Forming a concept of deterrence in the security system

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.
Everybody creates deterrence to make someone else not dare to do what they think. The use of deterrence has become more and more common over the years and is found almost everywhere and in every field. If in the past only countries used deterrence against mainly enemy countries, today almost everyone creates some kind of deterrence towards someone else for various reasons – a store owner who deters against theft, government bodies who deter against failure to pay bills, lawyers who deter citizens with threatening letters, a neighbor in a residential building who creates a deterrent so that no one messes with him/her, the traffic police who creates a deterrent for drivers, etc. Everyone who produces and uses deterrence has the same goal – to make the other party not carry out his/her thoughts and/or do what he is told without resisting. Many security systems also use deterrence against potential adversaries, but do they produce it in the right way and in the right way so that you will really be able to influence the adversary? Throughout my years of work in the close protection unit, and especially after the failure to assassinate the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, I used and felt the power of deterrence against the surrounding environs and especially against the potential adversary, and today, after thirty years of accumulated professional experience, I believe more in the importance and power of deterrence and thinks that every security system must produce a cross-circuit deterrence based on a professional concept of deterrence and unique to the characteristics of the object of security. As someone who specializes in the field of seeing through the attacker’s viewpoint, I am sure that a security system that includes strong and effective deterrence succeeds in keeping many adversaries away, and in contrast, a security system that combines deterrence in an unprofessional manner or without deterrence In general, it signals to the adversary that it is possible to approach and even attack.

In order to begin formulating a concept of deterrence, it is necessary to answer the following questions: What is deterrence?
How is deterrence created?
How do we achieve efficiency and benefit against the adversary?
What is the likelihood that the adversary will refrain from carrying out his/her plan to strike as a result of the sword of deterrence?

“Deterrence” (Dictionary definition): A strategy designed to prevent an adversary from performing a certain action, by signaling that the reaction to the action will bring the adversary more harm than good. Deterrence is based on the means that are or are not available to the threatening party and its willingness to use them. A central element of the deterrence strategy is that the threat should be perceived as a credible threat in the eyes of the threatened party. Since the goal of deterrence is to influence the adversary’s decision-making processes, the threatener must know the adversary’s characteristics (seeing from the attacker’s viewpoint). One of the significant difficulties in the concept of deterrence is the existence of a difference between the perception of reality and the world of values of the threatening side and those of the adversary. As a general rule, if there is a difference between the world view of the parties, the more difficult it will be for the threatener to place an effective deterrent against the adversary.

How do you create a concept of deterrence in a security system?
Step 1: The understanding and recognition of the effectiveness of deterrence against the adversary and the need to allocate a budget and resources to create it in a professional and correct manner.

Step 2: Determining working assumptions that are based on and refer to the characteristics of the criminal and terroristic adversaries. For example, does the threat of punishment really deter the criminal adversary? Does the threat of capture and imprisonment really affect the terroristic adversary? Is the mere threat stronger than the punishment itself?

Step 3: The indication of the criminal and terror threat towards the security object taken from the risk survey carried out for the facility and based on a professional analysis in view of the attacker.

Step 4: Determining what deterrence will include at the level of principles.

How are the rings of deterrence made?
Step 1: Deterrence on the website of the object of security – if the object of security has a website, it is possible to incorporate content indicating that there is a professional and invested security system that knows how to deal with various threats, including publishing photos of security guards, security vehicles, measures and more.

Step 2: Deterrence in the outer space – analyzing the outer space defined as a threat zone to the security object in order to mark places that can be used by the adversary to organize and axes that can be used by him/her to approach and enter the facility, and all this to decide where to place deterrent signage, cameras, lighting, obstacles and more.

Step 3: Deterrence along the line of walls, which includes the main entrance complex and emergency exit doors – creating a clear security screening process in the main entrance complex, which includes an entry and exit route, directing signage, deterrent signage and more. Use of an access control system at secondary doors and emergency doors, placement of signage deterring unauthorized entry, placement of cameras, lighting, and more.

Step 4: Deterrence inside the facility – division into areas to which only authorized persons can enter, use of an access control system for these areas, deterrent signage, cameras, an alarm system, and more.

Step 5: Physical security force – placing security guards and security screeners at all the deterrence circles – external, the entrance complex and inside the facility, and all this in combination with an observing and dispatch center to create a quick response force in response to any unusual event.

Step 6: Active security: All those in positions in the security system should learn to be active during the shift – act to locate the adversary in all sectors, conduct questioning for anomalies, conduct external and internal patrols, and more.

Crossing stage – Visibility: The subject of visibility crosses all the deterrence circles in the object of security, starting with the visibility of the security force which begins with the clothing, the manner of standing and the style of speech and continues with the visibility of the entrance complex, the technological systems, the signage and more.

How do you achieve efficiency and benefit against the adversary?
There are two ways to examine the effectiveness and usefulness of deterrence against the adversary. One way is learning from real events – conducting an investigation and drawing conclusions and lessons for application after each event. A second way is to use an external force that simulates the adversary to carry out drills based on the sight of the attacker and also at the end of them an investigation will be carried out and conclusions and lessons to be applied will be drawn.

What is the likelihood that the adversary will avoid carrying out his/her plan to strike as a result of the sword of deterrence? The answer to this is clear and unequivocal – the sword of deterrence affects the adversary and provided it was created professionally and correctly and is not based on coincidences and local and unfounded initiatives. For example – will buying and placing a dummy crow on the balcony succeed in deterring pigeons from coming and standing?

 

Whoever performs the analysis of the attacker’s vision will learn that the adversary sees almost the entire security system and is able to immediately distinguish dummy measures or alternatively carry out actions to test the reliability of the measures, therefore, when it comes to dummy measures, one should use those that really look and are close to reality.

Summary:

Experience determines that deterrence is effective against the adversary and provided that it is formulated and done in a professional and correct manner, therefore every security system must formulate a professional deterrence concept and implement it into a practical implementation plan. Those who know how to create a deterrent with a threat that will be perceived by the adversary already – realization at the highest level, will succeed in keeping him/her away from the security object. There is an obligation to periodically examine the deterrence effect on the adversary in all circles and improve it according to the results. One must invest in creating deterrence in each circle, recognizing that each circle should make the adversary regret his/her desire to attack the security object.

 

Remember, that “security should be maintained” in combination with a professional deterrence concept!!!

The adversary with the yellow vest

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

A pair of YouTuber friends from the United States decided to document whether they manage to enter paid and/or secure sites, such as a movie theater and a museum while wearing a yellow vest and equipped with a walkie-talkie without being required to be screened and pay. The two wanted to prove that wearing a yellow vest allows free entry into almost any public site from a critical point of view and not as an adversary, even though in practice they look and behave according to his/her thinking and action characteristics.
Here is the video documenting the two entering public sites without difficulty just because they are wearing a yellow vest:

Why would an usher or security guard think that two guys wearing a yellow vest are not required to perform a security screening at the entrance to the facility and why would an employee inside the facility who meets them believe their appearance and story and allow them to continue doing their “job” without inspection and supervision?
Why does a person who wears a yellow vest or dressed as a service provider or a security official manage to easily enter public facilities such as a cinema or a museum and have difficulty reproducing the success in facilities that are considered more secure such as a train station, a government office, etc.?
The answers are found in the level of awareness of the security array regarding the subject of seeing things from the attacker’s viewpoint and the operative actions that we carry out as part of the list of what to do when dealing with the adversary:

The attacker’s viewpoint- what is the way of thinking and characteristics of the adversary’s behavior?

1. The adversary invests a lot of time in learning about the behavior of people who stay in the public space, and work in different and diverse
civilian and governmental workplaces, and work in security positions at different levels.

2. The adversary collects information and learns about people’s reactions in different routine situations and under stressful conditions and
even initiates the creation of situations to experiment and test whether the theory works in reality.

3. The adversary knows how to quickly identify who is standing in front of him/her and what story and manipulation will fit and work on
him/her with a high percentage of success.

