Israel – Attempted Assassination of David Zvi Pinkas 1952

Minister David Zvi Pinkas was the first public elected official who had an assassination attempt on his life since the establishment of the State of Israel. David Zvi Pinkas was an Israeli politician, one of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence, and the third Minister of Transportation on behalf of the Mizrahi Party of the State of Israel from October 8, 1951, until his death from a heart attack on August 14, 1952. On Saturday night, June 20, 1952, a bomb was placed on the porch of David Zvi Pinkas, who lived at 6 Ramchal Street in Tel Aviv. The bomb did not explode, so the next day the assassins placed another bomb, this time near the door of his house.

The reason for the assassination – controversy over the issue of religious coercion:

Already during the Yishuv period, the tension between religion and secularism that characterized the Jewish pioneering efforts was the subject of heated debates that had the potential to be explosive, literally. The first prime minister of the State of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, was completely secular, but in the same breath, he was the same Ben-Gurion who wrote the “status quo letter” in 1947, which he sent as chairman of the Jewish Agency to Agudat Israel with lines for the status quo in religious matters for the forming country. Already with the formation of the first government, Ben-Gurion decided that his Mapai party would form a coalition with the United Religious Front and not with the left-wing Mapam Party or the Revisionist Herut party. The attitude towards religion and state issues that had been formed since the dawn of the state was that they had to be resolved through “politics of arrangements”, thus avoiding a sharp and resounding unilateral majority decision and arrangement by way of dialogue and agreement.
The first governments known to the state did not last long, and in some cases fell for reasons directly or indirectly related to religion. For example, the second government ended in February 1951, about four months after its establishment, following Ben-Gurion’s resignation due to disagreements with the religious parties over the provision of religious education for the children of the immigrants.
As mentioned, David Zvi Pinkas served as Minister of Transportation in the third government headed by Ben-Gurion, a government that was required to deal with days of austerity, rationing, and scarcity. As part of the directive to reduce fuel use, Pinkas ordered that vehicles would be stopped for two days a week, with one of those days being Saturday. The installation provoked a public scandal and was perceived as religious coercion under the guise of economic constraint.

The assassins:

The assassins were Haaretz writer and journalist Amos Keinan and Shaltiel Ben Yair, who was a sabotage expert in his military service, both of them belonged to the pre-state militia Lehi. Both of them thought something needed to be done and to personally protest the minister’s actions.

The course of action chosen for the assassination was an explosive device:

Placing a bomb in official institutions as a means of shocking decision-makers and the public in the face of a controversial issue was not an unusual act in those days. Those who were in the underground militias who felt that the new state was breaking a promise, sometimes decided that they were acting by the old means they knew. The arsenal of explosives they and their comrades have been caching since the War of Independence has been retrieved. The members of the underground did not break free so quickly from the atmosphere of terror in which they lived for years. They refused to digest that they were no longer fighting the British, but their own people from their nation. Placing a bomb on the Czechoslovakian embassy and at the sensational weekly journal “HaOlam HaZeh”; an explosion at the Soviet embassy as well as explosives seized from yeshiva students who intended to use it to harm the Ministry of Education, in protest of the crystallization of a state education law perceived as threatening religious education – all of these are just examples of publicized reports of underground members, convictions for serious offenses. But concealing a bomb in a person’s private home was a far-reaching step.
The bomb was received by Amos Keinan from Yaakov Heruti, whom he knew from high school. After the assassination attempt, he published the following details: “Keinan came to me and asked for explosives. For what purpose? I asked. For a display of protest. I did not doubt that Amos was telling the truth. This was also impossible for us. We made an appointment and I brought him the explosive sticks. Amos had two left hands, but Shaltiel Ben Yair was a professional, and the rest is known. The bomb was detonated in Pinkas’s house. From that day on, I did not speak to Amos in good or bad times for 30 years. I rejected any attempt to associate with him”.

The assassination:

As stated, Minister David Zvi Pinkas lived in an apartment in a building at 6 Ramchal Street in Tel Aviv:

On Saturday night, June 20, 1952, the assassins placed a bomb on Pinkas’s porch. The bomb did not explode and was discovered by Pinkas’s son who called the police. Police set up ambushes near Pinkas’s home and the next day another bomb was placed, this time near his door. It exploded, causing environmental damage, but no one was hurt. The sequence of events in the same was published by the police:
At 01:30, a police guard sensed two people entering the stairwell of a house at 6 Ramchal Street in Tel Aviv. After 20 seconds the two persons went out and tried to move away from the place. After arousing the suspicion of the police officers, the officers ordered them to stand still, the two did not obey and continued to walk away. The officers pulled out their weapons and told the two persons to stand still and if they won’t, they will open fire.  The two were arrested and handed over to the police station at 8 Yehuda Halevi Street. At that moment, an explosion was heard in the stairwell of the house that the two had left. The two policemen immediately went up to the stairwell and found the door of Pinkas’s apartment in the same building that it was broken into. The apartment is on the second floor on the left. The police sapper who arrived at the scene immediately discovered that the bomb that destroyed the door of the apartment was homemade.

The handling of the assassins:

During their detention, Keinan and Shaltiel maintained their right to remain silent, went on hunger strike in protest of their detention conditions, and did not admit to being involved in the incident. “I did not carry, I did not throw, I did not throw and I did not drop the bomb on the home of the Minister of Transportation Pinkas,” Keinan said in court. Only after the death of Pinkas did Keinan and Ben-Yair stand trial. They claimed to have arrived in the area innocently, after receiving an anonymous phone call. A civil judge who had no criminal experience was exceptionally appointed to their trial. The judge ruled that there was no doubt that the defendants were telling the truth, and acquitted them. An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court justices sharply criticized the judge, wondering why Keinan met in the middle of the night with a former commissioned officer who specializes in explosives. Despite this, they too strangely acquitted the defendants. Keinan later revealed to his associates that he indeed did carry out the assassination.

David Zvi Pinkas:

About two months after the assassination, Pinkas died of a sudden heart attack, he was only 57 years old. At the time of his death, a Tanach, the Pesachim Tractate, and work documents were found next to him. His family members linked his death to the attempt on his life and the contemptuous manner in which that was handled.
After Pinkas’s death, the third government did not last long: at the end of September 1952, Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel left the government due to the opposition of their members to the recruiting of women to the IDF. Three months later Ben Gurion also quit, again because of disagreements regarding religious education, and the government ended.

Video from the State Archives – Reporting on Pinkas’s Death (in the first part of the video):

In 1952, the prime minister and ministers in Israel were not secured. The security unit set up in 1958 has not yet been set up and therefore elected officials were exposed to one hundred percent harm except in cases where the police decided to act to secure them. Factually, in the assassination attempt on Pinkas’s life, the police placed an ambush around his home after the first explosive charge was placed on the porch and did not explode. I could not find an answer to the question of why the policemen who were in the ambush did not identify the assassins upon entering the building and did not prevent the placement of the second explosive device next to the door of the house. In recent years, ministers in Israel who are not secured by the Israel Security Agency, have been secured based on activity analysis and a situation assessment to determine the required level of security, except for placing security guards in homes that are defined as permanent facilities. There is no doubt that a security guard stationed at the minister’s house should locate any person who is not known and probably any suspicious object/charge placed in the threat area.

