The close protection specialist saved the Prime Minister of Japan

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On Saturday, April 15, 2023, a 24-year-old assassin attempted to assassinate Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida by throwing an explosive device planted inside a pipe. The footage of the moment of the assassination attempt and camera reconstruction provided rare documentation in which the assassin is clearly seen positioning himself in the crowd, reaching a distance of about 10 meters from the prime minister’s location, and throwing the bomb toward him. One of the Prime Minister’s close protection specialists recognized the charge and its fall to the ground, managed to move it away, and carried out an evacuation operation from the hands of the Prime Minister just before the charge exploded.

A news report reviewing the event:

This is an assassination attempt that takes place about nine months after the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and it seems that the Japanese close protection unit did not act to change the operational mindset of the Prime Minister’s security and still allows his participation in election events open to the general public without going through a screening process that would make it difficult for a potential assassin to approach the Prime Minister, and thus prevent the introduction of weapons that can be used to harm him.
The current security concept of the Japanese close protection unit puts the array of close protection specialists around the Prime Minister in need of repeatedly dealing with assassins who manage to get close to an effective and dangerous distance without knowing whether they will succeed in the mission of protecting his life. The events of the assassination of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in which the security system around him failed to prevent the assassin from firing from a medium range that hit him with fatal shots that killed him, and the current assassination in which one of the close protection specialists managed to prevent Prime Minister Fumio Kishida from being injured, prove that this is a kind of bet on who will win the next assassination attempt, the close protection specialist or the assassin. There is no doubt that the security concept of the Japanese close protection unit places every prime minister under its responsibility in clear and immediate danger.
Here is the footage of the moment when the explosive charge was thrown at the Prime Minister proving the fact that when an unfiltered audience is allowed to reach a short distance from where the principal is, the potential assassin takes advantage of this while realizing that his chances of success in carrying out the assassination are very high:

As a security expert, on the one hand, I admire and praise the quick action of the close protection specialist, which included the identification of the explosive charge, its quick removal, and the determined evacuation of the Prime Minister, which undoubtedly saved him from injury and even possible death, and on the other hand, I do not understand how a close protection unit that has already experienced an assassination of a prime minister continues to work according to a security concept that does not include an audience security screening process. In fact, in the field of close protection, the close protection specialist who is right next to the principal is the last ring that separates the potential assassin from the principal, therefore when the concept of security is based on only one security ring, it is about giving a distinct advantage to the assassin and creating a complex and very difficult professional challenge for the close protection specialists. Following the current assassination attempt on the Japanese Prime Minister, the Japanese government has announced that it will conduct a professional review of the country’s concept of personal security.
The following photo that documents the trajectory of the explosive charge toward the Prime Minister is the best proof in my professional opinion:

There are close protection units such as in Israel and the United States that were able to draw lessons from assassination attempts against prime ministers and presidents that led to an improvement and even a major change in the concept of close protection, and all this to do as much as possible so as not to fail again in dealing with the potential assassin. The security concept of these units includes several rings that combine a response against the existing threats from the adversary. All security rings in this concept are based on professional analysis from the attacker’s viewpoint, which also includes learning from assassination attempt events that occurred in various countries around the world. Those who look at these units from the side can get the impression that this is panic and professional exaggeration and sometimes even as a concept that does not manage risks at all, but for those who are involved in the field of close protection it is clear that the reason for this concept is the acceptance of responsibility for the life of a person chosen for a central public position whose violation can cause loss of life and even influence what is happening in the country.

In conclusion:
The subject of risk management also exists in the field of close protection, but unlike other fields, its significance is a determination of how much one is willing to put one’s personality at risk of harm and how much one is willing to absorb and deal with the consequences when the person is indeed harmed and even dies, therefore it is not possible to determine unequivocally which security concept is better or more suitable for personal protection. In the end, every country conducts itself in risk management including the field of personal security.

Remember, that security should be maintained with full awareness and understanding of risk management!!!

Personal security – a real danger from protesting citizens

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Wednesday, March 1, 2023, late in the afternoon, the Prime Minister’s wife is staying at a hair salon in Madinah Square in Tel Aviv. Israel is in a state of disagreement and agreement regarding the legal reform that the government decided to promote and carry out. The citizens opposed to the reform go on demonstrations.

At 19:30 it started to be announced on social networks and WhatsApp groups that the Prime Minister’s wife is at a hair salon at 22 H. Bayer St., Tel Aviv. According to the publications, following the announcement that was distributed, over a thousand protesters arrived in front of the barber shop and started protesting against the reform and against the Prime Minister’s wife who was still staying at the barber shop.

The prime minister’s wife is routinely secured by 2-3 bodyguards and apparently the same was the case with her security during her stay at the hair salon. After the arrival of a relatively large number of protesters, in the first stage security was increased with the police force, and in the second stage when it was decided to evacuate the Prime Minister’s wife from the barbershop, security was increased with security guards and armored vehicles of the Personal Security Unit of the General Security Service.

The event ended with the successful evacuation of the Prime Minister’s wife from the barbershop not only because the initial security force will be significantly increased with these additional and skilled forces but mainly because the protesters did not go into an offensive and violent phase.

A video documenting the demonstration and the evacuation phase from the barbershop:

Personal security includes the ability to deal with various threats, most of which include an adversary using an actual, visible means of attack. Incidents of assassination attempts from the past indicate that it is usually one assassin with one means of an attack who acts from a personal or nationalistic motive trying to change reality. When it comes to the security of a person who is not a prime minister, a security level of 2-3 security guards can be a professional and effective response to an opponent who will try to assassinate a person, on the other hand, what effective response can those security guards give when dealing with a crowd of angry protesters who decide to move from an orderly demonstration to an aggressive demonstration? Factually, if the protesters at a barbershop in Tel Aviv had decided to act violently, including bursting into the barbershop, no security guard and no policeman could have prevented it.

It is enough to look at the behavior of demonstrators in past events in the world, such as the behavior of citizens who demonstrated on Capitol Hill in Washington, USA and citizens in France who during the last week demonstrated against pension reform, and citizens in Sri Lanka who decided to demonstrate against the bad economic situation.

The headlines and the photographic documentation of the demonstrations in Sri Lanka leave no room for doubt regarding the fact that almost nothing can be done against the threat of an angry mob rushing forward:

“The President of Sri Lanka fled his home after crowds of protesters took him over. Protesters from around the country came to the capital Colombo to demand that the president resign and took over, among other things, his residence and office.”

A video documenting the abilities of a crowd of angry protesters:

The incident experienced by the Prime Minister’s wife at a salon in Tel Aviv is not surprising and is not unusual on a global scale because similar incidents in which citizens discovered that a personality was staying in a public place and came to it to protest occurred in several countries such as Canada where citizens demonstrated against the Prime Minister while he was in a restaurant:

And Australia where citizens demonstrated against the prime minister:

What does the threat of a mob of angry protesters look like?

An angry crowd of protesters resembles in its characteristics a herd of animals in the wild that decides to start running as a result of a sense of danger or for any other reason. You can’t stop and you can’t control a herd that rushes forward. The only ones who can stop this herd are himself or rather those who have been defined as leaders in it. Those who watched the video of the protests in Sri Lanka saw that many citizens could break into buildings, break through barriers, pass the defense line of security forces, burn, break, smash, vandalize, overturn vehicles, and even harm people, especially those who try to stop them.

What is the difference between one opponent who decides to become a personality assassin and many citizens who decide to protest against a personality?

One adversary can choose to be in one place with one means of attack at a certain point in time and if he is not detected before execution, he will probably succeed in carrying out one attack action that will last until he is stopped by the security forces. One opponent could avoid an attack because he felt a strong deterrent from the opposite security force.

Thousands or tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of citizens who gather together to demonstrate against a personality produce a common offensive and powerful force that can destroy and trample anything that stands in its way. Unlike a single opponent, a crowd of protesters will not only not be deterred by the actions of the security forces but may decide to worsen their behavior as a result. A crowd of protesters will behave and act according to the herd principle sometimes without thinking in real time about their actions and the serious consequences. Any peaceful demonstration can easily turn into a violent demonstration, it is enough for a number of demonstrators to decide to escalate the protest actions so that others will join them.

What is the response of a personal security system in a situation of a demonstration against a person?