4. The adversary is aware that most people like to identify with a story and help others, connect to emotion and act according to it, and in
addition act according to familiar patterns and images.

5. The adversary has high self-confidence, acting ability, the ability to impersonate, the ability to identify and exploit opportunities, and the
ability to motivate people.

6. When dealing with security personnel, the adversary will work to create a familiar and non-threatening story and appearance to create a
feeling that he/she is on the side of the good guys.

Why do the officials manning the entrance to the facility believe the adversary and allow him/her to enter?

1. The usher, security screener, and/or security guard manning the entrance to the facility are first of all human beings with a personal
character that includes experiences, images, and familiar patterns kept in memory, a level of self-confidence and emotion that will be
expressed in any situation where they have to face another person and make a decision whether to believe or not believe him/her.

2. In general, most people tend to believe what they see, therefore if someone arrives dressed in a yellow vest and holding a walkie-talkie
or a ladder and says that he/she has come to provide service and fix something in the facility, then there is a high probability that he/she
will be allowed to enter without a security screening process.

3. As a general rule, a person with low self-confidence will find it difficult to stand in front of someone whom he/she considers important,
authoritative, determined, and with high self-confidence and therefore also in this/her case, with a high probability that he/she or she will
be allowed to enter without a security check process.

4. Most people come from a place of wanting to help and especially those who will ask for help and not be seen as threatening, so when the
adversary asks to “just” enter the bathroom or says that he/she really doesn’t feel well and asks if it is possible to “just” wash his/her face
and leave, it is likely that the person in charge at the entrance to the facility will believe him/her and allow him/her to enter.

5. As a general rule, a person in charge of entering a facility who has not undergone appropriate professional training and/or who does not
work based on a security concept, security portfolio, and procedures will have a very difficult time facing a skilled adversary mainly due to
the lack of knowledge and awareness of the dangers.

6. Lack of knowledge of the potential adversary, his/her way of thinking, and his/her ways of acting with an emphasis on trying to enter the
facility will cause the person in charge at the entrance not to think for a moment that the person standing in front of him/her is a person
impersonating someone else.

 Why does the employee inside the facility believe the adversary with the yellow vest and allow him/her to continue
his/her actions?

1. As a general rule, the employee assumes that anyone who has passed the security system at the entrance to the facility is fine and has
permission to move around inside the facility.

2. An employee without training and/or awareness of the capabilities of the potential adversary, will have a low chance of understanding that
the person standing in front of him/her is not innocent.

 What should be done to successfully face the adversary with the reflective vest?

1. Formulate a security concept that will form the basis for the formation of a security portfolio and security procedures for the facility that
will be defined as a uniform rule for implementing all security functions in the facility.

2. Make sure that the security procedures at the entrance to the facility define a security check process based on unique identification for
every person who wants to enter the facility – as a general rule, it is recommended not to allow the person in charge at the entrance to the
facility discretion to avoid a situation where the adversary manages to create a false representation and deceive.

3. To incorporate in the professional training of the various positions in the security system content that deals with the attacker’s mindset –
thinking, characteristics, and methods of action.

4. Hold with the officials at the entrance to the facility simulations simulating the actions of the potential adversary who will try to enter the
facility without inspection – you can use YouTube videos to learn about the adversary and for illustration purposes.

5. To raise the awareness of the employees in the facility about the presence of anomalous people in their work environment with the help of
professional training sessions, an awareness campaign, and more.

6. Carry out exercises for the security array and employees to check the level of knowledge and the level of quality of execution
Two Israeli YouTubers also decided to record themselves trying to enter public and security facilities – although on their part this is
considered a prank, a lot can be learned from the results:

In conclusion:
The potential adversary will use all his/her abilities to try and enter the facility without a security screening process being performed on him/her while identifying and exploiting the weaknesses among the various officials stationed at the entrance to the facility. Most of the failures of those in leadership roles when dealing with the impersonating adversary stem from a lack of professional knowledge that causes disbelief that the adversary can arrive dressed in a yellow vest or as a military officer or as a police officer or as a service provider of one kind or another. The way to teach the security array to deal with an impersonating adversary can be done and is relatively easy, so all that remains is to be aware of the threat and give it an appropriate response.

Remember, that security should be maintained also in combination with understanding the attacker’s mindset!

The assassination of Shinzo Abe in Japan – incident analysis

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On Friday, July 8, 2022, reports began to arrive from Japan of an assassination attempt on former Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe during a speech he/she delivered at an open election rally in the western city of Nara, near the Yamoto Saidaiji train station. Shortly afterward, videos begin to show up on the Internet that managed to document the moments of the assassination – one assassin, a 41-year-old Japanese citizen who served in the Japanese navy, with one improvised weapon, fired two bullets at a distance of about 5 meters at the back of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The second bullet struck and wounded Shinzo Abe at a fatal level. A short time after he/she was taken to hospital, former Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe died of his wounds.
Assessment regarding the motive of the assassin Tsuya Yamagami was that Yamagami believed that the former prime minister had a connection to the Unification Church, which is located in South Korea and is also active in Japan.
Close protection in general and the Japanese close protection unit in particular once again experienced failure in dealing with one adversary with one gun emerging behind the principal and succeeding in firing accurately before any of the close protection specialists in their sectors managed to prevent the attack, even though he/she was a former prime minister who continued to have close protection at events.

There is no doubt that the characteristics of the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Japan are reminiscent of the characteristics of the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 26 years ago.

Picture of the assassin with the improvised weapon (it appears to be an improvised weapon with ammunition of a shotgun, which is easy to obtain in Japan, or a muzzleloader, with gunpowder, standard or improvised and a suitable bullet):

Once again the obvious question is: how can a professional and skilled close protection unit fail to prevent injury to the principal?

The uniqueness of close protection:
History shows that most of the assassination attempts on personalities around the world were carried out by one or more adversaries, with a personal or political motive, who had the ability, daring, and courage who simply decided to try and succeed despite the presence of close protection specialists around the principal. In addition, factually, most of the adversaries succeeded in the assassination mission in incidents in which the close protection unit allowed the public to stand close to the principal without undergoing a security screening (such as in the attempted assassination of US President Ronald Reagan, the assassination attempt on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and more).
The object of security in close protection is a flesh and blood person who can be injured at various levels and even reach a state of death from which there is no way back therefore the price of error in close protection is several times higher than the price of error in other security fields.
The adversary in close protection acts out of a strong motive, learns about the level of security around the principal, decides on the course of action for the assassination, the date and place, and how far he/she is willing to go to succeed in harming and even killing the target – the principal.

The uniqueness in the field of close protection is the fact that the security of the principal is dynamic and that the close protection specialist can never know whether all the security operations they perform daily do indeed keep potential rivals away from the principal, and despite this, he/she must continue to maintain security daily anew looking after the next adversary. Every close protection unit in the world must believe that at some point a new adversary may arise who dares to confront the close protection specialists in an attempt to harm the principal in the way and means he/she or she decides while exploiting mistakes in the perception and security methodology and/or level and quality of security in the field that is presented by the security array.
In close protection, if the security array allows the adversary to reach the state of carrying out the attack, whether, by firearms or other means of attack, the chance of succeeding in preventing actual personal injury becomes low, and it does not depend on the array and any active action against the adversary will start with failure.
Picture of the moment of shooting at the principal:

The Japanese Personnel Security Unit has failed in its mission to secure its security object, former Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe, during its participation in an open election event – I sincerely hope that this unit will overcome the severe sense of failure and move towards a better future.