Remember, security needs to be maintained.

The assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco in 1973

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On December 20, 1973, a team from the Basque separatist group ETA succeeded in assassinating the Spanish prime minister Luis Carrero Blanco. The course of action chosen by the separatists was a powerful explosive device planted under the road, this was defined then and in my opinion, will be defined as such today as groundbreaking and daring in the capabilities of an organized adversary.

Luis Carrero Blanco was considered a loyalist of the then President of Spain, Francisco Franco, who over the years appointed him to senior positions and even awarded him the rank of Admiral in 1966. In the years 1967-1973 Luis Carrero served as Vice President and was marked as the natural successor of Francisco Franco as President of Spain. In 1973 the post of Vice President was abolished and consequently, Luis Carrero was appointed President Franco’s prime minister. Luis Carrero was known for his extreme right-wing and monarchist views and so the Basques saw him as an heir who would continue Franco’s actions against the Basques and their independence.

Just before Luis Carrero took the presidency, the Basque separatists decided that the best way to prevent this was to assassinate the prime minister and the intended president. A group of Basque nationalists belonging to the ETA took on the task and as a first step decided to call the operation Operación Ogro (English: Operation Ogre). During the intelligence-gathering phase, they discovered that the prime minister frequently attends prayers at the five-story church of San Francisco de Borja and realized that this was a typical activity from which the assassination could be planned around. Aerial photograph showing the location of the church:

After deciding to assassinate the Prime Minister during his visit to the church, the assassins came up with possible courses of action to succeed in the important and critical task for them. The assassins thought about the close-range firing, medium-range firing, long-range sniping, explosive devices at the stopping point, and more, and finally concluded that due to the prime minister’s security level, the chances of success in these ways will below. To succeed in the mission, the assassins were required to think outside the box and so they did – the chosen course of action was to bury a powerful explosive device under the road on the necessary axis on which the prime minister travels when arriving and leaving the church.

The plan of action as carried out by the assassins:

The assassins located a rented basement apartment in a building located in the block of the church and in line with its facade. The assassins rented the apartment after telling the landlord that they were sculpture students and they indeed brought sculptures to the apartment to actualize the cover story. Over the course of five months, the assassins dug a tunnel under the necessary axis from the basement apartment to the front of the church while they managed to perfectly hide their actions from the landlord, neighbors, and their surroundings. After the excavation of the tunnel was completed, the assassins began to bring into the apartment and from there into the tunnel a powerful explosive device weighing 80 kilos that were stolen from a police checkpoint.

A video describing the actions of the assassination squad:

Day of the assassination on December 20, 1973:

The assassins armed the explosive device and verified that it was ready to activate. Three members of the group disguised themselves as electricians performing work on the street of the church so that none of the citizens and security guards of the prime minister suspected them. The three “electricians” were positioned so that they could clearly see the prime minister’s vehicle coming on the necessary axis to the church. At 09:36, the assassination squad’s observer identified the prime minister’s Dodge 3700 GT vehicle traveling towards the church and approaching a point on the road where it was above the location of the explosive device. With precise timing, the observer signals to his teammate to activate the powerful charge and he obeys the order immediately and a second later a loud explosion is heard in the street and the neighborhood. As a result of the explosion, Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco’s vehicle flew through the air to a height of 20 meters, over the five floors of the church, and plunged into the churchyard.

Presentation of the moment of the explosion from a film released in 1979:

Surprisingly, Luis Carrero Blanco survived the blast, was rushed to a hospital for medical treatment and died at 10:15 p.m. His bodyguard and driver died shortly after. The “electrician” assassins shouted at passers-by that there was a gas explosion and immediately fled the scene. The ETA took responsibility on January 22, 1974.

An authentic video documenting the arrival of the rescue forces at the scene of the incident:

 

Event scene photos:

 

 

 

 

 

 

How can one deal with such an action of the opponent?

Every close protection array should try and reduce as many as possible activities that repeat themselves frequently and subsequently every frequent facility and activity that the principal visits or does should be identified.

At each arrival or departure from a permanent facility or a repeated activity, it is necessary to establish a professional and effective intelligence circle that can detect changes in the threat environment such as the rental of an apartment to new students. Following the identification of a change by the intelligence, a physical examination of the new tenants will be carried out.

Upon arrival or departure from a permanent facility or printer activity, the security system must perform professional actions to detect anomalies in the threat sector and check anyone who is defined as new and unfamiliar in the sector such as electricians working on the street and also the array should break routines and deceive when it comes to the principal’s arrival and departure routes.

Remember that “security must be maintained” while ensuring that all required actions are performed.

 

The attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to Lisbon in 1979

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

In the 1970s, the State of Israel experienced dozens of terrorist attacks by Palestinian organizations against innocent civilians. Some are considered damaging and daring attacks:

May 22, 1970 – 3 bazooka missiles are fired at the Avivim children’s bus.

May 8, 1972 – A hijacking of a Sabena Airlines plane from Brussels to Tel Aviv.

May 30, 1972 – The massacre at Ben Gurion Airport is carried out by three terrorists from the extremist communist organization the Japanese Red Army.

April 11, 1974 – A terrorist attack in Kiryat Shmona is carried out by 3 terrorists.

May 15, 1974 – The Maalot massacre was carried out by 3 terrorists.

March 6, 1975 – The attack on the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv.

March 11, 1978 – The Coastal Road attack is carried out by terrorists who came from the sea in rubber boats.

April 22, 1979 – A terrorist attack in Nahariya by a terrorist cell under the command of Samir Kuntar.

One of the last attacks of this decade took place outside the borders of Israel when on November 13, 1979, a Palestinian terrorist cell attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Lisbon, the late Mr. Ephraim Eldar, who began his role as Israel’s first ambassador to Portugal two years earlier.

Since then, the Israeli embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, has been located on the fourth floor of the same high-rise building where the assassination attempt on the late Ephraim Eldar took place.