As a general rule, when a demonstration becomes violent and the citizens who participate in it rush forward, the security forces, including the personal security system, do not have the ability to prevent the progress and its destructive results, therefore, as a general rule, the best answer against protesting citizens is not to allow the person to stay near the demonstration, in order to prevent Any chance of reaching a situation where the demonstration becomes violent when the personality is near it.

Despite this, the decision whether or not to allow the personality to stay near the demonstration will depend on the characteristics of the facility where the personality is staying, the reasons for the demonstration, the characteristics of the period, and the number of demonstrators.

When choosing a response against protesters, one must not think in the direction of who is stronger and/or rely on the fact that the security forces are armed and the protesters are not, and of course, one must not think that security actions that affect the single opponent will have the same effect on a crowd of protesters.

One or two personal security guards with all the means at their disposal during the work will never be able to prevent a crowd of protesters from reaching the personnel and the same is true in the case of an additional security force that will come to reinforce to try and assist in the confrontation. As long as the number of demonstrators is significantly greater than the number of forces security, it will not be possible to prevent access to the personality.

The incident at the barbershop in Tel Aviv took place at a time that is defined as very sensitive in advance and it is clear that the security guards who secured the Prime Minister’s wife at the beginning knew this and therefore when they saw the first protesters arrive at the front of the salon and realized that the location of the Prime Minister’s wife had been circulated on social media, they had to order her immediate evacuation from the barbershop. When they did not do this and the number of demonstrators kept increasing, it is likely that the security guards realized that they could no longer evacuate the Prime Minister’s wife by themselves and therefore they did the right thing when they asked for reinforcements of the police force. Later, the head of the Shin Bet did the right thing when he decided to send a force of security guards with armored vehicles of the Personal Security Unit of the General Security Service so that they could evacuate the Prime Minister’s wife from the barber shop unharmed.


In conclusion:

To this day, citizens who have come together to demonstrate against a personality have ended up forcing the personality to resign or flee and even leave the country and seek asylum in another country. I am not aware of any demonstrators who have reached a personality and physically harmed him/her, and despite this it is important to remember that as long as the personality remains near the demonstration, the decision whether to do so is only on the side of the demonstrators without anyone being able to prevent it from them. The unequivocal conclusion in the context of a threat from demonstrators against a person is that the best answer to ensure his/her safety is to evacuate him/her ahead of time from proximity to the demonstrators, thereby eliminating the possibility of reaching a state of physical friction with them. If the demonstrators at the barbershop in Tel Aviv had decided to escalate their violent behavior against the prime minister’s wife, the security forces around her would not have been able to prevent them from reaching her and God forbid harming her.

Remember, “that security must be maintained” while taking any action to prevent physical friction from protesters!!!

Adapting the security response to changes in the threat level

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

A change in the attributed threats, advanced technologies, and especially the severe personnel crisis obliges the guiding agencies to make adjustments to the operating methods of the security entities.

The security profession was built based on an age-old fact that says that in the world, including in Israel, there are good and innocent people and in contrast, there are bad people whose purpose is to hurt others. The bad people are divided into two categories, those who carry out hostile terroristic activities and those who carry out criminal acts. The good side realized very quickly that to survive it must carry out defensive and offensive operations against the bad side. Governmental agencies such as the SHABAK and the police took the responsibility for public security within the country and the IDF and the Mossad have been given responsibility for maintaining the security of the country and the public from threats on the borders and outside the country.
At the individual level, many citizens understood and decided to protect themselves and according to their ability protected their private homes, cars, workplaces, and more.
As there was an increase in the number of terroristic and criminal operations, which made it difficult for the state entities to meet the many tasks, they realized that there was a need to find additional solutions to deal with the day-to-day issues. The use of governmental and civilian security guards was one of the immediate solutions that improved the ability to respond physically by making it possible to place a security guard in more and more facilities. Reality has determined that there will be no situation where the bad people will disappear from the world and certainly not in Israel, and hence it is a constant conflict that obliges the Israel Police primarily to legally and professionally regulate the civilian security industry and the terroristic and criminal adversaries to improve their operational capacity. It is clear to everyone that it will always be the security personnel against the adversary when most of the time they operate on parallel tracks and occasionally meet. The adversary will determine the type of threat, the time of action (when they meet), and the means of how they meet. The security guard is required to be operationally ready 24/7. The best person will win.
The rapid changes that the adversary does require the security forces to adapt to reality, to be up-to-date, to adopt technological capabilities, and to find solutions to the difficulty in recruiting professional personnel. All these and others require us to carry out an examination and change in the operational concept.

Dealing with the enemy requires the security forces to be up-to-date
The more the security forces become familiar with the reality and make sure to be up-to-date, the greater their chance of success in dealing with terroristic and criminal adversaries. This is not an easy task that requires all the security forces, especially those who are also defined as guiding entities, to be constantly connected to what is happening on the ground to be able to recognize and catch up to the adversary’s rate of progress and the progress of the technological means. Up-to-dateness is a cross-process issue because it affects each and every step, from determining the working assumptions, formulating the attributed threats, writing the operational concept, formulating the list of threats relevant to the security object, choosing the security response and also the professional training and the training for the security guards at the endpoint, those who carry out the operational work in the field. In addition to this, the security entities must ensure that all those involved in the work in the different circles, such as external consultants, companies, and suppliers are up-to-date and speak the same up-to-date professional language. Anyone who will participate in the process as a full-fledged employee or as a service provider and will not be up-to-date with regards to professional knowledge can find themselves unsuitable and worse, in their recommendations they can cause security gaps and operational damage which, in meeting with the adversary, can be devastating to the point of endangering lives.

The technology is integrated into the security response
Security technology is advancing and improving a lot and it seems that the main reason for this is the large investment of most technology companies in research and development. In today’s news, many companies are introducing new and improved products with technological capability, some of which already know how to do what the person forgot to do in the various security tasks. Analytics software with algorithms that make the camera capable of locating, detecting, identifying, and sending alerts in real time. Access control systems that incorporate conditions for a single, unambiguous entry approval, that if it is not met, the gate and/or door will not be opened.
Hovering devices that are connected to the means of location and detection, take to the air automatically, reach the threat sector in a short time, provide a real-time backward image and even allow for announcements to be made.
In addition to this, the drones know how to perform routine scans in the security area in accordance with the predetermined plan. Technological progress makes a great many products strong and reliable and as time goes by, succeeds in convincing more and more security officials that in certain tasks it has notable advantages compared to using personnel, and these can be relied on over time. On the one hand, it is very easy to “fall in love” with the technological system because they do not tire, complain, and make demands like human personnel, and on the other hand, it is mandatory to select these technologies through an operational and professional examination process so that it is 100% suitable for the required response to the threat.
Whoever chooses a technological means without an operational and professional process and even decides to replace personnel, not only will not improve the level of security response against the threats relevant to the security object of one’s responsibility, but their decisions will cause substantial gaps in the security system that will give the adversary a clear advantage in dealing with the security array. As a matter of fact, technological measures integrated into civilian and state security systems cannot, at the end of an operational process, stop the adversary from advancing to the target, therefore, at present, there must be a correct and balanced combination between the use of human personnel and technologies, one that manages to correctly combine the advantages and disadvantages of manpower and the technological means and produce from both of these the best response.

The difficulty in recruiting personnel for the security profession
Recruiting personnel who pass all the tests established as admission requirements for the security profession is directly affected by the changing reality that is first of all related to changes in the labor market and the personality characteristics of the current generations. Success or failure in recruitment will be determined according to the ability of the various security forces to get to know the current generation of recruits and the other offers that the labor market offers them.
The policymakers of the working conditions and especially the salary for the various positions in the security profession are obliged to make it attractive compared to other professions, otherwise, no one will want to work, and worse, those who do will do so as a last resort. Since the security guard is responsible for human life and can find himself making a fateful decision in certain situations, it is absolutely forbidden to recruit people into the security profession as a last resort. Everything in life has a reason, and so does the fact that the security forces, mainly civilians, have difficulty recruiting personnel for the various security positions.
The reasons for the situation are familiar and known, therefore the relevant parties have to decide whether they have a real desire to adapt the conditions to the current labor market and then succeed in recruiting suitable personnel according to the need, or leave the situation as it is and compromise on the level of recruitment. The reality in recent years is more suitable for the second part of the sentence. It can be determined with certainty that there is a direct connection between the dismal situation in recruiting white manpower and the advancement of technology that is beginning to partially replace it. Many technology companies have recognized the distress in recruitment and produce a technological solution that integrates or replaces human personnel. The policy that is established regarding recruitment will directly affect the operational concept which will have to include a professional combination of technology and personnel which can mean that it will be necessary to recruit fewer employees and thanks to this the terms of employment can improve and come very close to the current conditions in the labor market. Every sane person understands that a good decision must be made one hour before an event. Postponing making a decision and continuing with the current situation gives the adversary a greater chance of winning.

