and deadly shot.

In conclusion:

The Shamgar Committee, which examined in depth the reasons for the failure to prevent the assassination of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, found that it did not occur because of the close protection specialists who carried out the task of securing the Prime Minister on November 4, 1995. The committee came to the clear conclusion that the close protection specialists worked and performed the security exactly as defined in the unit’s security concept and as they were taught in the professional training, therefore in its decision the committee reinforces the insights I presented in the professional discourse.

Remember, that “security should be maintained” on the basis of work assumptions that correspond to reality and that define the concept of professional security!!!

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On May 23, 1992, the Italian judge Giovanni Falcone and his wife, accompanied by close protection specialists, landed at the Punta Raisi airport in Sicily as part of the regular trip they made during their bi-weekly visit to their home in Sicily. Giovanni and his wife boarded the private car with a front security car and a rear security car. The convoy began with a drive on the highway from the airport to the couple’s home in Sicily. An assassination squad of the Sicilian mafia followed the movements of Giovanni Falcone, and when the convoy of vehicles passed over a bridge, one of the members of the squad activated a powerful bomb that exploded with perfect timing, killing Giovanni, his wife, and three out of five close protection specialists.

Judge Giovanni Falcone and his colleague Judge Paolo Borsellino were recorded in the history books of Italy as two judges who stood out for their motivation, determination, and unique and creative way in the war against the well-known Sicilian mafia.
The Sicilian mafia is a criminal organization originating and based in Sicily, Italy. The Sicilian mafia managed to create a state within a state and operated by collecting patronage fees, arbitrating disputes between criminals, and organizing illegal deals and agreements. When the Italian state was created in 1860, Sicily was a restless region. Hundreds of years of neglect have created an atmosphere of mistrust towards the authorities and a tradition of taking the law into one’s own hands. From the mid-1970s, the mafia was defined as an organization that protected wealthy estate owners for a fee and then blackmailed them for patronage and ransom. The war against the Sicilian mafia began during the years of Mussolini’s reign, continued for many years after him, and was characterized by the authorities changing generations of investigators and judges mainly because most of them met their deaths in assassinations and on the mafia’s side by standing long trials, at the end of which most of them were sent to long prison terms. Both sides understood that this was a long-term war in which everyone involved would one day find themselves in prison or the grave.
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino also knew that the day would come when they would pay with their lives for deciding to take on a central role in the war against the Sicilian mafia. The authorities in Italy knew very well that the judges were in real danger of life, they placed a security system around them and thus turned them into secure protectees 24/7.
Over the years it was the Sicilian mafia that decided who would live and who would die – when and by what means of assassination. The mafia assassinated the lives of dozens of policemen, investigators, judges, and their families in various and diverse ways such as shooting and explosive devices. For the most part, those marked by the mafia as a target for assassination found their death in another successful assassination carried out by professional and skilled squads of the mafia. The fact that some of the targets for the assassination were secured neither deterred nor prevented the mafia from carrying out the assassination, and if we look at the success rates, it can be stated that the close protection could not really face the power of the Sicilian mafia, which more than once resembled the assassination abilities of a government and state organization, and at times it could be thought that it was even superior, the evidence of this is the close protection specialists who died in some of the assassinations.
Such assassinations prove that a criminal organization knows and can carry out a complex operation that requires high professional skills and part of its goals is to win the sympathy of the citizens and create future deterrence.
A photo of Giovanni Falcone with some of the close protection specialists stationed around him:

The assassination of Giovanni Falcone exposes the modus operandi of the Sicilian mafia in the use of remotely activated explosives.
The decision to assassinate Giovanni Falcone was made at the meetings of the Sicilian mafia committee between September and December 1991, following the existence of a trial against members of the mafia. The method of action chosen to kill Giovanni was a powerful explosive device. The selected assassination squad gathered intelligence on Giovanni’s movements and discovered that once every two weeks he and his wife come to their home in Sicily – this movement was defined by the squad as an activity that repeats itself with the same frequency and in the same way – arriving in Sicily by plane, landing at the Punta Raisi airport and traveling in three vehicles on the highway that leads from the airport to the city.
The members of the squad patrolled the highway and located a section of it that goes over a culvert built over a water crossing – this point was chosen as suitable for placing the explosive device. The members of the squad purchased 200 kilograms of explosives and began training in assembling an explosive device and how to activate it remotely while using the knowledge and experience of an explosives expert from the New York mafia the Gambino family. On May 8, 1992, the squad met to prepare the final explosive charge which included 13 barrels loaded with 400 kilograms of explosives. The squad placed the barrels in the water passage under the culvert.
On May 23, 1992, the day of the assassination, the assassination squad knew the fact that Giovanni and his wife were again flying to their home in Sicily and therefore set this day as the day of the assassination. The squad split up when one was stationed as the lookout at the airport and two as the lookout on a hill that allowed eye contact with the highway and especially with the culvert under which the explosive device was placed. After the observer at the airport recognized the arrival of the plane, the disembarkation of Giovanni Falcone and his wife, and their boarding of the personal vehicle located in the middle of the convoy, he relayed the information by telephone to the two observers on the hill. With the help of binoculars, the two followed the progress of the convoy on the highway and with perfect timing, when the three vehicles of the convoy got on the overpass, they remotely activated the powerful explosive device – the first escort car was hit by the full force of the explosion and flew several tens of meters from the road while the three close protection specialists inside were killed on the spot. The second car in which Giovanni Falcone and his wife were traveling crashed into a concrete wall and threw the two to their deaths through the front window.
Video showing the assassination:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The assassination squad of the Sicilian mafia was able to eliminate Giovanni Falcone and his wife mainly because it recognized in their conduct a repetitive activity. In close protection, an activity that repeats itself is defined as a characteristic behavior and is considered an activity in which the protectee is at the highest level of risk based on a working assumption that the adversary will discover it as part of the intelligence-gathering phase. The close protection unit has two ways to deal with recurring personal activity:
1. When it is an activity that cannot be changed, neither its time nor its route, resources must be invested to increase the level of security with an emphasis on the analysis of the area from the attacker’s viewpoint and preliminary actions to locate unusual people and objects. In the case of Giovanni Falcone, it was possible to change the flight time, change the position of the protectee’s vehicle in the convoy, and travel greater distances between the vehicles in the convoy.
2. When it comes to an activity where it is possible to deceive and break the routine, the times of the activity must be changed, the routes of travel must be changed at each arrival and departure, deception must be carried out in the convoy of vehicles, a dummy convoy must be operated, etc.

On July 19, 1992, two months after the assassination of his colleague Judge Giovanni Falcone, judge Paolo Borsellino was also killed by the Sicilian mafia. Also in the case of Paolo Borsellino, the assassination squad recognized in his conduct a recurring activity – a visit to his mother’s house which is in the city of Palermo. The assassination squad again chose to use explosives, only this time they placed them inside a vehicle and thus created a powerful explosive vehicle. The squad parked the vehicle ahead of time in front of the building where Judge Paolo Borsellino’s mother lived. On the day of the assassination, the members of the squad waited on the lookout for the arrival of Paolo Borsellino and when he arrived with his close protection specialists, they waited for him to get out of the vehicle and approach the main entrance door to the building. While he pressed the intercom and waited for the door to open, the squad member activated the explosive device that caused the death of Paolo Borsellino and the death of his five bodyguards.
Video describing the explosion:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In conclusion:
Close protection against the opponent is continuous and cannot stop even for a single moment. From the moment the adversary decides to assassinate a protectee, he or she will carry out an orderly and professional process that will usually begin with an intelligence-gathering phase to locate repetitive activity. The adversary can choose one of many courses of action available to him or her and usually, he or she will choose the course that he or she considers the best and safest for 100% success. Since the adversary is focused only on the assassination mission, he or she has the ability and patience to wait for the best time to execute which can be almost anywhere and anytime. A close protection unit that only places close protection specialists around the protectee and does not create and implement additional security circles will not succeed in preventing harm to the protectee.

Remember that security must be maintained with several defensive rings involving breaking routines and deception.