Picture of the building where the Israeli embassy is located:

On the day of the assassination attempt (November 13, 1979), the security at the embassy included the Israeli security director and a local policeman. The ambassador’s security was carried out by the locals, this included an operational driver and close protection specialist. At around 09:30 the ambassador’s car arrived in front of the building and stopped parallel to the main entrance. The persons in the vehicle sat in accordance with the principles of close protection when in vehicles when the driver is in his seat, the close protection specialist next to him in the front seat, and the ambassador in the back seat behind the close protection specialist. The embassy’s security director was on the fourth floor and the local policeman was stationed near the stop. Immediately after the vehicle was stopped, the close protection specialist got out of the vehicle while holding the ambassador’s briefcase. The driver made sure to stay in place in the vehicle while staying in the drive gear and his foot on the brakes. Everything was ready for the ambassador to leave the vehicle. As soon as the ambassador opens the door and starts exiting the vehicle, a terrorist emerges towards the vehicle, starts firing multiple times with an automatic rifle, and then decides to go around the vehicle in order to apparently be able to attack the driver and the local policeman. As a result of the shooting, the local close protection specialist was killed and Ambassador Ephraim Eldar was wounded in the leg. Making the right decision, the ambassador manages to get back into the vehicle. At the same time, a second terrorist emerges and throws a grenade at the local policeman who was standing at the seam, apparently between the front door and the location of the ambassador’s vehicle. The policeman was injured in the grenade explosion and extricated himself into the building. The driver of the local car acts with an amazing instinct, which suits everything the embassy’s security director briefed him, presses the accelerator, and starts driving fast forward while running over the first terrorist who did not manage to get around the vehicle from the front. The two terrorists flee the scene and disappear and the driver evacuates the ambassador to the nearest police station. From there was transferred to the nearest hospital for further medical treatment.
According to eyewitnesses, the two terrorists waited for the ambassador’s vehicle to arrive near the embassy building in a white sedan, and when it arrived, they got out of it and moved in its direction. The terrorists who carried out the operation have not been apprehended to date.

Picture of the location of the embassy building and the nearby junction:

Pictures showing the location of the stopping point:

Coverage of the event in the local media:

Insights and lessons learned from the event:

In close protection, the stage of leaving or arriving at the seam at a permanent facility is defined as highly sensitive because the adversary has the ability to know the location of the embassy facility and find out if there is a pause when the ambassador arrives in the morning and plan his actions accordingly.
I assume the terrorists carried out operations to gather information on the level of security at the embassy and especially on the level of security of the ambassador at the time of his arrival in the morning. There is no doubt that the terrorists saw and recognized the fact that when the ambassador arrived at the embassy there was one policeman waiting at the stop and together with the ambassador there was a close protection specialist – the terrorists’ decision to deliberately assassinate at the entrance to the embassy, ​​despite the presence of the security forces, is not coincidental. It seems that the security forces failed to create sufficient deterrence and the terrorists aspired to display a high level of ability, daring, determination, and added value and prestige. Those terrorists were able to locate a pattern of action by the ambassador in which he was secured solely by the attached close protection specialist and yet they chose to carry out the assassination in front of the Israeli embassy.
The local policeman and close protection specialist will forgive me for saying that the two terrorists would probably not have acted against them if they did not think they could defeat them and kill the ambassador.
The one who disrupted the plan for the terrorists was actually the driver who acted calmly and professionally, even though he was also injured during the first shooting. The local ambassador’s driver has proven in his actions that the role of the driver is a very important profession in a close protection array to the point of rescuing the principal from injury or death – a driver must remain in the vehicle until the principal arrives at his office in the building while keeping the vehicle in gear, just as the local driver did. The embassy staff did well in teaching the local driver what to do when arriving and stopping at the seam and how to act in an emergency.
A talented and skilled close protection array should know how to perform preliminary actions for the arrival of the principal, with an emphasis on actions to detect anomalies in the threatened sector and especially in the critical 15 minutes before the arrival.
There is no doubt that with the right scanning operations in order to detect anomalies in the area near the embassy building, the two terrorists could be identified sitting and waiting in the white sedan vehicle. In order to be able to see when the ambassador arrives at the embassy, ​​the two terrorists stay at least 15 minutes or more near the embassy building while maintaining eye contact on the stopping point, so if the terrorists can see the stopping point, the close protection specialist can also see them.
One of the actions the close protection specialist must do after getting out of the vehicle and just before allowing the ambassador to leave is a quick visual scan from the location and out to try and locate anomalous persons, according to the description of the assassination sequence, the first terrorist must have been moving towards the vehicle before the ambassador opened it, so the terrorist could therefore be seen by the close protection specialist next to him and react.
In addition, it is important to note that the close protection specialist must leave both hands free and must not hold anything with them that could interfere and even prevent him from acting when necessary.
In the context of the location of the ambassador at the time of the ambassador’s arrival – in general, the Israeli security directors and close protection specialists are at a higher professional level than the local security force and are therefore expected to be involved in the ambassador’s security operations, especially in sensitive stages.
It should be noted that in June 1982, Abu Nidal’s men attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Britain, the late Shlomo Argov, who was seriously wounded and remained disabled for the rest of his life. As a result, Israel entered ֹOperation Peace for Galilee (later known as the First Lebanon War).
In 2019, the Israeli Ambassador in Lisbon, Mr. Rafi Gamzu, revealed that since the incident in which the local ambassador’s close protection specialist was killed, no memorial service has been held by the embassy and the local police, so as a result, he initiated a memorial service that was conducted at the national headquarters of the Portuguese police, with the participation of the police’s leadership, ministers, the Israeli embassy’s personnel and the close protection specialist’s family.

A picture from the exciting ceremony:

Remember, security must be done according to defined principles by a professional force!

The Israel Security Agency’s Close Protection Unit (730) cannot be the best in the world

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

The best unit in the world with the most wanted protectors in the world, this is how the latest news report on the ISA’s close protection unit opened. The ISA and the unit’s management did not cooperate with the idea behind it, and veterans of that unit wrote on social media how much they did not like the main statement of the news report, that this is the best unit in the world, and how that statement is dangerous. Probably, many of the civilians who watched the news report may not understand why the unit and its veterans are not happy with the definition that is perceived as flattering since naturally and logically, who does not want to be the best in the world?

As a veteran of that unit, I will try to explain the reason for the unit’s and its veterans’ dissatisfaction with a definition that should be flattering and prestigious.

The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

The failure to prevent the assassination of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995, became from that day an open wound for the unit and its people for generations with no future expiration date. In 2018, photographer Ziv Koren accompanied the unit for a year during its routine work and training. As usual, even after reading Ziv Koren’s article, I took the time to read dozens of comments from citizens who saw fit to write their personal opinion on the unit. One of the comments made me stop mainly because it reminded me that there are failures that go on with you for life and because even though 25 years have passed since the incident, there are civilians, like the civilian who wrote the response who manages to explain in a few words what is kept in the unit and its people in memory that leaves the wound open and does not allow it to heal.

The language of the response: “What a load of bellowing and posturing, during the moment of truth!!! They failed in protecting!!!

A response from an ordinary citizen that explains well why a unit in general and a close protection specialist, in particular, cannot be defined or perceive themselves as the best in the world. Unlike sports, for example, whereas an athlete or sports team, one faces their adversary when he or she is seen and/or his or her moves are seen all the time, close protection specialists will act and maneuver knowing that most of the time they will not be able to see the adversary in front of their eyes at all. When athletes win and can look their adversaries in the eye, see how they react, know if they are scared, feel if they are deterred and if they are hurt, the close protection specialist on the other hand works in a kind of ignorance and deals most of the time with a “virtual” adversary. Close protection specialists do not have the privilege of knowing whether the actions they performed in all their rounds of dealing with adversaries are effective and really affect them, and usually, the first physical encounter between them will occur only when the adversary decides to perform the attacking action. This is the moment of truth that the citizen wrote about, one quick moment that puts the unit and its close protection specialists to the most difficult personal and professional test that will ultimately determine whether their mission ended in success or failure.