The attributed threats – a central and important element in the formulation of the security policy
Just before wanting to change the security concept, one must remember that it is affected by the attributed threat, the work assumptions, and the risk surveys, and hence the determination of attributed threats by the security entities has become a central and important element in the process of regulating the security profession.
The attributed threats are determined according to the adversary’s and determine for all those involved in the security profession the starting point in the analysis of the threats to the object of their responsibility. The operational and professional progress of the adversary has taught the various security entities that it is not enough to define an attribution threat once and that it is necessary to examine it and update it every time anew.
As time passes, the methods of action of the terroristic and criminal adversary improve and renew in terms of courage, determination, planning, creativity, professionalism, and technological means. it turns out that the adversary studies the other side well and above all knows how to identify its strengths and weaknesses and accordingly finds new ways of acting in order to win. In almost every investigation of a terror or criminal incident, the improvement in the adversary is immediately recognized in all stages of the operational process or only in the technological field. In certain incidents, it is revealed that the level of technological means possessed by the adversary does not fall behind that of any state security entity, which indicates that it has no problem finding advanced technology on the free market such as night vision devices and drones and even paying a lot of money for them. The terror incident that took place in Kfar Qasem in which the terrorist called the police telling a story of an imaginary incident of domestic violence in order to draw police officers into an ambush indicates the boldness, planning, and creativity of the terroristic adversary who understood and recognized that a police officer who comes to deal with incidents of this type usually does not come prepared for a combat incident. Incidents of theft from secure facilities in which it turns out that the adversary used drones that allow the monitoring of the area in real-time testify to the technological progress of the criminal adversary. Periodic examination of the attributed threats causes the security entities to be better connected to the changing reality and above all makes them up-to-date.

Summary – a change is required in the operational concept
In the constant confrontation between security personnel and the adversary, those who do not adapt themselves to the changing reality and those who delay in making decisions that change an existing situation will lose greatly. A great many past terror and criminal events prove this assertion.
The issues reviewed in the article lead to one clear conclusion – the entities that guide security in Israel must make an urgent change in the existing operating concept. The explanations for this are the ongoing difficulty in recruiting suitable personnel for the security profession and the advancement of technological products that seem to be able to bring a solution that bridges the professional gaps in the field.
In accordance with the regulatory process of writing security procedures, the operating concept is written only after the attribution threat has been formulated, the working assumptions have been determined and a risk survey has been written and this itself forms the basis for writing the security portfolio and the procedures. It is the responsibility of all the guiding entities to make decisions based on a process that includes all of the above steps and that is done by professionals with up-to-date knowledge that allows an analysis to be performed that is closest to reality and above all to the capabilities of the potential adversary, that is, seeing from the attacker’s viewpoint. The process must include all the technological issues that also require the use of professionals in the field at the highest level and this is to avoid as many as possible mistakes in choosing a technology that is not suitable for the characteristics of the task and the required response.

There is no doubt that the year 2023 begins with the news that the change in the existing operating concept can and should be carried out as part of the following professional formula:

Security = Methodology + the human factor + technology

The importance of discipline in the security profession

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Discipline will determine whether a security guard and/or security team will succeed or fail in dealing with the potential adversary and is therefore considered a central and important cornerstone in the security profession, more so than motivation and professional talent. In the security profession, as well as in other professions, the cornerstone of discipline includes self-discipline, team discipline, and organizational discipline. A large number of security events ended in failure against the opponent due to a discipline problem and not due to a problem of lack of professional knowledge or motivation. Are the security guards in Israel not disciplined? Are they less disciplined than security guards in other countries? Is the security guard in Israel aware of the heavy personal and general price that can result from a lack of discipline? Those who concur with these questions should know that there is light at the end of the tunnel because discipline is not defined as a trait but a habit that can be strengthened.

The first step must be the recognition of the dictionary definition of discipline:

Discipline is an action, a form of behavior, or a set of rules that a group of people or individuals follow, sometimes against their natural inclination, for a certain purpose.

It is possible to differentiate between self-discipline – in which a person accepts or imposes discipline on himself, and group discipline, in which the group imposes discipline on the individual, in different ways, such as punishment.

Discipline comes from the root word in Hebrew which means to listen. That is, listening internally to the voice of a person’s essence with one’s self, for a balanced and attentive action, coordinated with common sense and the heart.

Organizational discipline is a discipline that exists in the organization and is intended to serve the goals of the organization.

Usually, organizational discipline consists of both discipline that individuals in the organization impose on themselves, and discipline that the organization imposes on the individuals in it.

Military discipline – in the military, discipline exists to impose a code of conduct and orderly values, as well as to enforce a hierarchical chain of command among the soldiers. “Discipline is the backbone of every military entity and is based on duty, self-control, and self-respect. It adds strength to the spirit of the soldier and its power to curb fear and fatigue. Discipline has a positive effect on the spirit of the soldiers by increasing the efficiency of the execution of tasks, the ability to execute them, and esprit de corps. “Discipline cannot be chosen or contravened.”

Discipline is an important and inseparable element of our daily routine. There are two main approaches to discipline:

The first approach states: the person has an ideal, is autonomous, and has a healthy and positive relationship with life, who will learn and work out of free choice and out of aspiration for self-realization. Therefore, with this approach, there is no need at all for discipline and external boundaries, the “internal police officer” of the person will be able to distinguish between good and bad.

The second approach is contradictory: the main role of education, including professional education, is to transfer the accumulated knowledge, values, and customary norms from generation to generation. Here discipline is necessary for the development of the professional security guard, the trainer or the security manager is supposed to command the security guard how to behave when they have the means to impose their will on him or her, therefore in this approach discipline is necessary, because “the outside police officer” is the one who decides and determines.

I believe that discipline is a process to control order by helping the security guard discover and understand his or her self-worth and professional value, the security guard ultimately understands the benefit of obeying logical laws and procedures, as well as the responsibility assigned to him or from which the responsibility for his actions is derived.


I think that the second approach, which also includes military discipline, is very suitable for the characteristics of the security profession in Israel, and therefore if I were an actual security manager, I would choose to manage the security team under my responsibility with a discipline that is compatible with, and certainly close to, military discipline, which is most likely going to be contradictory to the Israeli mindset and more appropriate to the Chinese police officers in the picture who emanate discipline from head to toe – visibly, in order, with precision, with pride and with reference to the profession. I would convey to my security team a clear and sharp message that there will be no compromises in the matter of discipline while carrying out actions that build awareness of the advantages and achievements that discipline brings to the individual, the team, and the organization. I would persuade my security team that discipline will increase the chance of success in dealing with the potential opponent and writes the following sentence in large letters on a wall:

“Discipline – understanding that there is someone above me. There is authority. There is an obligation to a higher authority, there is an obligation to respond, and therefore I must perform. Period. This is a worldview that every security guard should have.”

Discipline in the security profession is of utmost importance to ensure the proper operation of the object of security and is a necessary condition for the full and efficient performance of the tasks assigned to the security guard and/or the security team. Managers, security managers, shift supervisors, and security guards alike are ordered to maintain discipline and compliance with the security portfolio and procedures and to adhere to them.

Discipline is inherent in all areas of work in security, from the training phase and later in the practical work phase, and it cannot be chosen, separated, and contravened – the sole security guard must act with high self-discipline that will be reflected in reference to the profession, punctuality, learning to expand professional knowledge and maximum accuracy in the performance of tasks based on the instructions and procedures. A team of security guards must strike the right balance between self-discipline and team discipline while protecting and supporting each other.

The security manager is responsible for enforcing discipline. The shift supervisor’s role is to assist the security manager in maintaining discipline among the security guards.

The security manager and the shift supervisor are obliged to set an example and make sure that they themselves conduct themselves at the same level of discipline that is required of the security guards.