 

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.
Everybody creates deterrence to make someone else not dare to do what they think. The use of deterrence has become more and more common over the years and is found almost everywhere and in every field. If in the past only countries used deterrence against mainly enemy countries, today almost everyone creates some kind of deterrence towards someone else for various reasons – a store owner who deters against theft, government bodies who deter against failure to pay bills, lawyers who deter citizens with threatening letters, a neighbor in a residential building who creates a deterrent so that no one messes with him/her, the traffic police who creates a deterrent for drivers, etc. Everyone who produces and uses deterrence has the same goal – to make the other party not carry out his/her thoughts and/or do what he is told without resisting. Many security systems also use deterrence against potential adversaries, but do they produce it in the right way and in the right way so that you will really be able to influence the adversary? Throughout my years of work in the close protection unit, and especially after the failure to assassinate the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, I used and felt the power of deterrence against the surrounding environs and especially against the potential adversary, and today, after thirty years of accumulated professional experience, I believe more in the importance and power of deterrence and thinks that every security system must produce a cross-circuit deterrence based on a professional concept of deterrence and unique to the characteristics of the object of security. As someone who specializes in the field of seeing through the attacker’s viewpoint, I am sure that a security system that includes strong and effective deterrence succeeds in keeping many adversaries away, and in contrast, a security system that combines deterrence in an unprofessional manner or without deterrence In general, it signals to the adversary that it is possible to approach and even attack.

In order to begin formulating a concept of deterrence, it is necessary to answer the following questions: What is deterrence?
How is deterrence created?
How do we achieve efficiency and benefit against the adversary?
What is the likelihood that the adversary will refrain from carrying out his/her plan to strike as a result of the sword of deterrence?

“Deterrence” (Dictionary definition): A strategy designed to prevent an adversary from performing a certain action, by signaling that the reaction to the action will bring the adversary more harm than good. Deterrence is based on the means that are or are not available to the threatening party and its willingness to use them. A central element of the deterrence strategy is that the threat should be perceived as a credible threat in the eyes of the threatened party. Since the goal of deterrence is to influence the adversary’s decision-making processes, the threatener must know the adversary’s characteristics (seeing from the attacker’s viewpoint). One of the significant difficulties in the concept of deterrence is the existence of a difference between the perception of reality and the world of values of the threatening side and those of the adversary. As a general rule, if there is a difference between the world view of the parties, the more difficult it will be for the threatener to place an effective deterrent against the adversary.

How do you create a concept of deterrence in a security system?
Step 1: The understanding and recognition of the effectiveness of deterrence against the adversary and the need to allocate a budget and resources to create it in a professional and correct manner.

Step 2: Determining working assumptions that are based on and refer to the characteristics of the criminal and terroristic adversaries. For example, does the threat of punishment really deter the criminal adversary? Does the threat of capture and imprisonment really affect the terroristic adversary? Is the mere threat stronger than the punishment itself?

Step 3: The indication of the criminal and terror threat towards the security object is taken from the risk survey carried out for the facility and based on a professional analysis in view of the attacker.

Step 4: Determining what deterrence will include at the level of principles.

How are the rings of deterrence made?
Step 1: Deterrence on the website of the object of security – if the object of security has a website, it is possible to incorporate content indicating that there is a professional and invested security system that knows how to deal with various threats, including publishing photos of security guards, security vehicles, measures and more.

Step 2: Deterrence in the outer space – analyzing the outer space defined as a threat zone to the security object in order to mark places that the adversary can use to organize and axes that can be used by him/her to approach and enter the facility, and all this to decide where to place deterrent signage, cameras, lighting, obstacles and more.

Step 3: Deterrence along the line of walls, which includes the main entrance complex and emergency exit doors – creating a clear security screening process in the main entrance complex, which includes an entry and exit route, directing signage, deterrent signage, and more. Use of an access control system at secondary doors and emergency doors, placement of signage deterring unauthorized entry, placement of cameras, lighting, and more.

Step 4: Deterrence inside the facility – division into areas to which only authorized persons can enter, use of an access control system for these areas, deterrent signage, cameras, an alarm system, and more.