A unit and the personal close protection specialists who have experienced the price and pain of failure will do anything to never fail again and will never think they are the best in the world and will not seek to award themselves honors and awards for their work.

When you think you’re the best in the world, you will fail!!!

Since I served in the unit about four years before the prime minister’s assassination, I can confidently say that my friends and I thought we worked in the best close protection unit in the world and we were the best personal close protection specialists in the world, we thought we would defeat any adversary who tried to deal with us. We were sure there could not be a situation where we failed. This is the message that came down from above and managed to become a belief that this is true. We thought there was room for comparison between us and other units in the world. I think until the moment of failure, a lot of people would have thought that a unit set up in 1958 and that for 37 years no personality under its protection was scratched, could get the title of the best unit in the world but after that, they realized it was a deceptive illusion. We, the personal close protection specialists, also in the ISA’s Close Protection Unit, after failing the biggest failure we could have dreamed of, we realized that the profession we chose could not be the best in the world and that the only honors in this field are shown only in the moment of truth. In retrospect, for the first time, we learned a hard and cruel lesson through which we understood the side effects of thinking that one is the best in the world and that this leads to only one result, failure!!! From November 4, 1995, every unit commander, every manager, and every close protection specialist present and past, lives and breathes the aforementioned lesson and in life will not think or say that he or she is the best personal close protection specialist in the world and this does not stand in contradiction to the fact that there should be a unit esprit de corps.

Esprit de corps

An operational unit will not survive without esprit de corps among those who serve in it and therefore every commander has to incorporate content related to this subject. In the close protection unit, many command and administrative changes have been made to move from a sense of “I am the best in the world” that destroys a strong, healthy, and constructive sense of esprit de corps. Every close protection specialist admitted to the unit learns about the failure already in his or first training session and will start working only after realizing one hundred percent what is the difference between being the best in the world and a professional and skilled close protection specialist, and throughout his or her service will continue to absorb this during routine work and training. This is true for every employee in the unit. The esprit de corps is based on the quality of the personnel, the structure of the unit, the attitude of the agency’s leadership to the unit, the cooperation with other units in the agency, the employee employment track, the level of investment in training and coaching, the level of investment in personal and general equipment, the level of attention to each employee and more. Employees of the ISA’s Close Protection Unit will proudly say that thanks to everything that is invested in them, they feel professional and skilled.

Professional and skilled close protection specialists

For 25 years, the goal of all of the unit’s commanders has been to invest everything possible to prepare the close protection specialists for the day when they will have to deal with an adversary who manages to reach the principal and carry out an attack. This is a difficult and challenging goal that to achieve it is necessary to work 24/7, 365 days a year, with focused thinking about the potential adversaries and their professional abilities. Since the failure, a 180-degree change has been made in the unit structure following which all prevention professions have been separated to allow dedicated units to allow the close protection specialist in the last defensive ring to focus and concentrate almost exclusively on thwarting through physical combat against adversaries should all the other preceding defensive rings fail.  In recent years, it is permissible to define the close protection specialists in the unit as ones who are professional and skilled at a high level and this is based on everything that is invested in the level of training, routine accompaniment, the level of protection around them and the level of personal technological means that they are equipped with. Will that be enough to determine that the close protection specialist will always defeat the adversary? Is that enough to know for sure that the unit cannot experience failure again? of course not.

Conclusion

The ISA’s Close Protection Unit, Unit 730, does not want and should not be the best unit in the world. Years will pass since the failure of November 4, 1995.

As an operational unit, all that interests the unit’s commanders and the people who serve in it is to succeed in distancing the adversaries from the principals under their responsibility and not fail on the day they will have to face the adversaries, no matter how many years have passed since the failure of November 4, 1995.

Remember, security must be maintained in peace and security!

The intrusion at the Capitol Building in Washington, DC- an event that must be studied

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

An event in which demonstrators break into a parliamentary building will always be defined as extreme and crossing a red line on the part of the citizens and despite this is not new and has occurred several times in the past in different democratic and less democratic countries. An event of this kind that takes place in the United States and especially in the Capitol building in the nation’s capital makes all the other events that have taken place before it in other countries look negligible and less interesting.

In my personal opinion, anyone with a managerial and/or security role in Israel/worldwide who is also responsible for responding to the forced entry of demonstrators into the facility must turn the documentation of the forced entry into the Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, into a professional lesson that will allow him or her to become better at their jobs and to function better.

The level and quality of event documentation as carried out in real-time by citizens and professional photographers in recent years allow all relevant professionals to learn about the characteristics of the event and sit down and investigate what happened and come out with an important list of topics to examine and lessons learned for [future] application.

My opinion is that regarding this event important lessons can be identified with certainty at a relatively early stage, this opinion is mainly based on the photographed documentation and less on orderly testimonies and investigations that are likely to come later on.

The videos and photos that are already published in all the various media and networks turn the event in question into an online tutorial on securing government facilities in situations where masses decide to break into it and provide another opportunity to examine some of the working guidelines associated with dealing with these kinds of situations.

Two days after the event, the list of topics to learn from including the importance of intelligence when anticipating such extreme events and preparing for them, mass behavior is driven by a negative common denominator, the level of relevance of the existing security system in the facility as an initial response to the event, the level of effectiveness of protection against forced entries, the level of readiness of the security array in the facility for the evacuation of those staying there in the case of such extreme events, the correctness of the guidelines for the use of weapons against a mob that broke into the facility, and so on.

If the break-in at the Capitol during the important debate that was taking place in it (to confirm Biden’s election as President of the United States) managed to surprise the leadership on both political sides, as well as the commander of the security forces and the security managers at the facility then this surprise is completely contradictory to how the event developed primarily before the movement and later rushing of the mob towards the facility:

The incumbent president left not the slightest doubt about his dissatisfaction with the election results.

During his four years in office, the incumbent president has managed to present to his people and the world his personality traits that, to say the least, can be defined as blatantly unconventional for better or worse.

During the first election in which he won and became President of the United States and especially during the last election in which he lost, Donald Trump showed extreme leadership and extreme influence on the electorate with a campaign that included statements and slogans that created blind faith follow-up and a common denominator for millions of citizens. Shared can become a group that can work together.

Even before the break-in of the Capitol building, the incumbent president managed to get his voters out of their comfort zone to show support for his personal and political views including until a state of confrontation with the security forces was reached.

Concurrent with the plenary debate on Biden’s election as president, the incumbent president decided to hold a mass rally a short distance from the Capitol building during which he was not afraid to inflame the crowd with extremist statements and slogans against the election campaign and in his view that it was a clear election theft.