The belief among the security forces that an adversary can actually arrive who will try to assassinate a person with a means of killing, including a firearm:

It is possible that the strict law in Japan on the right to bear a firearm with a license influenced the working assumptions in the security concept of the local close protection unit to the point that the chance of an assassin coming with a firearm is very small to impossible. If such a working assumption exists, it undoubtedly affects the security method applied by the security array that performs the various tasks under the responsibility of the unit – the close protection specialist in the field is focused more on dealing with an adversary with any non-firearm, including a pistol.
In the same way, the crime situation in Japan, which is considered one of the lowest in the world, can also affect the working assumptions that will determine that the chance of an attempted assassination attempt in Japan tends to be zero.
Note: Japan is considered an unparalleled safe country, one where citizens and tourists can roam around without fear for their lives or property. One reason for this is the tough policy on firearms possession. Japanese law prohibits, almost universally, the possession of firearms. Under Japanese law, the possession of a firearm is generally allowed only by formal agencies, such as the police and defense forces. Another group that is allowed to possess weapons is the hunters, whose law allows them to issue a rifle license only.
Such a law could cause the potential adversary to find other ways to obtain weapons, including making improvised weapons as the assassin did in the assassination of Shinzo Abe.
Picture of the improvised weapon used by the assassin:


The data on the level of principal security at the event can be extracted from the photographed documentation:

The Japanese close protection unit secured the principal based on the security plan in an open-air event with an audience.
The program included a decision on the location of the principal at the event and the location of the audience.
The road does not appear to be closed to vehicular traffic during the incident – vehicles are seen traveling during the principal’s speech.
The security array included several rings – close protection specialists, close protection specialists in the perimeter area for the location of the principal and police officers.
The audience at the event is located at several points and a distance of several meters from the location of the principal.
Some of the close protection specialists appear to be armed with a pistol.
It seems that at least 2 close protection specialists have in their hands a mobile device to protect the principal against a bullet hit.
It is not clear whether a security check process was conducted for the audience at the incident.
It seems that the principal did not wear a protective vest.
The backspace for the principal seems to be closed to visits by crowds.
The assassinating adversary was photographed standing with a side bag in the crowd group placed at the back right for the location of the principal.
The adversary was recorded going down the road, advancing towards the principal as he/she took out the improvised weapon, straightened his arms, and fired two bullets from a distance of about 5 meters.
The assassin’s adversary appears to have fired the first bullet and then a second.
According to the principal’s reaction, it seems that the first bullet did not hit him/her and the second bullet did hit and knocked him/her to the ground injured.
Just before the shooting, it appears that the close protection specialist who was in the back area to the location of the principal noticed the assassinating adversary but did not take any effective counter-measures that managed to prevent him/her from firing at the principal.
It seems that the close protection specialists next to the principal did not take any active action to bring the principal to the ground after hearing the first bullet fire.
It seems that the close protection specialist who was holding the mobile device against bullets did not have time to use it fully and effectively.
After firing the two bullets, one of the close protection specialists is seen jumping on the assassinating adversary who at this point drops the improvised weapon to the floor.
No close protection specialist was seen pulling out a gun at any point when the shooting began.
Aerial photo of the location of the incident and the security plan:


The assassinated adversary as documented stands in the audience:


Documentation of the assassinating adversary shooting:

 

How to deal with an assassinating adversary during a security event in an open field event:

Secure the principal based on a dedicated security plan for the event that includes an analysis of the attacker’s viewpoint, a list of relevant threats, and a list of responses to the threats.
Demarcation of the event area and its closure for vehicle entry.
Determining the location of the principal at the event.
Determining the location of the audience at the event and demarcating it with a fence – at a distance that will allow the audience to see and hear the principal and will make it difficult for the audience to approach him/her without the security force noticing.
Carrying out a security inspection process for the public to locate weapons on the body and/or baggage.
Deployment of close protection specialists in security rings: close ring, peripheral ring, and close protection specialists in positions in front of the audience.
Deployment of auxiliary forces, and police, mainly in the crowd complexes and roadblocks.
Performing actions to locate the adversary in the prevention phase – while he/she is in the crowd.
Use of protective equipment against shooting damage, such as a protective vest for the principal, placement of a reinforced glass wall in the scope of the principal’s location in accordance with professional analysis, or placement of at least 2 close protection specialists to close the principal back and use a mobile device to absorb bullets.
Active protection action of the close protection specialist placed in the back area for the principal from the moment the adversary is identified pulls out the gun and straightens the hands into firing position.
Proper work of the circle close to the principal from the moment the first shooting noise is heard by putting the principal on the ground quickly.

In conclusion:
It is no coincidence that we see close protection units that have experienced a failure in a close protection mission, such as the American close protection unit and the Israeli close protection unit, which have since invested a lot of resources and effort in learning about their potential adversary and preventive plan. Looking at it from the side, the level of security performed by the above units may seem excessive and unreasonable but for those in charge of the principal security task this is the level required not to be caught again unprepared to face the assassinate quarrel, this is all in order not to experience it again.
My heart goes out to the Japanese close protection unit that yesterday experienced the biggest failure that can be experienced in the field of close protection and in the hope that they will learn from the lessons of failure to get better and become a better unit.

Remember, “security must be maintained” by constantly thinking about the adversary !!!

 

school’s security

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

I am sure that the massacre carried out in an elementary school in the town of ּUvalde in Texas in which 19 students and two teachers were killed in cold blood, deprives sleep in those in charge of security in the Israeli Ministry of Education who have no doubt already sat down to check whether or not what needs to be done to do so. There is no doubt that this is an extreme threat with an increasing probability of realization and has the highest level of damage severity when it comes to risk management.

The shocking massacres that occur again and again in the United States can help in a better understanding of the threat and its occurrence characteristics from the attacker’s perspective.

The 18-year-old killer who committed the massacre at the school moved into his grandmother’s home in the town of Uvalde last March. The killer had previously attended this elementary school and returned to it with the rifle he legally bought the day after his classmates graduated. Residents who knew him said he was teased because of his attire and because of his family’s difficult financial situation, and he was considered a failing and obscure student who eventually dropped out of school. The massacre began on Tuesday morning when the killer shot his grandmother in the face and seriously injured her, took her van, and drove to school, at 11:28 he left the van after getting off it while armed with a rifle and about 1000 rounds. He started moving on foot towards the school while shooting at civilians who were on his way (some wanted to help him because they thought he had been in a car accident), at 11:40 he entered the school without interruption, broke into one of the classrooms where innocent teachers and students were at the time, and simply started shooting them mercilessly and emotionlessly. The local police announced that the killer murdered the students and teachers very shortly after he broke into the classroom.

Around 1 p.m., a police team managed to shoot the killer and neutralize him. During the time between 11:40 and 13:00, some of the students managed to hide from the killer’s eyes, some were injured by the shooting and did everything to make the killer think they were dead and some lay down on their wounded friends to try and save them from death. Children aged 8-10 found themselves at the scene of a brutal murder while seeing their friends killed and injured.

Texas police reported that the school has a security plan that some of its principles were not implemented at the time the killer committed the massacre – a back door remained open and a security guard was not on duty.

What is the agency that guides the Israeli Ministry of Education regarding the security of educational institutions in Israel?

The Security Division of the Israel Police is the agency that guides the Israeli Ministry of Education on how to maintain security in educational institutions in Israel (kindergartens, schools, high schools, and so on). The guidelines include the physical and technological means, the physical security, the security method, and the method of supervision and control required to check that the application in the field complies with the guidelines.

Can such a massacre take place in a school in Israel? (Combination of Ami Popper and the Merkaz HaRav massacre?)

The working assumption of the Ministry of Education should be that a massacre of this kind can be carried out in a school in Israel (it is possible that this working assumption already exists). The massacre in the United States, and especially the massacre in Texas, must serve as a very powerful warning alarm, one that cannot and must not be ignored. It must not be mistaken to think that such a massacre in Israel cannot take place here. In Israel, as in the United States, and regardless of the policy of selling weapons to civilians, a former and disgruntled student may decide to return to school to take revenge for the murder of teachers and students. It must not be assumed that an Israeli person will not reach such an extreme situation.

Where is the threat of massacre on the list of relevant threats to schools?

Risk management includes two parameters for measuring the level of frustration – the likelihood of the threat being realized and the level of damage if it occurred.