Step 5: Physical security force – placing security guards and security screeners at all the deterrence circles – external, the entrance complex and inside the facility, and all this in combination with an observing and dispatch center to create a quick response force in response to any unusual event.

Step 6: Active security: All those in positions in the security system should learn to be active during the shift – act to locate the adversary in all sectors, conduct questioning for anomalies, conduct external and internal patrols, and more.

Crossing stage – Visibility: The subject of visibility crosses all the deterrence circles in the object of security, starting with the visibility of the security force which begins with the clothing, the manner of standing, and the style of speech and continues with the visibility of the entrance complex, the technological systems, the signage and more.

How do you achieve efficiency and benefit against the adversary?
There are two ways to examine the effectiveness and usefulness of deterrence against the adversary. One way is learning from real events – conducting an investigation and drawing conclusions and lessons for application after each event. A second way is to use an external force that simulates the adversary to carry out drills based on the sight of the attacker. In the end, an investigation will be carried out and conclusions and lessons to be applied will be drawn.

What is the likelihood that the adversary will avoid carrying out his/her plan to strike as a result of the sword of deterrence? The answer to this is clear and unequivocal – the sword of deterrence affects the adversary and provided it was created professionally and correctly and is not based on coincidences and local and unfounded initiatives. For example – will buying and placing a dummy crow on the balcony succeed in deterring pigeons from coming and standing?

 

Whoever performs the analysis of the attacker’s vision will learn that the adversary sees almost the entire security system and is able to distinguish dummy measures immediately or alternatively carry out actions to test the reliability of the measures, therefore, when it comes to dummy measures, one should use those that really look and are close to reality.

Summary:

Experience determines that deterrence is effective against the adversary provided that it is formulated and done in a professional and correct manner, therefore every security system must formulate a professional deterrence concept and implement it into a practical implementation plan. Those who know how to create a deterrent with a threat that will be perceived by the adversary already – realized at the highest level, will succeed in keeping him/her away from the security object. There is an obligation to periodically examine the deterrence effect on the adversary in all circles and improve it according to the results. One must invest in creating deterrence in each circle, recognizing that each circle should make the adversary regret his/her desire to attack the security object.

 

Remember, that “security should be maintained” in combination with a professional deterrence concept!!!

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

A pair of YouTuber friends from the United States decided to document whether they manage to enter paid and/or secure sites, such as a movie theater and a museum while wearing a yellow vest and equipped with a walkie-talkie without being required to be screened and pay. The two wanted to prove that wearing a yellow vest allows free entry into almost any public site from a critical point of view and not as an adversary, even though in practice they look and behave according to his/her thinking and action characteristics.
Here is the video documenting the two entering public sites without difficulty just because they are wearing a yellow vest:

Why would an usher or security guard think that two guys wearing a yellow vest are not required to perform a security screening at the entrance to the facility and why would an employee inside the facility who meets them believe their appearance and story and allow them to continue doing their “job” without inspection and supervision?
Why does a person who wears a yellow vest or dressed as a service provider or a security official manage to easily enter public facilities such as a cinema or a museum and have difficulty reproducing the success in facilities that are considered more secure such as a train station, a government office, etc.?
The answers are found in the level of awareness of the security array regarding the subject of seeing things from the attacker’s viewpoint and the operative actions that we carry out as part of the list of what to do when dealing with the adversary:

The attacker’s viewpoint- what is the way of thinking and characteristics of the adversary’s behavior?

1. The adversary invests a lot of time in learning about the behavior of people who stay in the public space, and work in different and diverse
civilian and governmental workplaces, and work in security positions at different levels.

2. The adversary collects information and learns about people’s reactions in different routine situations and under stressful conditions and
even initiates the creation of situations to experiment and test whether the theory works in reality.

3. The adversary knows how to quickly identify who is standing in front of him/her and what story and manipulation will fit and work on
him/her with a high percentage of success.

4. The adversary is aware that most people like to identify with a story and help others, connect to emotion and act according to it, and in
addition act according to familiar patterns and images.