As stated, all of the above information was known and known and therefore I think that the conduct of the incumbent president and the masses who support him did not come as a surprise to all the relevant officials nor did it cause them to be unprepared for forced entries into the Capitol, also the unconventional President Donald Trump will probably not go to great lengths and certainly will not take action to undermine democracy and prevent Republicans (as opposed to extremist groups on the Democrat side) will not become violent, is the real reason for the slow response.

The event as it occurred on January 1, 2021, once again proved that assessments are separate from reality and that there should always be an alternative plan that can be implemented quickly and efficiently.

If I were currently in a position responsible for securing a government facility and/or a position that is supposed to preserve democracy in the country (in Israel, for example, the security director of the Knesset/Prime Minister’s Office/Close Protection Unit/etc.) I would take some time to watch the filmed documentation from the event in question and learn from the following topics that stood out in it to examine my working guidelines and the perception of the operation according to which the forces in the security array work:

At the national level:

A thorough examination of whether a situation can arise in a democratic state where a prime minister or president can in his or her behavior and actions undermine democracy and its values, what is the point at which those who are defined as “guardians of democracy” must intervene and who is responsible for activating special forces in the country and when. It is clear that the “guardians of democracy” must be apolitical in order to be able to truly produce a valuable mechanism and a high chance of success against the “theft” of democracy and takeover of the state.

If the state determines that the prime minister or incumbent president has the decision when to use the special forces then it will not be a surprise in the situation created in the event in question that the incumbent president, with unconventional personality traits, is dissatisfied with the election results, activates the masses in his favor and perhaps delays the activation of special units so that these units would not interfere with the crowd performing the entire mission it was sent to do.

A video from the rally in which the incumbent president appears to be speaking to the crowd and perhaps inspires them to act:

Intelligence as a strong foundation in the decision-making process:

Examining the process of gathering intelligence, processing it, and turning it into information influences situational assessments that end in decisions that are being made to be carried out. It seems that regarding the event in question there was intelligence about the rally held by the incumbent president and what is happening there and it was likely that the rally would turn into a violent demonstration that could also reach the Capitol building and yet it can be estimated that the facility’s security would not be reinforced in advance with special forces trained to deal with forced entry from a wild mob. Although the law states that in Washington D.C. the incumbent president decides when to activate the National Guard, there are still other ways and forces that will make the security array more ready.

The preparedness and capability of the security system routinely deployed in dealing with forced entry from a mob:
Examining the working assumption relating to the behavior of a crowd with a negative common denominator to understand whether the crowd behavior as documented in the event is appropriate to the characteristics of citizens in Israel or any other country in the world and if the forces that comprise the security array are appropriate and can handle the mob and prevent it from breaking into the building.

The documentation from the incident in question indicates that the security system that is routinely at the Capitol does not have the training and ability to deal with angry mobs trying to force their way in. It can be seen that police officers/security guards stand in front of the crowd without the ability and the appropriate tools to stop the mob and with the understanding that if they do not allow them to move forward then their lives would be in danger. In my opinion, the police/security guards seen in the videos acted responsibly, logically, and correctly when they decided not to try and confront the mob, allowing it to enter the facility and refrained from using force or weapons and performing actions that would aggravate the situation more than it is:


The effectiveness of the fencing means used by the facility and its security system against crowds:

In some of the videos and photos, one can clearly see that a standard mobile iron fence does not manage to delay or prevent the mob from moving forward and worse even at some point becomes an obstacle that poses a danger to the civilians and the police/security guards.

The filmed documentation leaves no doubt as to the effectiveness of the mobile fences in an event of this type:



Level of protection of the facility:

Examination of the durability and efficiency level of protection of the windows and doors in the facility against a mob attempting forced entry into the building.

Forced entry by the crowd using batons, plastic shields, and hammers on the windows and doors is the real test for the protection and much better than the resistance testing done in a laboratory or experimental conditions:



The readiness of the facility’s structure against forced entry by mobs:

The event in question gives us a rare glimpse into what a civilian participating in a violent demonstration is willing to do and how far he or she is willing to do to enter the facility. Some of the protesters climbing on the high wall proves that at the planning stage one cannot be satisfied with the fact that the wall is high and the wall needs to be made so that persons without ladders cannot scale it, otherwise you may think that when you funneled the crowd for it to enter only through the openings is effective when in practice you created with your own hands a way to bypass an axis of entry. In one of the videos one can see that part of the wall includes prominent concrete strips that were used by the demonstrators to grab and place their feet:

If you believe that a scenario of an angry mob trying to force its way into the facility for which you are responsible is relevant, you need to define the possible lines where the mob can advance, mark the openings in them and determine what level of response you are interested in doing to prevent a forced entry. The incident in question where the crowd is seen breaking or trying to break several doors in the wall line and inside the building makes us examine our definitions on the subject and the level and effectiveness of the existing doors in the facility in resisting forced entries. Factually, the doors in the wall line of the Capitol building and at the entrance to the plenary hall, for example, did not withstand the attacks on it and the power of the mob. When you see security guards in the plenum use furniture to prevent the doors from breaking in, then it is clear that they are not designed as a response to forced entries:

Evacuation of those staying at the facility:

Every security and safety plan in the facility must include a section relating to the evacuation of those staying there during exceptional situations and emergencies, including what needs to happen for the decision to evacuate to be made, when, how, and where to evacuate to with a clear understanding that human life precedes all. It seems that at the event in question the decision to evacuate the occupants of the facility did not match the axis of the progress of the crowd and its actions. In a situation where it took at least an hour between the movement of the crowd from the rally to the Capitol building to the illogical decision to break into the building, leading to encounters with elected officials and employees at the facility to the point of having to protect elected officials left in the plenum including drawing pistols and firing live ammunition on the protesters.

A professional evacuation plan and its implementation at the appropriate time would have prevented the unnecessary situation created in the event in question where elected officials are seen seeking shelter between the rows of chairs and would not have put the security guards in unnecessary dilemmas.


The civilians’ respect for special forces:

The event in question clearly shows the respect that citizens in certain countries (I think this is also true for Israel) have for special forces. Although the approval given for the special forces to be activated came relatively late, when the crowd understood and even saw the special forces’ arrival at the facility and their placement in front of the building and entering it, there was a shift in the mob’s behavior that allowed the event to end. I think one can notice the excitement that gripped the employees at the facility and the protesters when the special forces arrived and went inside. It seems like everyone was just waiting for their arrival:




One of the most important, necessary, and best ways to eventually become a more professional and effective security system is to view documentation of events that occurred, including those that occurred in other countries. What happened on January 6th, 2021 is a groundbreaking event that is likely to enter American history and soon it will be taught in universities in the context of democracy and also in security education in the context of securing a facility against a mob trying to force its way inside a building.

Remember, security needs to be maintained in full operational readiness for any scenario.

Note:

When examining an event of this kind that took place in the most progressive democracy in the whole world and see the inclusive and slow response of the decision-makers and security forces, when you know it is one of the best security forces that are out there, then one thinks that what happened was a planned production run by one director and several assistants.