There is an interesting phenomenon that indicates that there is a sharp drop in the level of discipline, especially among the security guards who only a short time ago served in the IDF, which, as mentioned, is considered an organization that believes in and depends on the level of discipline. In this transition from military service to civilian work, the security guards allow themselves to drop in the level of self-discipline and the level of team discipline. I think that this decrease is made possible mainly because the requirement of discipline and its enforcement is not sharp and clear enough, not in the security manager, shift manager, and security guard training schools. Because of this, all those in charge arrive at the various security systems with a low level of discipline that does not match the characteristics of their role in civilian security. Suppose the security manager does not demand and does not act towards the adoption of iron discipline. In that case, the security guards will continue to conduct themselves with a lack of discipline that will undoubtedly lead them and possibly the security system to failure.
A security guard without discipline will not be able to locate the adversary in time and will not be able to prevent him or her from acting and carrying out his or her malicious plan. A security system without discipline will not be able to fulfill its responsibilities. In order for the security guard to conduct him or herself and work with high self- and team discipline at any given moment, in any task assigned to him or her, including during professional training sessions, and in any situation when he or she works alone or in a team, there is an obligation to demand and instill discipline over time and without compromise.
Lack of discipline will create opportunities for the potential adversary to act and will place the security guard in a position of failure.

Remember, that “security should be maintained” with iron discipline!!!

Yitzhak Rabin’s murder – the reasons for the failure

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

27 years have passed since that evening on November 4, 1995, an evening when the citizen Yigal Amir succeeded in assassinating the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with the help of a gun in his possession and two precise and deadly bullets fired from a distance of 30 cm from the Prime Minister’s back. For the past 8 years, I have been lecturing on the assassination of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to many graduates and students. In between lectures I find myself understanding more and more what happened to us and can supply better and more correct explanations. This year I was selected to head a professional debate where I was asked to talk about the period before November 4, 1995, when I functioned as a close protection specialist and try to explain the reasons for the failure and whether they are related to the characteristics and conduct of the close protection unit in the years before the assassination.

The Israel Security Agency’s close protection unit was established in 1958 as a lesson from an incident in which an Israeli citizen threw a grenade inside the Knesset plenum while it was housed in Beit Frumin. From then until November 4, 1995, the unit developed in accordance with the need for personnel and the consolidation of the security concept based on the fact that in all those years it was not required to deal with a real threat to any of the security objects that were its responsibility, including the prime minister. As mentioned, the professional discourse presented me with an intellectual challenge in searching for the question of whether the reason or reasons for the failure to secure the Prime Minister originated in the years before the assassination:

About the unit before the assassination:

A close protection unit is an operational unit with over 30 years of routine operational experience consisting of a normative structure tree that includes a unit head, department managers, branch heads, commanders, and close protection specialists. There is a clear division between the unit’s headquarters and the employees in the field, with the layer of commanders functioning as a link between them. There is respect on the part of the close protection specialists towards the commanders and managers at the headquarters. Recruitment to the unit took place in accordance with a defined and orderly process where everyone who successfully completes it undergoes general and specialized professional training in the field of close protection. Anyone who successfully completes the training is accepted into the unit and undergoes a process of initiation and overlap by an older close protection specialist. A close protection specialist in the unit is sent on personal security missions where he is responsible for screening the crowd with the help of increasing female soldiers, performing an anti-sabotage scan, supervising, picking up the principal, and integrating into his actual security until departure. The operational work, with an emphasis on the work in the prime minister’s team, is carried out in a professional process that includes a preliminary briefing, command and control, and a summary for the purpose of learning lessons. All the close protection specialists perform the tasks very seriously and in accordance with what was learned in the professional training and defined in the concept of security and the various mission portfolios.


After about 37 years of operational work in which no real adversary appeared, it would be very logical to understand the sense of self-confidence that prevailed among the unit managers, commanders and close protection specialists. On the one hand, there is no doubt that it is important for a unit to conduct itself operationally with a sense of self-confidence that the actions carried out in the field are correct and respond to the relevant threats, and on the other hand, the feeling of self-confidence must not turn into arrogance and arrogance and even thinking that you are the best in the world.

I remember very well that among the close protection specialists there was professional self-confidence but neither bragging nor arrogance, therefore I am sure that the feeling of security is not the reason for the failure to prevent the assassination.

Working assumptions:

The central working assumption from the moment the unit was established until November 4, 1995, was that “an Israeli-born Jew will not harm a Jew”, will not harm a state personality, and certainly not the head of the government. A job assignment that made the management level truly believe that an Israeli-born Jew would not assassinate the Prime Minister and passed from them to the level of commanders and close protection specialists in the field. The strong belief was translated by the close protection specialists in the field into an almost immediate clearing of anyone who seemed to fit the job description. This does not mean that the close protection specialists do not look at all those who approach the Prime Minister, but it is possible that the work environment causes the look to be different and less operationally stressful.

Yigal Amir proved that the main work premise of the service and within it the close protection unit was fundamentally wrong and did not correspond to the fact that in the past Israeli-born Jews harmed other Israeli-born Jews and certainly does not correspond to everything that happened in Israel in the months before November 4, 1995.

There is no doubt that the mistaken assumption of work is one of the main reasons for the failure to prevent the assassination of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin mainly because it created a mistaken belief and influenced what was defined in the unit’s security concept.

The security concept:

The close protection unit worked on the basis of a professional and clear security concept that defined that as a general rule the prime minister would be secured by a commander and four close protection specialists, would travel in an unarmored vehicle, and would be able to meet almost any person on the street or at events without undergoing identification and a security check at such a level that it would be possible to know what his or her intentions are and whether he or she is carrying weapons. The security concept was based on the belief that every close protection specialist in the unit received all the professional knowledge and tools required in order to successfully overcome anyone who would act to harm the prime minister.

Here too, Yigal Amir proved that in general, the security concept of the close protection unit was fundamentally wrong, and in particular the thinking that the armed close protection specialist would always succeed in defeating the opponent.

I am sure that the mistaken perception of security was also a major reason for the failure to prevent the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Supervision and Control:

The Shamgar Committee found that the head of the service was not sufficiently involved in the activities of the close protection unit and, as part of this, did not supervise or visit the extent desired in order to know if there were professional gaps in its activity. The supervision and control within the unit over the work of the close protection specialists in the field was also not sufficiently defined, orderly and professional and it seems that in general the various close protection specialists were sent to carry out the security tasks with full faith that they would always perform it to the best of their ability and without gaps, a “fire and forget” style of operation.

Since the failure to supervise and control the action in the field prevents the detection of professional gaps and does not allow the layer of close protection specialists to be heard, it is clear that this has a part in the reason for the failure to prevent the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The attacker’s viewpoint and detecting exceptions:

Seeing from the attacker’s viewpoint was a professional field that did not exist in the security concept of the close protection unit and therefore was not studied in the professional training. The implication of this was that the close protection specialist in the field did not know how to think from the point of view of the attacker and did not know how to professionally detect exceptions in the threat sector.

This professional gap was one of the main reasons why Yigal Amir stood for about 40 minutes near close protection specialists who actually saw him but did not define him as an anomaly in the section and thus allowed him to safely arrive at the point of time and the meeting with the Prime Minister that suited the execution of a precise and deadly shot.

In conclusion:

The Shamgar Committee, which examined in depth the reasons for the failure to prevent the assassination of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, found that it did not occur because of the close protection specialists who carried out the task of securing the Prime Minister on November 4, 1995. The committee came to the clear conclusion that the close protection specialists worked and performed the security exactly as defined in the unit’s security concept and as they were taught in the professional training, therefore in its decision the committee reinforces the insights I presented in the professional discourse.

Remember, that “security should be maintained” on the basis of work assumptions that correspond to reality and that define the concept of professional security!!!

Sicilian assassination

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On May 23, 1992, the Italian judge Giovanni Falcone and his wife, accompanied by close protection specialists, landed at the Punta Raisi airport in Sicily as part of the regular trip they made during their bi-weekly visit to their home in Sicily. Giovanni and his wife boarded the private car with a front security car and a rear security car. The convoy began with a drive on the highway from the airport to the couple’s home in Sicily. An assassination squad of the Sicilian mafia followed the movements of Giovanni Falcone, and when the convoy of vehicles passed over a bridge, one of the members of the squad activated a powerful bomb that exploded with perfect timing, killing Giovanni, his wife, and three out of five close protection specialists.