The level of damage in the massacre of young and innocent young children is clear and unequivocal – it is a disaster at a national level that will undoubtedly cause great shock and immediate and many changes.

The likelihood of realization is given to different interpretations – although it is a threat that is defined as extreme and such that many will think and say that “where we are at such a massacre will not happen”, its likelihood of implementation exceeds any other massacre in the United States. The position of the threat in the list of relevant threats affects the level of response that will be given to deal with it.

What is the damage in a school massacre?

Our children are the most precious thing that exists for us in this world and cannot be compared to anything else precious that we have already achieved or that we strive to achieve. When children, especially young children, are injured or, G-d forbid, murdered in cold blood in a massacre perpetrated by a cruel killer (such as a former student), time will be stopped first for the benefit of the families but later for a deep account of everything related to school security in Israel. There will no doubt be a shock at the governmental level, one that will come directly from all citizens of the State of Israel and especially from those who have children in the many schools spread from the Dan area to Eilat.

Financial businesses invest very high sums to secure the money with the help of advanced technological means and skilled personnel – children are much more “expensive” than money !!

Companies invest millions to secure the information they have – children are much more “expensive” than the information !!

Museums invest capital to secure works of art – children are much more “expensive” than works of art !!

What actions must be taken in the immediate term?

Note: Everything I write on the subject is solely in my opinion that of course you can agree or disagree and in addition some may already have been implemented in practice.

  1. Classification of schools: A school should be defined as a secure facility – a unique asset to be protected. Since there are many schools of different types, it is important to perform a professional analysis that will ultimately determine what the classification of each school is. The classification is defined based on several fixed parameters whose level varies according to the data and characteristics of each school individually.
  2. Security package for each classification: Pre-determine a security package according to the level of classification determined for each school. A basic security package should be established for all schools and an extended security package for those that will be highly classified. In a situation where there is a danger of harm to students, I think that an elementary school is more sensitive than a high school, mainly because of the level of ability to react against a single attacker.
  3. Basic package for each school: Formulation of a security plan, demarcation of the school compound with a strong iron fence in shape and height that will make it difficult for a person to pass, placing security signs on the perimeter fence, entrance complex with a gate that can be closed and manned by an armed security guard, at each of the school’s buildings the main entrance and standard emergency doors must be defined, a security trustee will be defined who will undergo professional training to fulfill the role, guidance and practice of the teaching staff and students in the various threat scenarios.
  4. Extended security package: the basic package + placement of a minimum of 2 security guards, the proactive armament of teachers, placement of security doors at the entrance to each classroom, placement of cameras including warning cameras, distress buttons, doors connecting classrooms to allow passage in case of emergency.
  5. Central dispatching center: Establishing a security center that will have the ability to view cameras and the ability to control, monitor, provide oversight and respond in an emergency.
  6. Cooperation with rescue forces: Defining security cooperation with the various rescue forces and performing joint periodic exercises to practice and improve the level of response in the event of an emergency.

 

As mentioned, the massacre in Texas must serve as a powerful and noisy warning alarm that cannot be ignored and we can’t go on as usual. Decision-makers in the field of school security in Israel must hurry and make decisions that will examine the working assumptions related to the list of threats and that will succeed in giving a quick and reliable picture of the level of security in the various schools in Israel. Everything must be done so that children and teachers will not be massacred in an Israeli school.

 

Remember, security must also be maintained in schools in Israel and it is nice to have it in advance !!!

 

Close protection during wartime

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

The war between Russia and Ukraine reminded the whole world how large the circle of consequences and influence is and goes beyond the borders of the countries and regions involved in the war. Two countries are in a state of direct fighting that affects the routine of life in large parts of the world and forces heads of states such as the United States, China, and Europe to intervene by choosing sides and making decisions, including taking unusual actions such as imposing sanctions, transferring weapons and receiving refugees.
War puts many protected leaders at the forefront and in a new situation that can make them a target for assassination by elements who disagree with the decisions they have made and in the case of Russia and Ukraine, the president of the attacked country suddenly becomes a target for assassination by the attacking state. The local and global political change directly affects all the close protection units that secure the heads of state involved in the war. There is no doubt that the conduct of the war affects the agenda of a head of state, president, or prime minister, who is required to be focused on the conduct of the war, the strategy he or she chooses, and the consequences, so it is likely that most of the activities he or she would have done regularly are replaced with a long stay at a permanent facility and/or at a facility that is a hiding place.
War produces new potential assassins, individuals or an organization or state, who will act to assassinate a secure head of state out of a motive that stems from and is related to war. In terms of possible threats against a secure head of state, war expands the circle of potential assassins because it adds officials who work in the professional staff of the secured head of state and stay within his or her immediate vicinity for a long time and are even defined in terms of security as preferred (those who should not be screened).
Can a period of war cause such a functionary to decide to try and assassinate the secure head of state while taking advantage of being preferred? Does this complex question also apply to a close protection specialist working in a close protection unit and belonging to the security team of the secured head of state?
In 2016, a Turkish policeman from the close protection unit of the local police in Ankara set out on a mission to secure the Russian ambassador to Turkey and following Russia’s policy in Syria decided to assassinate the ambassador during the inauguration of an art gallery.
The assassination was recorded on cameras:
There have been times in history when assassination attempts by a functionary working in his or her immediate area were considered common – during World War II it was reported that Adolf Hitler survived dozens of assassination attempts some of which were almost successful, yet the crossing of lines by a close protection specialist in 2016 is defined as a constitutive event in the world of close protection and there is no doubt that close protection units to re-examine their work assumptions related to the internal threat and the threat from home and especially in sensitive periods like wartime.

And now history repeats itself and in the Russian-Ukrainian war, the latter report that since the beginning of the war, President Zelensky has fully survived no less than 12 assassination attempts that were likely carried out in various ways by elements related to Russia. I hope that in the not too distant future details will be revealed about the attempts to assassinate Zelensky and the world media reports on a phenomenon that people who are close to the Russian president, such as ministers and oligarchs, are resigning and daring to speak out against the president’s decisions before the war.
These two cases of Hitler in World War II and of Zelensky in the war with Russia in 2022, reinforce the assumption that during the war the threat to heads of the state increases significantly and requires close protection units to take unique actions and changes to successfully provide a professional and effective response against it.
Based on media reports, the realization of the threat against a secure head of state, such as Ukrainian President Zelensky, is carried out by special units and/or skilled mercenaries sent and hired by the Russian attacking state that aims to capture and even harm the president thus challenging the Ukrainian close protection unit that needs to know how to respond and deal with special forces and skilled fighters.
Today, every close protection unit must be ready for war and must therefore perform the following actions:

1. Add to the working assumptions that in sensitive periods, such as a time of war, a functionary from the immediate vicinity of the secure head of state can become a potential assassin.

2. Be involved with the relevant governmental agencies in all matters of preparation and maintenance of emergency facilities – adapting the facilities to the security of the head of state during his or her stay in the facility in terms of infrastructure, technological means, creating security rings, security posts, etc.

3. Immediate reduction of the staff working and staying in the immediate vicinity of the secure head of state and operating compartmentalization in everything related to the schedules, movements, and location of the head of state.

4. Adjust and change the circle of persons who are screened with an emphasis on canceling the list of preferred persons and checking all the officials who must be in the vicinity of the secure head of state.

5. Make the close protection specialists infantry in every way, in appearance and the ability to carry and use long firearms – a unit like the Israeli close protection unit has an advantage in this matter because the professional training it provides to security guards includes combat capabilities in military characteristics.

6. Have the ability to secure the head of state in wartime activities, which also include constant movement and urgent and immediate location changes, and a professional deception plan.

7. Technological means including encrypted portable communications devices that are appropriate for arduous work and can be operated without any other factors.

8. Know how to cooperate with military units that with their help, an external combative security circle can be formed.

Remember that security must be maintained even in wartime conditions!