5. The adversary has high self-confidence, acting ability, the ability to impersonate, the ability to identify and exploit opportunities, and the
ability to motivate people.

6. When dealing with security personnel, the adversary will work to create a familiar and non-threatening story and appearance to create a
feeling that he/she is on the side of the good guys.

Why do the officials manning the entrance to the facility believe the adversary and allow him/her to enter?

1. The usher, security screener, and/or security guard manning the entrance to the facility are first of all human beings with a personal
character that includes experiences, images, and familiar patterns kept in memory, a level of self-confidence and emotion that will be
expressed in any situation where they have to face another person and make a decision whether to believe or not believe him/her.

2. In general, most people tend to believe what they see, therefore if someone arrives dressed in a yellow vest and holding a walkie-talkie
or a ladder and says that he/she has come to provide service and fix something in the facility, then there is a high probability that he/she
will be allowed to enter without a security screening process.

3. As a general rule, a person with low self-confidence will find it difficult to stand in front of someone whom he/she considers important,
authoritative, determined, and with high self-confidence and therefore also in this/her case, with a high probability that he/she or she will
be allowed to enter without a security check process.

4. Most people come from a place of wanting to help and especially those who will ask for help and not be seen as threatening, so when the
adversary asks to “just” enter the bathroom or says that he/she really doesn’t feel well and asks if it is possible to “just” wash his/her face
and leave, it is likely that the person in charge at the entrance to the facility will believe him/her and allow him/her to enter.

5. As a general rule, a person in charge of entering a facility who has not undergone appropriate professional training and/or who does not
work based on a security concept, security portfolio, and procedures will have a very difficult time facing a skilled adversary mainly due to
the lack of knowledge and awareness of the dangers.

6. Lack of knowledge of the potential adversary, his/her way of thinking, and his/her ways of acting with an emphasis on trying to enter the
facility will cause the person in charge at the entrance not to think for a moment that the person standing in front of him/her is a person
impersonating someone else.

 Why does the employee inside the facility believe the adversary with the yellow vest and allow him/her to continue
his/her actions?

1. As a general rule, the employee assumes that anyone who has passed the security system at the entrance to the facility is fine and has
permission to move around inside the facility.

2. An employee without training and/or awareness of the capabilities of the potential adversary, will have a low chance of understanding that
the person standing in front of him/her is not innocent.

 What should be done to successfully face the adversary with the reflective vest?

1. Formulate a security concept that will form the basis for the formation of a security portfolio and security procedures for the facility that
will be defined as a uniform rule for implementing all security functions in the facility.

2. Make sure that the security procedures at the entrance to the facility define a security check process based on unique identification for
every person who wants to enter the facility – as a general rule, it is recommended not to allow the person in charge at the entrance to the
facility discretion to avoid a situation where the adversary manages to create a false representation and deceive.

3. To incorporate in the professional training of the various positions in the security system content that deals with the attacker’s mindset –
thinking, characteristics, and methods of action.

4. Hold with the officials at the entrance to the facility simulations simulating the actions of the potential adversary who will try to enter the
facility without inspection – you can use YouTube videos to learn about the adversary and for illustration purposes.

5. To raise the awareness of the employees in the facility about the presence of anomalous people in their work environment with the help of
professional training sessions, an awareness campaign, and more.

6. Carry out exercises for the security array and employees to check the level of knowledge and the level of quality of execution
Two Israeli YouTubers also decided to record themselves trying to enter public and security facilities – although on their part this is
considered a prank, a lot can be learned from the results:

In conclusion:
The potential adversary will use all his/her abilities to try and enter the facility without a security screening process being performed on him/her while identifying and exploiting the weaknesses among the various officials stationed at the entrance to the facility. Most of the failures of those in leadership roles when dealing with the impersonating adversary stem from a lack of professional knowledge that causes disbelief that the adversary can arrive dressed in a yellow vest or as a military officer or as a police officer or as a service provider of one kind or another. The way to teach the security array to deal with an impersonating adversary can be done and is relatively easy, so all that remains is to be aware of the threat and give it an appropriate response.

Remember, that security should be maintained also in combination with understanding the attacker’s mindset!