Judge Giovanni Falcone and his colleague Judge Paolo Borsellino were recorded in the history books of Italy as two judges who stood out for their motivation, determination, and unique and creative way in the war against the well-known Sicilian mafia.
The Sicilian mafia is a criminal organization originating and based in Sicily, Italy. The Sicilian mafia managed to create a state within a state and operated by collecting patronage fees, arbitrating disputes between criminals, and organizing illegal deals and agreements. When the Italian state was created in 1860, Sicily was a restless region. Hundreds of years of neglect have created an atmosphere of mistrust towards the authorities and a tradition of taking the law into one’s own hands. From the mid-1970s, the mafia was defined as an organization that protected wealthy estate owners for a fee and then blackmailed them for patronage and ransom. The war against the Sicilian mafia began during the years of Mussolini’s reign, continued for many years after him, and was characterized by the authorities changing generations of investigators and judges mainly because most of them met their deaths in assassinations and on the mafia’s side by standing long trials, at the end of which most of them were sent to long prison terms. Both sides understood that this was a long-term war in which everyone involved would one day find themselves in prison or the grave.
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino also knew that the day would come when they would pay with their lives for deciding to take on a central role in the war against the Sicilian mafia. The authorities in Italy knew very well that the judges were in real danger of life, they placed a security system around them and thus turned them into secure protectees 24/7.
Over the years it was the Sicilian mafia that decided who would live and who would die – when and by what means of assassination. The mafia assassinated the lives of dozens of policemen, investigators, judges, and their families in various and diverse ways such as shooting and explosive devices. For the most part, those marked by the mafia as a target for assassination found their death in another successful assassination carried out by professional and skilled squads of the mafia. The fact that some of the targets for the assassination were secured neither deterred nor prevented the mafia from carrying out the assassination, and if we look at the success rates, it can be stated that the close protection could not really face the power of the Sicilian mafia, which more than once resembled the assassination abilities of a government and state organization, and at times it could be thought that it was even superior, the evidence of this is the close protection specialists who died in some of the assassinations.
Such assassinations prove that a criminal organization knows and can carry out a complex operation that requires high professional skills and part of its goals is to win the sympathy of the citizens and create future deterrence.
A photo of Giovanni Falcone with some of the close protection specialists stationed around him:

The assassination of Giovanni Falcone exposes the modus operandi of the Sicilian mafia in the use of remotely activated explosives.
The decision to assassinate Giovanni Falcone was made at the meetings of the Sicilian mafia committee between September and December 1991, following the existence of a trial against members of the mafia. The method of action chosen to kill Giovanni was a powerful explosive device. The selected assassination squad gathered intelligence on Giovanni’s movements and discovered that once every two weeks he and his wife come to their home in Sicily – this movement was defined by the squad as an activity that repeats itself with the same frequency and in the same way – arriving in Sicily by plane, landing at the Punta Raisi airport and traveling in three vehicles on the highway that leads from the airport to the city.
The members of the squad patrolled the highway and located a section of it that goes over a culvert built over a water crossing – this point was chosen as suitable for placing the explosive device. The members of the squad purchased 200 kilograms of explosives and began training in assembling an explosive device and how to activate it remotely while using the knowledge and experience of an explosives expert from the New York mafia the Gambino family. On May 8, 1992, the squad met to prepare the final explosive charge which included 13 barrels loaded with 400 kilograms of explosives. The squad placed the barrels in the water passage under the culvert.
On May 23, 1992, the day of the assassination, the assassination squad knew the fact that Giovanni and his wife were again flying to their home in Sicily and therefore set this day as the day of the assassination. The squad split up when one was stationed as the lookout at the airport and two as the lookout on a hill that allowed eye contact with the highway and especially with the culvert under which the explosive device was placed. After the observer at the airport recognized the arrival of the plane, the disembarkation of Giovanni Falcone and his wife, and their boarding of the personal vehicle located in the middle of the convoy, he relayed the information by telephone to the two observers on the hill. With the help of binoculars, the two followed the progress of the convoy on the highway and with perfect timing, when the three vehicles of the convoy got on the overpass, they remotely activated the powerful explosive device – the first escort car was hit by the full force of the explosion and flew several tens of meters from the road while the three close protection specialists inside were killed on the spot. The second car in which Giovanni Falcone and his wife were traveling crashed into a concrete wall and threw the two to their deaths through the front window.
Video showing the assassination:








The assassination squad of the Sicilian mafia was able to eliminate Giovanni Falcone and his wife mainly because it recognized in their conduct a repetitive activity. In close protection, an activity that repeats itself is defined as a characteristic behavior and is considered an activity in which the protectee is at the highest level of risk based on a working assumption that the adversary will discover it as part of the intelligence-gathering phase. The close protection unit has two ways to deal with recurring personal activity:
1. When it is an activity that cannot be changed, neither its time nor its route, resources must be invested to increase the level of security with an emphasis on the analysis of the area from the attacker’s viewpoint and preliminary actions to locate unusual people and objects. In the case of Giovanni Falcone, it was possible to change the flight time, change the position of the protectee’s vehicle in the convoy, and travel greater distances between the vehicles in the convoy.
2. When it comes to an activity where it is possible to deceive and break the routine, the times of the activity must be changed, the routes of travel must be changed at each arrival and departure, deception must be carried out in the convoy of vehicles, a dummy convoy must be operated, etc.

On July 19, 1992, two months after the assassination of his colleague Judge Giovanni Falcone, judge Paolo Borsellino was also killed by the Sicilian mafia. Also in the case of Paolo Borsellino, the assassination squad recognized in his conduct a recurring activity – a visit to his mother’s house which is in the city of Palermo. The assassination squad again chose to use explosives, only this time they placed them inside a vehicle and thus created a powerful explosive vehicle. The squad parked the vehicle ahead of time in front of the building where Judge Paolo Borsellino’s mother lived. On the day of the assassination, the members of the squad waited on the lookout for the arrival of Paolo Borsellino and when he arrived with his close protection specialists, they waited for him to get out of the vehicle and approach the main entrance door to the building. While he pressed the intercom and waited for the door to open, the squad member activated the explosive device that caused the death of Paolo Borsellino and the death of his five bodyguards.
Video describing the explosion:








In conclusion:
Close protection against the opponent is continuous and cannot stop even for a single moment. From the moment the adversary decides to assassinate a protectee, he or she will carry out an orderly and professional process that will usually begin with an intelligence-gathering phase to locate repetitive activity. The adversary can choose one of many courses of action available to him or her and usually, he or she will choose the course that he or she considers the best and safest for 100% success. Since the adversary is focused only on the assassination mission, he or she has the ability and patience to wait for the best time to execute which can be almost anywhere and anytime. A close protection unit that only places close protection specialists around the protectee and does not create and implement additional security circles will not succeed in preventing harm to the protectee.

Remember that security must be maintained with several defensive rings involving breaking routines and deception.


Forming a concept of deterrence in the security system

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.
Everybody creates deterrence to make someone else not dare to do what they think. The use of deterrence has become more and more common over the years and is found almost everywhere and in every field. If in the past only countries used deterrence against mainly enemy countries, today almost everyone creates some kind of deterrence towards someone else for various reasons – a store owner who deters against theft, government bodies who deter against failure to pay bills, lawyers who deter citizens with threatening letters, a neighbor in a residential building who creates a deterrent so that no one messes with him/her, the traffic police who creates a deterrent for drivers, etc. Everyone who produces and uses deterrence has the same goal – to make the other party not carry out his/her thoughts and/or do what he is told without resisting. Many security systems also use deterrence against potential adversaries, but do they produce it in the right way and in the right way so that you will really be able to influence the adversary? Throughout my years of work in the close protection unit, and especially after the failure to assassinate the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, I used and felt the power of deterrence against the surrounding environs and especially against the potential adversary, and today, after thirty years of accumulated professional experience, I believe more in the importance and power of deterrence and thinks that every security system must produce a cross-circuit deterrence based on a professional concept of deterrence and unique to the characteristics of the object of security. As someone who specializes in the field of seeing through the attacker’s viewpoint, I am sure that a security system that includes strong and effective deterrence succeeds in keeping many adversaries away, and in contrast, a security system that combines deterrence in an unprofessional manner or without deterrence In general, it signals to the adversary that it is possible to approach and even attack.

In order to begin formulating a concept of deterrence, it is necessary to answer the following questions: What is deterrence?
How is deterrence created?
How do we achieve efficiency and benefit against the adversary?
What is the likelihood that the adversary will refrain from carrying out his/her plan to strike as a result of the sword of deterrence?