In the United States, precisely on the left side of the political map, there are extremist organizations such as Antifa that are not afraid to carry out aggressive actions against governmental institutions and businesses, causing billions of dollars in damage. In contrast, in general, the right-wing refrained from behaving violently and therefore there may have been those who together decided to allow right-wing citizens to let off steam but under some control and in accordance with predetermined limits. How else can one explain all the phenomena that took place and were seen during the protesters’ forced entry into the Capitol? The number of wounded and killed by the demonstrators and by the security forces is very small compared to the number of protesters who moved in and did things inside the Capitol building. Many police officers and security guards from the facility’s security array seemed to not oppose the movement of the crowd towards the building and even opened barriers for them that were placed on the traffic lane and at the entrance to the building.

The demonstrators who entered the Capitol pretty much-maintained restraint and did not appear to be carrying out a beatdown inside the building and what is inside it. The behavior of the protesters gave the impression that their whole purpose was to be photographed inside the building to prove that they did what they did.

The very slow decision-making of the leadership is too extreme when taking into consideration the characteristics of the event and seems to have been done in a predetermined manner.

I do not doubt that over time many different opinions will be published about what happened on  January 6th, 2021 and time will tell what happened in this groundbreaking event.

The group of assassins VS the nuclear bombing group in Iran

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Note: The details in the article on the assassination of the nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (the assassination in Iran), are taken from the media publications only and therefore some may be correct and some may be inaccurate.

Good evening dear viewers from your professional and experienced commentators, Miky Weinberg and Yair Oanunu. It turns out that even after many years of coverage and interpretation of events, one can still get excited about a new event and that is what happens to us on this special and unusual evening.

Finally, after waiting patiently for a long time, the battle between the assassins and the Iranian nuclear bomb group taking place in the resort town of Absard near Tehran is about to begin and we are here to intensify the experience for you.

The atmosphere in this amazing and impressive hall is electrifying and all thanks to you dear viewers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The signs and allusions to the approaching of this fateful and important battle have been given and published recently in succession:

The Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu, mentioned the name of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh when he presented to the world the documents that the Mossad managed to take from the Iranians under their noses – there is no doubt that a clear message was sent to the Iranian nuclear bomb group.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US President Donald Trump joined the challenge against the Iranian armament and he too marked the nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh as a target and thus awakened the Iranian nuclear bomb group from its slumber.

We have no doubt that Donald Trump, along with Benjamin Netanyahu, managed to upset the fans of the Iranian nuclear bomb group.

 

Iranian fans took to the streets en masse and demanded that the Iranian nuclear bomb group hold the battle as soon as possible and even stepped up to do so when they burned the flags of Israel and the United States. We are sure that a lot of Iranian fans will come to watch and cheer on their team in the hope that this time they will win.

 

 

 

 


The whole world waited patiently for the official announcement of the battle between the two teams, and to our great joy it came in a big way:

 

 

Both teams know that this time too it will be a battle that will determine who will die and who will live. Who will come out on top?

Will the assassins win again this time or will the Iranian nuclear bomb group finally succeed in doing so?

Which team, dear spectators, will win the championship belt for 2020 at the end of the fight?

 

 

 

There is no doubt that the Iranian nuclear bomb group has a big and difficult challenge in defending the life of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.
If we recall their previous loss in which Qassem Suleimani paid with his life, they must not make the same mistakes.

What are the common mistakes that the Iranian nuclear bomb group makes over and over again when conducting close protection operations:

  • Use of the same vehicles helps the opponent to mark the principal’s vehicle and easily identify it during the battle.
  • Inadequacy of early response capabilities and operational functioning during the realization of a physical assault threat – the security guards who do not have the ability to fight against an aggressive opponent prevent the response from being rapid.
  • Repeated movement patterns, traveling on the same axes allows the opponent to know exactly where the principal’s convoy will go and thus plan ahead and place a deadly ambush.
  • Failure to observe basic security principles with the principal, for example, letting the principal drive the vehicle.
  • Failure to combine appropriate weapons to respond to an attack by an aggressive opponent.
  • Passive security, security that waits for the opponent’s action without performing active security actions. This includes a failure to send an advance team to scan the fixed travel route for the purpose of detecting anomalies.
  • A method of security and operational work without planning from the eyes of the attacker and without the use of tactical deception and breaking the routine.
  • Lack of production and use of tactical intelligence, threat assessment, and analysis of reports for each threat and each planned characteristic activity.
  • Lack of adjustment of the levels of physical and technological protection, packaging and operational sampling, and operational transportation vehicles for assessing the potential threat by the opponent to the secured object/protectee.
  • The force’s composition (forces and missions) does not match the requirements of conducting security operations during a threatened principal’s movement at such a level, including personnel and mission vehicles (close, escort, advances, observers, EOD, etc.).
  • Mismatch of the profile of the security personnel and their operational competence to the characteristics of the mission dedicated to protecting a threatened principal.

In contrast, the assassins always manage to surprise again thanks to the level of professionalism and quality of execution of its members and thanks to their high ability to gather intelligence before a battle. The assassins invest a lot of effort and time in the phase of learning about the opponent and preparing the plan of action from the mindset of the attacker. As it seems, even in this battle the assassins are supposed to win, but it is perhaps precisely because of this that the Iranian nuclear bomb group will be able to surprise and transfer the 2020 victory belt to its closet.

Dear viewers, the last press conference before the start of the fight is about to begin.

We see from our broadcasting position that the President of the United States himself is coming to the podium and the spokesman for the Iranian nuclear bomb group is approaching his position.

As usual, Donald Trump is full of confidence and gives a performance with the 2019 championship belt hanging on his left shoulder. On the other hand, the Iranian speaker waves at him in what looks like a snake. Can’t believe it, could it be that the Iranian speaker brought a snake to the press conference? There is no end to the creativity of these two veteran rivals.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

What excitement, what atmosphere, what tension. In a few minutes, the battle will begin. The arena is ready. The roars of excitement and encouragement of your dear viewers are heard very loudly. Due to the limitations of the coronavirus, the audience is watching an online battle so to hear it one has to click on the left audio-video and increase the volume of the speakers.

 

The group of assassins enters the battlefield first and rushes to place a hidden camera, a car bomb, and what looks like a sniper weapon disguised in the back of a pickup truck. We do not know the exact plan of the assassins but there is no doubt that it is going to be surprising and deadly.

We manage to see the Iranian nuclear bomb group advancing towards the battlefield. The group chose to arrive in a convoy of three vehicles with nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh driving in a Nissan mid-size vehicle. Wait, could it be that the group has again chosen to use the same axis?

Could it be that we see the nuclear scientist driving himself in the ministry vehicle with his wife sitting next to him? Could it be that they have not sent a preliminary advance team again to check whether the opponent’s team is preparing a surprise for them?

To our sorrow or rather to the sorrow of the large Iranian crowd that came tonight to see his team win, it seems that the answer to all our questions is… Yes !!! Once again the Iranian nuclear bomb group is repeating past mistakes that caused it to lose and big time. Maybe we are wrong, maybe we do not see right, maybe they will still surprise.