Dealing with an extreme event

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Every day of remembrance for those who perished in an extreme event, such as those who perished in the attack on the Twin Towers in New York, and every contemporary event such as the cyber-attack on Hillel Yaffe Hospital, should remind every organization’s manager how dangerous a routine is and reinvigorate with him their duty to engage in risk management including supervision and control over their level of readiness and that of everyone under them. And yet, anyone with their head in place and their feet on the ground knows that no event can be predicted and that even an organization prepared for extreme events can encounter a “black swan.”

What is an extreme event?

It is an unusual event whose chances of occurrence are estimated to be very low, but once it has occurred, its impact on the organization/system is far-reaching – a small chance of occurrence and a large impact. This is not another event. The consequences of an extreme event are usually in a negative context and are defined as a “disruptive” event – undermining the existing order. The trigger for an extreme event can be external (political, economic, natural forces) and can be internal (employee). In the light of the attacker’s viewpoint, the organization must be prepared for the wrath of the business opponent, the wrath of nature, the wrath of the political opponent, and the wrath of the opponent from within.

What is a “black swan”?

An event that is happening for the first time, on a global level, highlights the uncertainty and our inability as humans, to assess in advance the likelihood of its occurrence and the extent of its impact. The attack on the Twin Towers was defined as a “black swan” even though the FBI’s report had early information on some of the threats that did not become a real threat.

Working assumptions:

While it is not possible to guarantee a solution to every risk, it is possible to prepare an organization better for changing situations and extreme emergencies.

An extreme event occurs for certain reasons and therefore strict adherence to a permanent risk management process will increase the chance of predicting and reducing the damage.

Risk Management:

A professional field that every manager must engage in to examine in depth all the risks relevant to the organization as part of a long-term managerial concept and to enable the organization to meet goals and objectives without interruption. Managers can decide to carry out the risk management by themselves or entrust the task to a professional official inside or outside the organization. Risk management produces a snapshot based on factual data, past events, and an assessment whose outcome determines the likelihood of the risk being realized and the extent of its damage to the organization.

 

What is defined as a routine event and what is defined as an extreme event / “black swan”?

In 2001, no one seemed to know or could not believe that a terrorist organization would use civilian planes in ramming attacks as with the Twin Towers in the New York United States, so at the time it was a “black swan” – since it can no longer be defined as such, so now it must be discussed as a risk that could occur again.

In 2021, a cyber-attack, as it occurred at Hillel Yaffe Hospital this week, is defined and is already considered a routine event that can take place in any organization that works with and depends on computer systems. Factually and without knowing how the hackers managed to break into the hospital’s computer systems, it is clear that in the defensive rings used there was an identifiable weakness through which the hackers attacked – in providing explanations, it could not be argued that this was an extreme incident or a “black swan”.

In 2021, an injury to a public official as occurred yesterday, Friday 15 October, against a British MP during his participation in an event at the church, is not considered an extreme event and certainly not a “black swan” and is therefore defined as a routine event taken into account as part of the state’s risk management. They will re-analyze the risk to determine whether the extent of the damage to the country requires a change in the close protection policy.

Is the use of drones against ships in 2021 considered an extreme event / “black swan”?
The answer lies in World War II where the Japanese sent pilots who exploded on enemy ships (kamikazes) – in the eyes of the attacker, this is not a surprise and therefore this risk must be discussed in the risk management process.

Why should organizational managers be concerned in protect themselves from risks?

Every organization manager must carry out a professional and orderly risk management process with the help of which he or she will make decisions for implementation – based on cooperation with security organizations, examination of past events in Israel and around the world, and more. As part of the process, the manager will determine the organization’s protective objectives, and goals such as critical infrastructure, assets, information, etc., the violation of which will interrupt the continuity of the organization’s functioning and/or threaten its continued existence.

This is done through the following:
Establishment of control and monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of decisions – drawing lessons and implementing them as part of the organizational culture.

Establishment of a professional mechanism that will regularly examine whether there are recognizable indicators that indicate that an extreme event is approaching.

Appointment of managers who are known for not being able to immediately agree to any decision or action and are brave enough to express an opinion that is contrary to the majority opinion and certainly to the opinion of the organization’s manager.

Activating a factor is defined as an “external eye” for the organization that will perform objective control, including activating a professional “red team” that will examine the organization’s readiness for all relevant risks.

The role of the security manager in the risk management process:

The security manager in the organization is a partner in formulating the security concept, which also includes a risk management process, and is responsible for implementing the security plan. A smart manager will integrate the organization’s UAV into the full risk management process in the organization and use his or her professional knowledge, experience, and ability – which requires the security manager to take care of meeting the professional expectations from him or her in the field of risk management.

In conclusion:

Factually, most of the events that can pose a risk to an organization can be predicted and effective actions can be taken to prevent them or minimize the damage that results from them. Risk management requires consistency and perseverance over time in constructing scenarios. The organization must appoint an entity that will challenge patterns and assumptions and work to define circumstances that will cause significant systemic failure.

 

Remember, managing an organization requires performing a professional risk management process!!!

A peek at the Red Team – the elite unit for preventing the hostile takeover of IDF bases

They are only eight reservists, with a rich background in security, with one goal in mind: to train the IDF’s bases in Israel to defend against attempts to infiltrate them • Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Miky Weinberg, the team commander and one of its founders: “Our goal is to train the soldiers, from the gate guard to the base commander for an extreme event.

The operators raided at dawn, quietly approaching the military base quietly, silently, they quickly set up a ladder and within a moment they were inside. Now almost nothing can stop them from harming soldiers, gathering critical intelligence, or stealing sophisticated weapons. Luckily, this time it was the Red Team’s operators, a special unit whose entire purpose is to examine whether it is possible to infiltrate an IDF military base. Next time, the infiltrators may be enemy forces.

A few weeks ago, the Red Team operators carried out a large-scale exercise at an IDF base in the north. Although this is an exercise that is carried out throughout the State of Israel, the context cannot be ignored – in a future conflict, Hezbollah plans to occupy settlements so that taking over a military base can be a great achievement for it. In addition, attempts have been made in the past to infiltrate bases in the past in this region.

 

The Red Team is unique and special in the IDF. There are only about eight reservists, veterans of special forces, and combat units with a background in security. including those who held senior positions in the Close Protection Unit and the Operations Unit in the Israel Security Agency. The goal is one – to teach and train the various bases in Israel to protect themselves in the best way possible. In recent years, the team has been responsible for the security of the soldiers and a variety of bases in the IDF, which are dispersed throughout the State of Israel.

To infiltrate the bases, the Red Team uses methods of forgery, fraudulent manipulation, physical intrusion, and tactical combat – all in full coordination with the bases’ commanders. This is especially critical these days, against the background of the burglary of a Bedouin car thief into a base in southern Israel at the beginning of the year, along with attempts to steal ammunition from many bases. The IDF understands the problem and therefore sets up the base defense system, to dramatically improve the bases through infrastructure and advanced means, protection of bunkers and weapons, extensive investment in technologies, and hundreds of audits of the bases.

“Boutique Ability”

The idea to set up the company was fleshed out about a decade ago by three people including Lt. Col. (Res.) Miky Weinberg, who serves as the company commander. The three veteran security and professionals realized that they could, as reservists, contribute to the IDF in the field of base defense, as they do in civilian life. Weinberg served for about 20 years as a close protection specialist for several prime ministers (Shamir, Rabin, Peres, and Netanyahu) and currently, he owns a private security company. As a result, he has vast experience in this field.

“In the past, we would come, do an exercise, leave lessons learned and move on,” Weinberg explains.

‘’In the past two years, we work under the IDF’s operational department, which allows us to provide a package of products to the base. We know how to take a base, identify the gaps and build a real plan that can be spread over half a year. We examine the entire field of combat, from the attacker’s viewpoint, accompanying the base from the base commander, through the defense officer to the last of the soldiers. At the end also comes the assault exercise, which is the icing on the cake. Our goal is to improve every base we visit.