“Deterrence” (Dictionary definition): A strategy designed to prevent an adversary from performing a certain action, by signaling that the reaction to the action will bring the adversary more harm than good. Deterrence is based on the means that are or are not available to the threatening party and its willingness to use them. A central element of the deterrence strategy is that the threat should be perceived as a credible threat in the eyes of the threatened party. Since the goal of deterrence is to influence the adversary’s decision-making processes, the threatener must know the adversary’s characteristics (seeing from the attacker’s viewpoint). One of the significant difficulties in the concept of deterrence is the existence of a difference between the perception of reality and the world of values of the threatening side and those of the adversary. As a general rule, if there is a difference between the world view of the parties, the more difficult it will be for the threatener to place an effective deterrent against the adversary.

How do you create a concept of deterrence in a security system?
Step 1: The understanding and recognition of the effectiveness of deterrence against the adversary and the need to allocate a budget and resources to create it in a professional and correct manner.

Step 2: Determining working assumptions that are based on and refer to the characteristics of the criminal and terroristic adversaries. For example, does the threat of punishment really deter the criminal adversary? Does the threat of capture and imprisonment really affect the terroristic adversary? Is the mere threat stronger than the punishment itself?

Step 3: The indication of the criminal and terror threat towards the security object is taken from the risk survey carried out for the facility and based on a professional analysis in view of the attacker.

Step 4: Determining what deterrence will include at the level of principles.

How are the rings of deterrence made?
Step 1: Deterrence on the website of the object of security – if the object of security has a website, it is possible to incorporate content indicating that there is a professional and invested security system that knows how to deal with various threats, including publishing photos of security guards, security vehicles, measures and more.

Step 2: Deterrence in the outer space – analyzing the outer space defined as a threat zone to the security object in order to mark places that the adversary can use to organize and axes that can be used by him/her to approach and enter the facility, and all this to decide where to place deterrent signage, cameras, lighting, obstacles and more.

Step 3: Deterrence along the line of walls, which includes the main entrance complex and emergency exit doors – creating a clear security screening process in the main entrance complex, which includes an entry and exit route, directing signage, deterrent signage, and more. Use of an access control system at secondary doors and emergency doors, placement of signage deterring unauthorized entry, placement of cameras, lighting, and more.

Step 4: Deterrence inside the facility – division into areas to which only authorized persons can enter, use of an access control system for these areas, deterrent signage, cameras, an alarm system, and more.

Step 5: Physical security force – placing security guards and security screeners at all the deterrence circles – external, the entrance complex and inside the facility, and all this in combination with an observing and dispatch center to create a quick response force in response to any unusual event.

Step 6: Active security: All those in positions in the security system should learn to be active during the shift – act to locate the adversary in all sectors, conduct questioning for anomalies, conduct external and internal patrols, and more.

Crossing stage – Visibility: The subject of visibility crosses all the deterrence circles in the object of security, starting with the visibility of the security force which begins with the clothing, the manner of standing, and the style of speech and continues with the visibility of the entrance complex, the technological systems, the signage and more.

How do you achieve efficiency and benefit against the adversary?
There are two ways to examine the effectiveness and usefulness of deterrence against the adversary. One way is learning from real events – conducting an investigation and drawing conclusions and lessons for application after each event. A second way is to use an external force that simulates the adversary to carry out drills based on the sight of the attacker. In the end, an investigation will be carried out and conclusions and lessons to be applied will be drawn.

What is the likelihood that the adversary will avoid carrying out his/her plan to strike as a result of the sword of deterrence? The answer to this is clear and unequivocal – the sword of deterrence affects the adversary and provided it was created professionally and correctly and is not based on coincidences and local and unfounded initiatives. For example – will buying and placing a dummy crow on the balcony succeed in deterring pigeons from coming and standing?


Whoever performs the analysis of the attacker’s vision will learn that the adversary sees almost the entire security system and is able to distinguish dummy measures immediately or alternatively carry out actions to test the reliability of the measures, therefore, when it comes to dummy measures, one should use those that really look and are close to reality.


Experience determines that deterrence is effective against the adversary provided that it is formulated and done in a professional and correct manner, therefore every security system must formulate a professional deterrence concept and implement it into a practical implementation plan. Those who know how to create a deterrent with a threat that will be perceived by the adversary already – realized at the highest level, will succeed in keeping him/her away from the security object. There is an obligation to periodically examine the deterrence effect on the adversary in all circles and improve it according to the results. One must invest in creating deterrence in each circle, recognizing that each circle should make the adversary regret his/her desire to attack the security object.


Remember, that “security should be maintained” in combination with a professional deterrence concept!!!

The adversary with the yellow vest

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

A pair of YouTuber friends from the United States decided to document whether they manage to enter paid and/or secure sites, such as a movie theater and a museum while wearing a yellow vest and equipped with a walkie-talkie without being required to be screened and pay. The two wanted to prove that wearing a yellow vest allows free entry into almost any public site from a critical point of view and not as an adversary, even though in practice they look and behave according to his/her thinking and action characteristics.
Here is the video documenting the two entering public sites without difficulty just because they are wearing a yellow vest:

Why would an usher or security guard think that two guys wearing a yellow vest are not required to perform a security screening at the entrance to the facility and why would an employee inside the facility who meets them believe their appearance and story and allow them to continue doing their “job” without inspection and supervision?
Why does a person who wears a yellow vest or dressed as a service provider or a security official manage to easily enter public facilities such as a cinema or a museum and have difficulty reproducing the success in facilities that are considered more secure such as a train station, a government office, etc.?
The answers are found in the level of awareness of the security array regarding the subject of seeing things from the attacker’s viewpoint and the operative actions that we carry out as part of the list of what to do when dealing with the adversary:

The attacker’s viewpoint- what is the way of thinking and characteristics of the adversary’s behavior?

1. The adversary invests a lot of time in learning about the behavior of people who stay in the public space, and work in different and diverse
civilian and governmental workplaces, and work in security positions at different levels.

2. The adversary collects information and learns about people’s reactions in different routine situations and under stressful conditions and
even initiates the creation of situations to experiment and test whether the theory works in reality.

3. The adversary knows how to quickly identify who is standing in front of him/her and what story and manipulation will fit and work on
him/her with a high percentage of success.

4. The adversary is aware that most people like to identify with a story and help others, connect to emotion and act according to it, and in
addition act according to familiar patterns and images.

5. The adversary has high self-confidence, acting ability, the ability to impersonate, the ability to identify and exploit opportunities, and the
ability to motivate people.

6. When dealing with security personnel, the adversary will work to create a familiar and non-threatening story and appearance to create a
feeling that he/she is on the side of the good guys.

Why do the officials manning the entrance to the facility believe the adversary and allow him/her to enter?

1. The usher, security screener, and/or security guard manning the entrance to the facility are first of all human beings with a personal
character that includes experiences, images, and familiar patterns kept in memory, a level of self-confidence and emotion that will be
expressed in any situation where they have to face another person and make a decision whether to believe or not believe him/her.

2. In general, most people tend to believe what they see, therefore if someone arrives dressed in a yellow vest and holding a walkie-talkie
or a ladder and says that he/she has come to provide service and fix something in the facility, then there is a high probability that he/she
will be allowed to enter without a security screening process.

3. As a general rule, a person with low self-confidence will find it difficult to stand in front of someone whom he/she considers important,
authoritative, determined, and with high self-confidence and therefore also in this/her case, with a high probability that he/she or she will
be allowed to enter without a security check process.

4. Most people come from a place of wanting to help and especially those who will ask for help and not be seen as threatening, so when the
adversary asks to “just” enter the bathroom or says that he/she really doesn’t feel well and asks if it is possible to “just” wash his/her face
and leave, it is likely that the person in charge at the entrance to the facility will believe him/her and allow him/her to enter.

5. As a general rule, a person in charge of entering a facility who has not undergone appropriate professional training and/or who does not
work based on a security concept, security portfolio, and procedures will have a very difficult time facing a skilled adversary mainly due to
the lack of knowledge and awareness of the dangers.

6. Lack of knowledge of the potential adversary, his/her way of thinking, and his/her ways of acting with an emphasis on trying to enter the
facility will cause the person in charge at the entrance not to think for a moment that the person standing in front of him/her is a person
impersonating someone else.

 Why does the employee inside the facility believe the adversary with the yellow vest and allow him/her to continue
his/her actions?

1. As a general rule, the employee assumes that anyone who has passed the security system at the entrance to the facility is fine and has
permission to move around inside the facility.