The convoy of nuclear scientists begins to enter the battlefield as the assassins are seen waiting patiently. Who will attack first? The tension in the arena tears the air.

The assassins identify with the help of the hidden camera the familiar Nissan vehicle and the face of the nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh – the target is identified!!! The assassins rush to activate the exploding vehicle, a huge explosion is heard that blows the parts of the vehicle over a large distance and more importantly manages to get the convoy of the nuclear bomb group to stop on the spot. Again the surprise came from the group of assassins. Will the nuclear bomb group be able to respond? Or we again watch a battle that ends in a knockout?

Security guards from the rear escort vehicle try to get out and respond but before they can move, each of the four takes a deadly bullet that kills him on the spot.

The group of assassins is in full swing and it does not appear that they intend to reduce the intensity of the attack until the nuclear scientist is abducted and dies. Firing sounds are heard from the direction of the van, but where is the shooter? Unbelievably, the group of assassins is firing remotely at the sniper rifle. Once again they surprise and justify being world champions.

The special sniper rifle bullets penetrate the front armored glass of the Nissan vehicle on their way to the exposed body of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.

Mohsen appears to have been fatally wounded and the group of assassins understands this well. The group’s members are quick to hide from the battlefield all the evidence that can attest to their all-too-successful method of operation.

The convoy of the Iranian nuclear bomb group remains in place with the nuclear scientist and the killed security guards each sitting in their place. Again the team lost. Again the team failed to face the world champion and again the one who paid the price for the loss is the secured principal.

We and the audience from all over the world and especially the Iranian audience look at the battle scene and see the story of the battle through the marks it left (Warning: the video on the left includes unpleasant content):

In the photo: the remains of the exploding vehicle that flew in all directions and at a great distance from the battlefield, which indicates the size of the explosive device that was activated remotely.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The armored Nissan vehicle – the bullets hit the front window and the small window on the left side and blood marks on the road.

 

 

 

 


As usual, as we do for you immediately after each fight, we have summarized the bulk of the fight into a concluding video:


Just before we conclude the battle and close the broadcast, we received special documentation of the battle in the simulation – only for your eyes dear viewers:

 

 

The world media is quick to report on the death of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and publishes a picture of him against the backdrop of the Iranian flag.

 

 

 

 

 

The Iranian leader warns the United States and Israel in heavy revenge for the additional victory he and his country suffered.

 

 

 

 

 

Our dear viewers, we have reached the end of the special broadcast. We watched a battle in which only one group remembered that security must be maintained and by deception you will make war.

The world championship remains in the hands of the assassins’ group and they come out of here with the championship belt for 2020.

A big victory picture of the commander of the winning team with the championship belt has been published right now in all the global media?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Until our next coverage, we, Miky Weinberg and Yair Oanunu are glad you were here with us and wish you a continued safe, and secure evening.

Remember that security must be maintained.

Attempted assassination of President Trump or just an innocent vehicle – the reaction of the security array

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

US President Donald Trump visited Springfield when during his ride in the long, massive and secure presidential convoy a vehicle burst to the left of the convoy, and here (referring to the direction of travel) a white private vehicle eventually stopped on the side parallel to the presidential vehicle.

the event was filmed:

Photography from another angle:

In close protection, securing the principal during vehicular movements is considered on the one hand difficult and challenging and on the other hand, there are numerous options in response to the possible threats. One of the threats is an adversary operating with the help of a vehicle that allows him to collide with the principal’s vehicle as a fatal accident (this has happened before), collide and operate the vehicle as a car bomb (this has happened before), block the principal’s vehicle and start shooting (this has happened before) and more.

The incident in question illustrates the adversary’s ability to succeed and surprise because it may be considered the least logical and predictable because of the ditch located on the side of the road and perhaps because of the wooded area adjacent to it, and indeed it can be seen that no security forces are stationed on this side of the road.

At the end of the event it turned out that he was a completely innocent person who happened to be where he was when the presidential convoy passed, but can this be assumed to be the reason for the visible action in real-time, while the incident is taking place? Can the security personnel in the convoy act in what appears to be indifference just because the vehicle stopped and did not continue to gallop on its way to the President’s vehicle? Of course not.

The rule in security states that in identifying an exceptional event, the security system must act quickly and decisively in order to be able to classify it correctly, choose the right actions, and all this within the framework of securing the president. In my opinion, the reaction of the President’s protection team is very worrying because of the slowness and indifference that is clearly visible from the moment the event begins and also because of the professional mistakes related to securing a person in a vehicular convoy.

The following images illustrate the security response issues:

Photo 1:

The moment the vehicle appears in coordination to the left of the convoy. Note that at this point the vehicle is parallel to the president’s possible location in the convoy. This is the moment when the security array is required to first identify and classify the incident.

Event classification at this point – vehicle bursting in from the left.

This is an incident that is defined as very unusual that requires a quick and determined response from the security array.


Photo 2:

The security vehicle that goes to handle the incident – at this stage the force whose job it is to act against threats of this kind, is required to act quickly and resolutely until a complete and correct appraisal of the situation is complete and the threat neutralized according to the threat and legal powers that are available to the security team. The problem is that from what is seen in the video and image, the behavior of the responding force is far from professional when it comes to close protection.

The required response: Arrival with a security vehicle, stopping at a tactical distance and in a place that prevents the vehicle from continuing to travel, unloading security personnel from the vehicle with weapons drawn and alert and fearful of the possibility of an exploding vehicle and an adversary who can escape, shoot or himself explode.

The behavior of the security team is reminiscent of a traffic cop arresting a citizen for a traffic offense and not the security team of the President of the United States facing a vehicle that appears to be bursting towards the convoy.

Let’s watch the video in slow motion and conclude:

 

The incident once again illustrates how the potential adversary is surprising in arriving, approaching the object of security, and ultimately in the action, he has chosen to take against him. The incident shows how a security array must not act against a potential threat and once again emphasizes the fact that today almost every incident is filmed by the media or by citizens and shortly after its occurrence it already appears on social media.

In vehicular close protection, there are a number of responses against existing threats such as armored vehicles, identical vehicles in the convoy, changing the principal’s position in the convoy, and security vehicles for concealment and providing a quick response against any threat. The vehicle that first responded to the incident has to continue handling the bursting vehicle and not continue driving and send another vehicle a long time afterward.

In the above case, it is a small private vehicle that probably would not really have been able to reach the Presidential vehicle, but what would have happened if it had been a larger vehicle that would have crossed the ditch without any problem and managed to accelerate in a very short time towards the Presidential vehicle?

Such a vehicle for example:

In vehicular security, as long as the traffic lane is open and not blocked, the best response is to continue a fast forward ride with the principal’s vehicle.

I wish for the President of the United States that all the anomalous events around him have turned out to be innocent and especially that his security array will respond more quickly and decisively than the level of response demonstrated in the event in question.