“Our ability is a boutique ability. We do not audit a base, but come to it and bring it to a much better place. We do not come to audit but to improve, to build a response for each unit. The understanding in the IDF is that an event could happen again, in some way or another, and our goal is to train the soldiers – from the gate guard to the base commander – for an extreme event”.

“It’s not showmanship’’

The head of the security division in the operations division explains that the ability provided by the Red Team is critical and that its goal is to complete the range of operations the IDF has carried out at bases in recent years. “We are conducting a very significant campaign to improve the security of the IDF bases, and the team is providing the units with tools in preparation for the defense of the base,” he says.

“They come to the unit, accompany it for weeks and prepare it for an exercise to raise the level of security. Afterward, they perform the exercise which involves the use of various means – including dummy weapons, smoke grenades, and more – to show soldiers how such a scenario would be carried out. Sometimes we use editorial effects to reflect the nature of the exercise, in the video we provide them. They must understand the threat. It is not a matter of showmanship but of giving them the tools in the most authentic way possible.

“The team reaches all units in the IDF, including classified units. All IDF entities are trained by us, with of course more strategic and meaningful bases receiving visits more frequently. I have been in the security field since 2005, and I do not remember an investment like there has been in recent times in securing bases. We are in a much safer place than we were.

“We are constantly on the pulse, to make sure there is no need to align one line or another. Our job is to be vigilant all the time, with the hand on the pulse, and to see that we do not fall asleep on guard – literally. We understand the threats, deal with them and examine them. “All the time. Our job is to make sure that people are prepared for such an incident”.

“A man of closing circles”

One of the operators in the unit is Sergeant Major Yair Oanunu, who serves as a team mentor in addition to his expertise in the field of the opposing forces’ mindset and as a security consultant. He came to the security world through tragic circumstances. As an ultra-Orthodox youth who grew up in Jerusalem during the years of the second intifada, he experienced firsthand two serious suicide bombings that led him to the understanding that he must prevent such incidents.

At the end of his military service, he began working as a security guard on buses in Jerusalem, during a particularly threatening period in which they were a target for suicide bombers. After that, he worked in the world of security engineering, at Ben Gurion Airport’s covert security array, close protection, and so on.

“The idea of ​​the Red Team is to bring the attacker’s viewpoint and how to defend against it. I educate the base’s personnel on how to act against an attacker. I am a person of closing circles, perhaps because of past traumas, and I want to make the necessary corrections. We discovered that the IDF has points that need to be improved in the field of base defense, and now we have the opportunity to correct them. That is our job”.

The murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane 1990 – Chronicle of an assassin

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On November 5, 1990, Rabbi Meir Kahane addressed Orthodox Jews at the Marriott hotel in New York in an attempt to persuade them to make aliyah (immigrate) to Israel. After the speech, shortly after 9:00 PM, as the crowd gathered around Kahane, the assassin El Sayyid Nosair, dressed as an ultra-Orthodox Jew, emerged and shot one bullet into Kahane’s neck, killing him. During his escape from the courtroom, El Sayyid Nosair was wounded by a police officer. El Sayyid Nosair survived the injury, survived the charges for the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane, and was eventually charged with possession of a weapon and shooting at civilians and a police officer.

Was El Sayyid Nosair born a murderer?

El Sayyid Nosair was born in Port Said, Egypt, where he became an engineer and worked in this field. In 1981 he emigrated to the United States, and in 1989 became an American citizen, married, and had three children (one of them is Zak Ebrahim). Nosair lived in New Jersey and worked various jobs in New Jersey and New York. Among other things, Nosair was employed by New York City to repair air conditioners in the city’s criminal court. It seems that El Sayyid Nosair managed to fit well into the wheel of life in the United States and together with his family created a good and comfortable routine.

Ebrahim remembers his father as a loving father with an excellent sense of humor, who did not quarrel with his wife and was only interested in raising his children to be good people. In his adulthood, Ebrahim was asked what had changed in his father and when did this happen? This was his response: “When I was 6, something started to happen to my father. He became depressed, stayed at home a lot, and would read the Koran quietly. My father started going to the mosque regularly. One of the preachers in the mosque especially captured my father’s heart: Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (one of the founders and thinkers of the ideology of Sunni international Islamic terrorism in the twentieth century, and a senior member of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization.) My father met Abdullah Azzam at the mosque and returned enthusiastically. He and his friends from the mosque went out to the camps to practice survival skills and hand-to-hand combat. They also practiced shooting. He also started taking me to the mosque to listen to the inciting sermons of the “blind sheikh” – Omar Abdul-Rahman, the spiritual father of many terror organizations and close to bin Laden. The religious preaching of the blind sheikh did not exactly focus on honoring parents or the importance of prayer. My father took me with him to hear the blind sheikh many times. I did not understand enough Arabic to grasp more than a few words, but the cruelty that emerged from his person made me shiver. My father got closer to the blind sheikh and became his driver and bodyguard. The breaking point came when my father told my mother that he no longer wanted to support jihad from afar. He aspires to go to Afghanistan and take up arms. My mother was horrified. In the end, my father did not go. In 1989, someone tried to eliminate Azzam with an explosive device. The charge did not explode. In November of that year, Azzam was traveling with his two sons in a jeep on his way to Friday prayers when the killer remotely detonated an explosive device planted on the way. All three were killed. My mother described the news of Azzam’s death as the moment she lost my father once and for all. As a fundamentalist who believed that he was a living instrument for expressing the wrath of Allah, my father was looking for potential targets, and such were not lacking. Soon, my father discovered what his real call was: to murder Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Ebrahim’s description explains in an extraordinary way how a person born into a normative home becomes an extremist and a murderer in adulthood:

El Sayyid Nosair’s decision to leave his nation-state, Egypt, and emigrate to the United States to create a better life for himself, undoubtedly became the first reason he became extremist mainly because of the many differences between Egypt and the United States – Nosair expressed disgust with American culture.

There is a great chance that a person who lives in a place that does not match the education, culture, and religion he received at his parents’ home and in his nation-state, will look for a place that will remind him of this – this place is the mosque that El Sayyid Nosair started going to. In addition, he will look for another person, a leader, who will be able to follow him, who will show him the light, who will give him new hope – extremist religious preachers, like the blind sheikh and Azzam, are these same leaders, leaders who work and know-how to locate in the mosque “weak” people who are looking for themselves, who are looking for the right way for them in order to make them “disciplined” soldiers who will work for them – El Sayyid Nosair is from exactly the right group of people.

Why did El Sayyid Nosair choose to harm an Israeli personality?

The slogan of the preacher in the mosque, Azzam, was in the context of Afghanistan: “Jihad and the rifle alone – no negotiations, no documents, and no dialogues.”

The blind sheikh, on the other hand, came to America to form loyalists to global jihad, who not only demanded Afghanistan but sought to put an end, by all necessary means, to Israeli control of Palestine, funded and supported by the United States – Israel is the enemy of Islam.

The new leaders of El Sayyid Nosair have marked for him and for the rest of the believers the enemies to be fought, including Israel. In order to become an active and efficient soldier who would increase his value in the eyes of the leaders, El Sayyid decided to take action and try and harm Ariel Sharon but soon abandoned his plan probably because he realized he was a secure personality. In search of another goal, El Sayyid found Rabbi Meir Kahane.

How does a political personality become a target for the opponent?

Any person who chooses a political path and, in this context, makes himself an extremist due to his opinions and/or actions, increases the chance that he will accumulate enemies inside and outside the house. There is no doubt that the late Rabbi Meir Kahane fit the definition of an extremist politician in his views and actions over the years until the day of his assassination.