2. An employee without training and/or awareness of the capabilities of the potential adversary, will have a low chance of understanding that
the person standing in front of him/her is not innocent.

 What should be done to successfully face the adversary with the reflective vest?

1. Formulate a security concept that will form the basis for the formation of a security portfolio and security procedures for the facility that
will be defined as a uniform rule for implementing all security functions in the facility.

2. Make sure that the security procedures at the entrance to the facility define a security check process based on unique identification for
every person who wants to enter the facility – as a general rule, it is recommended not to allow the person in charge at the entrance to the
facility discretion to avoid a situation where the adversary manages to create a false representation and deceive.

3. To incorporate in the professional training of the various positions in the security system content that deals with the attacker’s mindset –
thinking, characteristics, and methods of action.

4. Hold with the officials at the entrance to the facility simulations simulating the actions of the potential adversary who will try to enter the
facility without inspection – you can use YouTube videos to learn about the adversary and for illustration purposes.

5. To raise the awareness of the employees in the facility about the presence of anomalous people in their work environment with the help of
professional training sessions, an awareness campaign, and more.

6. Carry out exercises for the security array and employees to check the level of knowledge and the level of quality of execution
Two Israeli YouTubers also decided to record themselves trying to enter public and security facilities – although on their part this is
considered a prank, a lot can be learned from the results:

In conclusion:
The potential adversary will use all his/her abilities to try and enter the facility without a security screening process being performed on him/her while identifying and exploiting the weaknesses among the various officials stationed at the entrance to the facility. Most of the failures of those in leadership roles when dealing with the impersonating adversary stem from a lack of professional knowledge that causes disbelief that the adversary can arrive dressed in a yellow vest or as a military officer or as a police officer or as a service provider of one kind or another. The way to teach the security array to deal with an impersonating adversary can be done and is relatively easy, so all that remains is to be aware of the threat and give it an appropriate response.

Remember, that security should be maintained also in combination with understanding the attacker’s mindset!

The assassination of Shinzo Abe in Japan – incident analysis

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On Friday, July 8, 2022, reports began to arrive from Japan of an assassination attempt on former Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe during a speech he/she delivered at an open election rally in the western city of Nara, near the Yamoto Saidaiji train station. Shortly afterward, videos begin to show up on the Internet that managed to document the moments of the assassination – one assassin, a 41-year-old Japanese citizen who served in the Japanese navy, with one improvised weapon, fired two bullets at a distance of about 5 meters at the back of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The second bullet struck and wounded Shinzo Abe at a fatal level. A short time after he/she was taken to hospital, former Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe died of his wounds.
Assessment regarding the motive of the assassin Tsuya Yamagami was that Yamagami believed that the former prime minister had a connection to the Unification Church, which is located in South Korea and is also active in Japan.
Close protection in general and the Japanese close protection unit in particular once again experienced failure in dealing with one adversary with one gun emerging behind the principal and succeeding in firing accurately before any of the close protection specialists in their sectors managed to prevent the attack, even though he/she was a former prime minister who continued to have close protection at events.

There is no doubt that the characteristics of the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Japan are reminiscent of the characteristics of the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 26 years ago.

Picture of the assassin with the improvised weapon (it appears to be an improvised weapon with ammunition of a shotgun, which is easy to obtain in Japan, or a muzzleloader, with gunpowder, standard or improvised and a suitable bullet):

Once again the obvious question is: how can a professional and skilled close protection unit fail to prevent injury to the principal?

The uniqueness of close protection:
History shows that most of the assassination attempts on personalities around the world were carried out by one or more adversaries, with a personal or political motive, who had the ability, daring, and courage who simply decided to try and succeed despite the presence of close protection specialists around the principal. In addition, factually, most of the adversaries succeeded in the assassination mission in incidents in which the close protection unit allowed the public to stand close to the principal without undergoing a security screening (such as in the attempted assassination of US President Ronald Reagan, the assassination attempt on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and more).
The object of security in close protection is a flesh and blood person who can be injured at various levels and even reach a state of death from which there is no way back therefore the price of error in close protection is several times higher than the price of error in other security fields.
The adversary in close protection acts out of a strong motive, learns about the level of security around the principal, decides on the course of action for the assassination, the date and place, and how far he/she is willing to go to succeed in harming and even killing the target – the principal.

The uniqueness in the field of close protection is the fact that the security of the principal is dynamic and that the close protection specialist can never know whether all the security operations they perform daily do indeed keep potential rivals away from the principal, and despite this, he/she must continue to maintain security daily anew looking after the next adversary. Every close protection unit in the world must believe that at some point a new adversary may arise who dares to confront the close protection specialists in an attempt to harm the principal in the way and means he/she or she decides while exploiting mistakes in the perception and security methodology and/or level and quality of security in the field that is presented by the security array.
In close protection, if the security array allows the adversary to reach the state of carrying out the attack, whether, by firearms or other means of attack, the chance of succeeding in preventing actual personal injury becomes low, and it does not depend on the array and any active action against the adversary will start with failure.
Picture of the moment of shooting at the principal:

The Japanese Personnel Security Unit has failed in its mission to secure its security object, former Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe, during its participation in an open election event – I sincerely hope that this unit will overcome the severe sense of failure and move towards a better future.

The belief among the security forces that an adversary can actually arrive who will try to assassinate a person with a means of killing, including a firearm:

It is possible that the strict law in Japan on the right to bear a firearm with a license influenced the working assumptions in the security concept of the local close protection unit to the point that the chance of an assassin coming with a firearm is very small to impossible. If such a working assumption exists, it undoubtedly affects the security method applied by the security array that performs the various tasks under the responsibility of the unit – the close protection specialist in the field is focused more on dealing with an adversary with any non-firearm, including a pistol.
In the same way, the crime situation in Japan, which is considered one of the lowest in the world, can also affect the working assumptions that will determine that the chance of an attempted assassination attempt in Japan tends to be zero.
Note: Japan is considered an unparalleled safe country, one where citizens and tourists can roam around without fear for their lives or property. One reason for this is the tough policy on firearms possession. Japanese law prohibits, almost universally, the possession of firearms. Under Japanese law, the possession of a firearm is generally allowed only by formal agencies, such as the police and defense forces. Another group that is allowed to possess weapons is the hunters, whose law allows them to issue a rifle license only.
Such a law could cause the potential adversary to find other ways to obtain weapons, including making improvised weapons as the assassin did in the assassination of Shinzo Abe.
Picture of the improvised weapon used by the assassin:

The data on the level of principal security at the event can be extracted from the photographed documentation:

The Japanese close protection unit secured the principal based on the security plan in an open-air event with an audience.
The program included a decision on the location of the principal at the event and the location of the audience.
The road does not appear to be closed to vehicular traffic during the incident – vehicles are seen traveling during the principal’s speech.
The security array included several rings – close protection specialists, close protection specialists in the perimeter area for the location of the principal and police officers.
The audience at the event is located at several points and a distance of several meters from the location of the principal.
Some of the close protection specialists appear to be armed with a pistol.
It seems that at least 2 close protection specialists have in their hands a mobile device to protect the principal against a bullet hit.
It is not clear whether a security check process was conducted for the audience at the incident.
It seems that the principal did not wear a protective vest.
The backspace for the principal seems to be closed to visits by crowds.
The assassinating adversary was photographed standing with a side bag in the crowd group placed at the back right for the location of the principal.
The adversary was recorded going down the road, advancing towards the principal as he/she took out the improvised weapon, straightened his arms, and fired two bullets from a distance of about 5 meters.
The assassin’s adversary appears to have fired the first bullet and then a second.
According to the principal’s reaction, it seems that the first bullet did not hit him/her and the second bullet did hit and knocked him/her to the ground injured.
Just before the shooting, it appears that the close protection specialist who was in the back area to the location of the principal noticed the assassinating adversary but did not take any effective counter-measures that managed to prevent him/her from firing at the principal.
It seems that the close protection specialists next to the principal did not take any active action to bring the principal to the ground after hearing the first bullet fire.
It seems that the close protection specialist who was holding the mobile device against bullets did not have time to use it fully and effectively.
After firing the two bullets, one of the close protection specialists is seen jumping on the assassinating adversary who at this point drops the improvised weapon to the floor.
No close protection specialist was seen pulling out a gun at any point when the shooting began.
Aerial photo of the location of the incident and the security plan:

The assassinated adversary as documented stands in the audience:

Documentation of the assassinating adversary shooting:


How to deal with an assassinating adversary during a security event in an open field event:

Secure the principal based on a dedicated security plan for the event that includes an analysis of the attacker’s viewpoint, a list of relevant threats, and a list of responses to the threats.
Demarcation of the event area and its closure for vehicle entry.
Determining the location of the principal at the event.
Determining the location of the audience at the event and demarcating it with a fence – at a distance that will allow the audience to see and hear the principal and will make it difficult for the audience to approach him/her without the security force noticing.
Carrying out a security inspection process for the public to locate weapons on the body and/or baggage.
Deployment of close protection specialists in security rings: close ring, peripheral ring, and close protection specialists in positions in front of the audience.
Deployment of auxiliary forces, and police, mainly in the crowd complexes and roadblocks.
Performing actions to locate the adversary in the prevention phase – while he/she is in the crowd.
Use of protective equipment against shooting damage, such as a protective vest for the principal, placement of a reinforced glass wall in the scope of the principal’s location in accordance with professional analysis, or placement of at least 2 close protection specialists to close the principal back and use a mobile device to absorb bullets.
Active protection action of the close protection specialist placed in the back area for the principal from the moment the adversary is identified pulls out the gun and straightens the hands into firing position.
Proper work of the circle close to the principal from the moment the first shooting noise is heard by putting the principal on the ground quickly.

In conclusion:
It is no coincidence that we see close protection units that have experienced a failure in a close protection mission, such as the American close protection unit and the Israeli close protection unit, which have since invested a lot of resources and effort in learning about their potential adversary and preventive plan. Looking at it from the side, the level of security performed by the above units may seem excessive and unreasonable but for those in charge of the principal security task this is the level required not to be caught again unprepared to face the assassinate quarrel, this is all in order not to experience it again.
My heart goes out to the Japanese close protection unit that yesterday experienced the biggest failure that can be experienced in the field of close protection and in the hope that they will learn from the lessons of failure to get better and become a better unit.

Remember, “security must be maintained” by constantly thinking about the adversary !!!


school’s security

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

I am sure that the massacre carried out in an elementary school in the town of ּUvalde in Texas in which 19 students and two teachers were killed in cold blood, deprives sleep in those in charge of security in the Israeli Ministry of Education who have no doubt already sat down to check whether or not what needs to be done to do so. There is no doubt that this is an extreme threat with an increasing probability of realization and has the highest level of damage severity when it comes to risk management.

The shocking massacres that occur again and again in the United States can help in a better understanding of the threat and its occurrence characteristics from the attacker’s perspective.

The 18-year-old killer who committed the massacre at the school moved into his grandmother’s home in the town of Uvalde last March. The killer had previously attended this elementary school and returned to it with the rifle he legally bought the day after his classmates graduated. Residents who knew him said he was teased because of his attire and because of his family’s difficult financial situation, and he was considered a failing and obscure student who eventually dropped out of school. The massacre began on Tuesday morning when the killer shot his grandmother in the face and seriously injured her, took her van, and drove to school, at 11:28 he left the van after getting off it while armed with a rifle and about 1000 rounds. He started moving on foot towards the school while shooting at civilians who were on his way (some wanted to help him because they thought he had been in a car accident), at 11:40 he entered the school without interruption, broke into one of the classrooms where innocent teachers and students were at the time, and simply started shooting them mercilessly and emotionlessly. The local police announced that the killer murdered the students and teachers very shortly after he broke into the classroom.

Around 1 p.m., a police team managed to shoot the killer and neutralize him. During the time between 11:40 and 13:00, some of the students managed to hide from the killer’s eyes, some were injured by the shooting and did everything to make the killer think they were dead and some lay down on their wounded friends to try and save them from death. Children aged 8-10 found themselves at the scene of a brutal murder while seeing their friends killed and injured.

Texas police reported that the school has a security plan that some of its principles were not implemented at the time the killer committed the massacre – a back door remained open and a security guard was not on duty.

What is the agency that guides the Israeli Ministry of Education regarding the security of educational institutions in Israel?

The Security Division of the Israel Police is the agency that guides the Israeli Ministry of Education on how to maintain security in educational institutions in Israel (kindergartens, schools, high schools, and so on). The guidelines include the physical and technological means, the physical security, the security method, and the method of supervision and control required to check that the application in the field complies with the guidelines.

Can such a massacre take place in a school in Israel? (Combination of Ami Popper and the Merkaz HaRav massacre?)

The working assumption of the Ministry of Education should be that a massacre of this kind can be carried out in a school in Israel (it is possible that this working assumption already exists). The massacre in the United States, and especially the massacre in Texas, must serve as a very powerful warning alarm, one that cannot and must not be ignored. It must not be mistaken to think that such a massacre in Israel cannot take place here. In Israel, as in the United States, and regardless of the policy of selling weapons to civilians, a former and disgruntled student may decide to return to school to take revenge for the murder of teachers and students. It must not be assumed that an Israeli person will not reach such an extreme situation.

Where is the threat of massacre on the list of relevant threats to schools?

Risk management includes two parameters for measuring the level of frustration – the likelihood of the threat being realized and the level of damage if it occurred.

The level of damage in the massacre of young and innocent young children is clear and unequivocal – it is a disaster at a national level that will undoubtedly cause great shock and immediate and many changes.

The likelihood of realization is given to different interpretations – although it is a threat that is defined as extreme and such that many will think and say that “where we are at such a massacre will not happen”, its likelihood of implementation exceeds any other massacre in the United States. The position of the threat in the list of relevant threats affects the level of response that will be given to deal with it.

What is the damage in a school massacre?

Our children are the most precious thing that exists for us in this world and cannot be compared to anything else precious that we have already achieved or that we strive to achieve. When children, especially young children, are injured or, G-d forbid, murdered in cold blood in a massacre perpetrated by a cruel killer (such as a former student), time will be stopped first for the benefit of the families but later for a deep account of everything related to school security in Israel. There will no doubt be a shock at the governmental level, one that will come directly from all citizens of the State of Israel and especially from those who have children in the many schools spread from the Dan area to Eilat.

Financial businesses invest very high sums to secure the money with the help of advanced technological means and skilled personnel – children are much more “expensive” than money !!

Companies invest millions to secure the information they have – children are much more “expensive” than the information !!

Museums invest capital to secure works of art – children are much more “expensive” than works of art !!

What actions must be taken in the immediate term?

Note: Everything I write on the subject is solely in my opinion that of course you can agree or disagree and in addition some may already have been implemented in practice.

  1. Classification of schools: A school should be defined as a secure facility – a unique asset to be protected. Since there are many schools of different types, it is important to perform a professional analysis that will ultimately determine what the classification of each school is. The classification is defined based on several fixed parameters whose level varies according to the data and characteristics of each school individually.
  2. Security package for each classification: Pre-determine a security package according to the level of classification determined for each school. A basic security package should be established for all schools and an extended security package for those that will be highly classified. In a situation where there is a danger of harm to students, I think that an elementary school is more sensitive than a high school, mainly because of the level of ability to react against a single attacker.
  3. Basic package for each school: Formulation of a security plan, demarcation of the school compound with a strong iron fence in shape and height that will make it difficult for a person to pass, placing security signs on the perimeter fence, entrance complex with a gate that can be closed and manned by an armed security guard, at each of the school’s buildings the main entrance and standard emergency doors must be defined, a security trustee will be defined who will undergo professional training to fulfill the role, guidance and practice of the teaching staff and students in the various threat scenarios.
  4. Extended security package: the basic package + placement of a minimum of 2 security guards, the proactive armament of teachers, placement of security doors at the entrance to each classroom, placement of cameras including warning cameras, distress buttons, doors connecting classrooms to allow passage in case of emergency.
  5. Central dispatching center: Establishing a security center that will have the ability to view cameras and the ability to control, monitor, provide oversight and respond in an emergency.
  6. Cooperation with rescue forces: Defining security cooperation with the various rescue forces and performing joint periodic exercises to practice and improve the level of response in the event of an emergency.


As mentioned, the massacre in Texas must serve as a powerful and noisy warning alarm that cannot be ignored and we can’t go on as usual. Decision-makers in the field of school security in Israel must hurry and make decisions that will examine the working assumptions related to the list of threats and that will succeed in giving a quick and reliable picture of the level of security in the various schools in Israel. Everything must be done so that children and teachers will not be massacred in an Israeli school.


Remember, security must also be maintained in schools in Israel and it is nice to have it in advance !!!