“A Jewish state means Jewish thinking and connections, means Jewish culture and a Jewish spirit in the Jewish public. But above all, it means Jewish sovereignty and Jewish control over its vocation. This can only be implemented within a permanent Jewish majority and its Arab minority. Robbers who robbed them of their land. The Arabs do not feel a binding connection or emotion towards a state

“A Jewish state means Jewish thinking and connections, means Jewish culture and a Jewish spirit in the Jewish public. But above all, it means Jewish sovereignty and Jewish control over its vocation. This can only be implemented within a permanent Jewish majority and its Arab minority. By the Arabs are sure that the Jews are robbers who robbed them of their land. The Arabs do not feel a binding connection or emotion towards a state whose soul is Jewish. And the Arabs are multiplying, in quantity and quality. They will demand a greater share of power; they will demand “autonomy” for different parts of the country. Soon they will threaten the existence of the Jewish majority with the Arab birthrate. The result: a bloody clash. If indeed we want to prevent such a development, there is only one way open before us: immediate transfer of the Arabs from the land of Israel to their lands. Since for Israel’s Arabs and Jews, there is only one solution. Separation. The Jews in their land, and the Arabs in their lands. Separation. Only separation.

There is no doubt that there was a conflict between the views of Rabbi Meir Kahane and the views of El Sayyid Nosair.

What was El Sayyid Nosair ‘s mindset?

As stated, El Sayyid Nosair chose Rabbi Meir Kahane as the appropriate target for the realization of his new mission as a global jihad fighter. In a letter he sent from prison in which he confessed to the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, El Sayyid described: “In 1989 I began following Meir Kahane during his visits to the New York area. I attended two of his lectures in two synagogues, one in Long Island and one in Brooklyn. With Rabbi Kahane alone, in private, at least twice. I also spoke to him in public during the Q&A after the lecture. On November 5, 1990, I attended another of his lectures at a Manhattan hotel. At the end of the lecture, I shot Kahane and fled the hotel.”

Why did El Sayyid Nosair choose to assassinate Rabbi Meir Kahane during an event?

El Sayyid Nosair’s choice proves that the opponent chooses to carry out the assassination itself precisely during a public and political activity of the personality and instead of with an audience to increase the added value of his action by witnesses and photography and publicity in the various media. It is clear that during the surveillance he carried out, El Sayyid Nosair could have located Rabbi Kahane in a quieter and more convenient place to carry out the assassination, a place that would also have allowed him to shoot and disappear from the area. The assassin’s opponent is willing to risk his life or a long prison sentence just to show his religious leaders and other believers his action for jihad.

Would any person who finds himself in a negative and extreme environment choose to go that route?

Ebrahim, the son of El Sayyid Nosair, could have been exactly where his father found himself and yet chose a different path, the opposite and good one. In addition, he and his family chose to completely break away from the father of the family and even changed their name. Ebrahim spends part of his time delivering a lecture describing his past with his father and family.

In the act of assassination, El Sayyid Nosair revealed the way he turned from a normative person into an extremist assassin and his way of thinking and acting that included gathering intelligence and tracking the target, being able to assimilate in the target’s environment, being able to portray a different character and in the end to choose with the final act, shooting at close range in order to succeed in achieving the goal with high percentages – the murder of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Can a personality, like the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, prevent and thwart an assassination attempt on him even though he is not a secure personality?

A personality with opinions and actions that are considered extreme must know that he or she is setting up rivals inside and outside the home. An unsecured personality who travels abroad can and should invest in security for him or herself, this can be security performed by professional personal security guards or unprofessional security but is visible by an assistant or the staff accompanying the personality – an assistant who has been trained to perform unarmed security operations In an environment close to the personality, emphasizing visibility that produces outward deterrence, can cause the opponent to choose not to carry out the assassination act.

 

Remember, “security needs to be maintained” in every way.

Awareness of the security personnel’s responsibility

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

In the security profession, unlike many other professions, the pyramid of responsibility is reversed so that its apex touches the ground and the base is at the top. The meaning of such a pyramid is that most of the responsibility for carrying out the task lies with the lowest ranking people in the hierarchy of positions – the security guards, the police officers, and the soldiers. Does the process of recruiting, training, and managing the work routine really succeed in instilling in the various security personnel awareness of the magnitude of the responsibility that is placed on them? Are the security personnel themselves really aware and understand the magnitude of the responsibility placed on them? The answer to these two important questions is NO! A great number of managers don’t act or don’t do enough to succeed in their main task, and along with them, many security personnel fails to realize the responsibility that comes with the profession. A large number of incidents that have occurred in the past prove that the opponent acted precisely at the moment when the security personnel were not alert to what was going on around them and were not focused and dedicated to the task assigned to them. The fact that in the security profession the pyramid is reversed, produces another fundamental difference compared to other professions and it relates to the fact that the task of preserving human lives makes everything between all security personnel equal, whether they work at a governmental or civilian agency and whether they secure a VIP or a shopping mall or area with people. Unfortunately, not a day goes by without a photo or video of security personnel (security guards, police officers, soldiers) who, despite being in an operational and active position, take a “break” to have a conversation with a co-worker or to look at what’s new on their cell phones or just to lower their heads for a light rest.

Any security system that incorporates the field of viewing things from the potential adversary’s perspective is sure to be more successful than others in raising awareness of the importance of the mission among the security personnel who work in it. Security guards who understand who their adversaries are and what their ways of thinking and acting are will better understand that an assault event can occur at any given moment during the shift, without warning and without prior preparation and in addition, know and recognize that in recent years security personnel has been attacked more than civilians by various adversaries, which raises the importance of the concept of the protection of our forces. Although recruiting for security positions is often considered relatively easy, not everyone is suitable to work in this special and difficult profession if only for the main reason of responsibility imposed on the security personnel and that is the task of preserving human lives. Factually, a lot of security people who are already working and performing the various missions in the field, do not really understand that their failure can cause the security object under their responsibility to be harmed, or G-d forbid, killed and they do not really internalize that an injury can be lifelong and no dead person can be brought back to life.

As someone who deals with viewing situations from the adversaries’ viewpoint on a regular basis, and as someone who researches, learns, and teaches about the ways of potential adversaries, I believe that the best way to assimilate the issue to raise awareness of responsibility among security personnel is to learn and investigate events that have occurred and documented.

One photo taken just before the assassination attempt on US President Ronald Reagan on March 30, 1981, illustrates well the fact that security personnel cannot fail to carry out his mission at the highest level as long as they are at their posts and they are required to face any opponent who may suddenly act. Also important is that they are required to act contrary to one’s will and natural senses found in every human being:

President Ronald Reagan ends an event at the Hilton Hotel in Washington and goes out with his entourage and security team to a vehicle that is waiting ahead of time at the designated departure point. The security array allows journalists and citizens to stand near the seam (the open area between the hotel and the president’s car) and at the same time places police and security guards in positions to prevent and thwart any attempt to harm the president. At the time the photo is being documented, the president’s security team and the police officers assisting him did not know that inside the group of journalists standing to the president’s left a few meters away was John Hinckley, a mentally ill citizen influenced by a character from the movie ‘Taxi Driver’, who arrived to try to kill the president with the aid of a gun in his possession. Just before John Hinckley decides to fire at the president, it can be seen that the police officers placed in front of him are looking at the president instead of looking in his direction, the direction from which the assassinating adversary can come. Those same cops failed in their operational behavior at exactly the critical stage in the security of the president, just as they were required to be at the highest level of readiness, concentration, focus, and alertness. The picture exceptionally shows the phenomenon where security personnel fails to overcome the body’s natural desire, in the above case, curiosity and a strong desire to see the president up close instead of standing and looking at the area where threats can come from. There are many things that can distract security personnel from their mission – a personality or a famous person, looking at a special and beautiful car, fiddling with the cell phone, looking at the game instead of the crowd, and more, anything interesting that makes the mind give a command to look. In my opinion, it can be stated that in with their non-operational behavior, the police allowed John Hinckley to pull out his pistol and manage to fire 6 bullets at the president and hit and wound him with one of them. There is no doubt that if the police had resisted the severe temptation and constantly looked in the direction of the group of journalists while the president was walking to the car, they would have been able to identify John Hinckley’s action earlier that would have prevented him from firing at the president.

Documentation of the assassination attempt:

 

Anyone who chooses to work as a security person, security guard, police officer, and soldier, must know and understand that they have chosen one of the most difficult professions to implement, a profession that combines great responsibility for human life and physical and mental difficulty while being at one’s post and performing any task anytime, anywhere. Every security manager should know that even though the exercise of responsibility at the edge is on the employee performing the task, they must constantly work to raise awareness of the employee’s responsibility to try and overcome all the natural but destructive behavioral phenomena when it comes to dealing with the adversary.

Remember, security must be maintained with full awareness of the responsibility for human life!

 

Israel – Attempted Assassination of David Zvi Pinkas 1952

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Minister David Zvi Pinkas was the first public elected official who had an assassination attempt on his life since the establishment of the State of Israel. David Zvi Pinkas was an Israeli politician, one of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence, and the third Minister of Transportation on behalf of the Mizrahi Party of the State of Israel from October 8, 1951, until his death from a heart attack on August 14, 1952. On Saturday night, June 20, 1952, a bomb was placed on the porch of David Zvi Pinkas, who lived at 6 Ramchal Street in Tel Aviv. The bomb did not explode, so the next day the assassins placed another bomb, this time near the door of his house.

The reason for the assassination – controversy over the issue of religious coercion:

Already during the Yishuv period, the tension between religion and secularism that characterized the Jewish pioneering efforts was the subject of heated debates that had the potential to be explosive, literally. The first prime minister of the State of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, was completely secular, but in the same breath, he was the same Ben-Gurion who wrote the “status quo letter” in 1947, which he sent as chairman of the Jewish Agency to Agudat Israel with lines for the status quo in religious matters for the forming country. Already with the formation of the first government, Ben-Gurion decided that his Mapai party would form a coalition with the United Religious Front and not with the left-wing Mapam Party or the Revisionist Herut party. The attitude towards religion and state issues that had been formed since the dawn of the state was that they had to be resolved through “politics of arrangements”, thus avoiding a sharp and resounding unilateral majority decision and arrangement by way of dialogue and agreement.
The first governments known to the state did not last long, and in some cases fell for reasons directly or indirectly related to religion. For example, the second government ended in February 1951, about four months after its establishment, following Ben-Gurion’s resignation due to disagreements with the religious parties over the provision of religious education for the children of the immigrants.
As mentioned, David Zvi Pinkas served as Minister of Transportation in the third government headed by Ben-Gurion, a government that was required to deal with days of austerity, rationing, and scarcity. As part of the directive to reduce fuel use, Pinkas ordered that vehicles would be stopped for two days a week, with one of those days being Saturday. The installation provoked a public scandal and was perceived as religious coercion under the guise of economic constraint.

The assassins:

The assassins were Haaretz writer and journalist Amos Keinan and Shaltiel Ben Yair, who was a sabotage expert in his military service, both of them belonged to the pre-state militia Lehi. Both of them thought something needed to be done and to personally protest the minister’s actions.

The course of action chosen for the assassination was an explosive device:

Placing a bomb in official institutions as a means of shocking decision-makers and the public in the face of a controversial issue was not an unusual act in those days. Those who were in the underground militias who felt that the new state was breaking a promise, sometimes decided that they were acting by the old means they knew. The arsenal of explosives they and their comrades have been caching since the War of Independence has been retrieved. The members of the underground did not break free so quickly from the atmosphere of terror in which they lived for years. They refused to digest that they were no longer fighting the British, but their own people from their nation. Placing a bomb on the Czechoslovakian embassy and at the sensational weekly journal “HaOlam HaZeh”; an explosion at the Soviet embassy as well as explosives seized from yeshiva students who intended to use it to harm the Ministry of Education, in protest of the crystallization of a state education law perceived as threatening religious education – all of these are just examples of publicized reports of underground members, convictions for serious offenses. But concealing a bomb in a person’s private home was a far-reaching step.
The bomb was received by Amos Keinan from Yaakov Heruti, whom he knew from high school. After the assassination attempt, he published the following details: “Keinan came to me and asked for explosives. For what purpose? I asked. For a display of protest. I did not doubt that Amos was telling the truth. This was also impossible for us. We made an appointment and I brought him the explosive sticks. Amos had two left hands, but Shaltiel Ben Yair was a professional, and the rest is known. The bomb was detonated in Pinkas’s house. From that day on, I did not speak to Amos in good or bad times for 30 years. I rejected any attempt to associate with him”.

The assassination:

As stated, Minister David Zvi Pinkas lived in an apartment in a building at 6 Ramchal Street in Tel Aviv:

On Saturday night, June 20, 1952, the assassins placed a bomb on Pinkas’s porch. The bomb did not explode and was discovered by Pinkas’s son who called the police. Police set up ambushes near Pinkas’s home and the next day another bomb was placed, this time near his door. It exploded, causing environmental damage, but no one was hurt. The sequence of events in the same was published by the police:
At 01:30, a police guard sensed two people entering the stairwell of a house at 6 Ramchal Street in Tel Aviv. After 20 seconds the two persons went out and tried to move away from the place. After arousing the suspicion of the police officers, the officers ordered them to stand still, the two did not obey and continued to walk away. The officers pulled out their weapons and told the two persons to stand still and if they won’t, they will open fire.  The two were arrested and handed over to the police station at 8 Yehuda Halevi Street. At that moment, an explosion was heard in the stairwell of the house that the two had left. The two policemen immediately went up to the stairwell and found the door of Pinkas’s apartment in the same building that it was broken into. The apartment is on the second floor on the left. The police sapper who arrived at the scene immediately discovered that the bomb that destroyed the door of the apartment was homemade.

The handling of the assassins:

During their detention, Keinan and Shaltiel maintained their right to remain silent, went on hunger strike in protest of their detention conditions, and did not admit to being involved in the incident. “I did not carry, I did not throw, I did not throw and I did not drop the bomb on the home of the Minister of Transportation Pinkas,” Keinan said in court. Only after the death of Pinkas did Keinan and Ben-Yair stand trial. They claimed to have arrived in the area innocently, after receiving an anonymous phone call. A civil judge who had no criminal experience was exceptionally appointed to their trial. The judge ruled that there was no doubt that the defendants were telling the truth, and acquitted them. An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court justices sharply criticized the judge, wondering why Keinan met in the middle of the night with a former commissioned officer who specializes in explosives. Despite this, they too strangely acquitted the defendants. Keinan later revealed to his associates that he indeed did carry out the assassination.

David Zvi Pinkas:

About two months after the assassination, Pinkas died of a sudden heart attack, he was only 57 years old. At the time of his death, a Tanach, the Pesachim Tractate, and work documents were found next to him. His family members linked his death to the attempt on his life and the contemptuous manner in which that was handled.
After Pinkas’s death, the third government did not last long: at the end of September 1952, Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel left the government due to the opposition of their members to the recruiting of women to the IDF. Three months later Ben Gurion also quit, again because of disagreements regarding religious education, and the government ended.

Video from the State Archives – Reporting on Pinkas’s Death (in the first part of the video):

In 1952, the prime minister and ministers in Israel were not secured. The security unit set up in 1958 has not yet been set up and therefore elected officials were exposed to one hundred percent harm except in cases where the police decided to act to secure them. Factually, in the assassination attempt on Pinkas’s life, the police placed an ambush around his home after the first explosive charge was placed on the porch and did not explode. I could not find an answer to the question of why the policemen who were in the ambush did not identify the assassins upon entering the building and did not prevent the placement of the second explosive device next to the door of the house. In recent years, ministers in Israel who are not secured by the Israel Security Agency, have been secured based on activity analysis and a situation assessment to determine the required level of security, except for placing security guards in homes that are defined as permanent facilities. There is no doubt that a security guard stationed at the minister’s house should locate any person who is not known and probably any suspicious object/charge placed in the threat area.

Remember, security needs to be maintained.