Another example of a weak response from a close protection system:

During the security of the President of Morocco in a vehicular movement, a man burst towards the convoy and reached as far as the President’s vehicle without any of the security personnel interrupting him. Here, too, the security system does not appear to have responded as required in such situations – rescue in fast-moving driving forward. What is certain is that the best reaction is to stop the principal’s vehicle!

the event’s video:

 

Remember that security must be maintained quickly and resolutely against all threats until they are neutralized and finally classified.

 

 

 

The importance of the deterrent defensive security ring in the facility’s security preparations

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Having seen and visited dozens of secure facilities at varying levels, I can unequivocally determine that most of them do not have a deterrent towards the adversary and in those that already exist then it seems completely coincidental and does not really achieve its goal.

Anyone who knows and has heard me already knows my opinion that says that a security system that finds itself facing the adversary and is forced to act with force or with weapons, is a security system at a point of severe failure that is now required to minimize damage. The security system failed because it failed to prevent the adversary from reaching the area of the facility and start acting to implement his plan and plot.

Why would a security system fail in the prevention phase?

There can be several reasons for this, the main one of which deals with the external and internal deterrent rings in the facility. A facility without a deterrent security ring invites the potential adversary to it because the latter is not challenged, not afraid, and feels that the target is easy to penetrate and attack.

The adversary does not feel fear beyond the basic fear and therefore does not show suspicious signs in his behavior.

Any security plan for a facility designed and written without thinking and analyzing from the attacker’s perspective will probably be without a deterrent ring at all or with an imperceptible and ineffective deterrent ring. To truly understand the importance of the deterrent ring in a facility, one must first know that an adversary is a person whose main difference between him and most human beings is that he has decided to perform an action that is defined as negative and illegal and contrary to social behavioral norms.

This fact is the biggest advantage of any security system and it is the one that provides an opportunity to make the adversary decide not to act at all or to succeed and identify him before committing the act of assault, whether it is a criminal or terroristic.

A professional deterrent will succeed in keeping the novice adversary away from the facility, the one who has not yet gained enough experience and courage to perform a negative action. A professional deterrent circle will also manage to keep away from the facility a certain portion of the professional and skilled adversaries, the same adversary who is better able to overcome with a sense of fear and therefore these adversaries will display suspicious indicators that are more difficult to identify.

The main working assumption in creating a circle of deterrence says that no person in a state of fear and tension will not display suspicious indicators in their behaviors. Hence anything that includes a deterrent ring should cause the potential adversary to feel fear and tension which will translate into displaying suspicious behavioral indicators. Once that happens, some of the adversaries will just go and look for another place and those who still decide to stay will display suspicious behavioral indicators even if they try to avoid doing so.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The deterrent circle includes several elements that are all aimed directly at the adversary:

Advertising on a website – an installation of an organization that operates a website, should advertise the existence of a 24/7 security system and even state that it includes security guards and advanced technological means. In addition, it is advisable to give some examples of apprehending adversaries in the facility and punishing them severely. All of this in order to convey to the adversary a clear and sharp message that he will think well before deciding to come and attack the facility.

Perimeter Lighting – Placing permanent external perimeter lighting for the facility and lighting that is turned on by motion detection. Proper and good lighting will make the adversary feel uncomfortable and think he may be seen.

Warning signs – Placing warning signs that indicate that the facility is secure 24/7 can be mistaken as nonsensical, but in reality, they manage to increase the adversary’s sense of fear and tension.

Funneling of vehicles and pedestrians – Funnelling vehicles and pedestrians on a pre-planned route that will bring them to the parking lot and/or the main entrance to the facility only will make it difficult for the adversary to walk around the facility trying to find uncontrolled openings. Such funneling will create in the adversary a feeling that the security system is in good hands and again will cause him an increase in the feeling of fear and tension.

Cameras – Placing real cameras and dummy cameras outside the facility will make the adversary think that it is possible for the cameras to take pictures and see him at any given moment.

Security vehicle – placing a dedicated security vehicle or other vehicles to which the symbols of a security vehicle are added in a prominent place that is visible.

Physical security force – placing security guards and inspectors in the external sector and at the entrance to the facility, with an emphasis on the entry route for vehicles and people. Emphasis on the visibility of the security guards and inspectors.

Active security system – conducting unconventional outdoor patrols and questioning people in the vicinity of the facility.

The deterrent ring also excels in the positive balance between the relatively low cost of its creation and the added value it produces to the overall security system in its confrontation with the adversary.

Any security manager that works to implement my recommendations will significantly improve the response against the adversary, and who does not want to reach such a situation?

I can point out here that a number of facilities that have accepted my recommendations on the subject and fully implemented them have had an improvement in their sense of security and the effectiveness of their security system.

Remember that security is maintained first of all by creating a professional and effective deterrent!

A fatal shooting at a bar in California proves that just one security guard at the entrance is not enough

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

On November 8, 2018, a former Marine arrived at a dance bar in California and shot 12 innocent civilians after shooting and killed the security guard stationed at the entrance to the bar. This is a skilled Marine with post-trauma from his military service who seems to have managed to surprise the security guard at the entrance and shoot him without difficulty and without resistance. After neutralizing the security guard, there was nothing and who would stand in his way and prevent him from carrying out the shocking killing spree in which people who just wanted to enjoy themselves were killed.

While this is not the first incident where an armed civilian or terrorist enters a scene with a crowd and shoots people but I think the fact that the first shooting was carried out to neutralize the security guard is one that requires analysis and professional thinking on what can and should be done differently.

The event reiterates some familiar principles in security:

  1. There is a good chance that a security guard at the entrance will deter some of the adversaries from trying and carrying out their plot in the secure facility.
  2. There is a very high probability that the security guard in the first defensive security ring will meet the adversary first.
  3. There is a very high probability that the adversary will succeed in surprising the security guard.

In most cases, the security level of one security guard will not suffice as an effective response to reports.

Most citizens will choose to flee rather than resist.

It is most difficult for the various security forces to deal with one adversary who decides to leave his home in order to murder innocent people in a leisurely place.

One adversary who acts alone and on his own will usually not float in the intelligence ring and if he does not make mistakes on the way to the target, will be discovered for the first time at the entrance to the facility or immediately after starting the assault.

This is a confrontation against the potential adversary at the highest level of difficulty and still, there is an obligation to take all known and possible actions in order to try to identify him as early as possible and prevent him from carrying out his malicious plan.

I believe the former Marine came as far as the entrance or entrance area to the bar without revealing the weapons in his possession so it was difficult for the security guard to identify that he was a threat. A threat with combat skill and determination like a Marine has combined with post-trauma issues, will not leave much chance for a security guard who is supposed to prevent him from entering and doing his thing in a bar.

The above event and similar ones send a clear message that securing a place that accommodates a large number of people who are a preferred target for an adversary looking for crowd concentration can’t start and end their security preparations only by placing a security guard at the entrance. In order to elevate the level of security a security array that integrates physical security, tactical obstacles, utilizing employees, instructing the crowd, and preparing the installation for emergencies. Beyond the routine activities of the place, it is obligatory to constantly think about the possibility of an emergency event and therefore the owner of the place must invest resources to create maximum readiness to deal with the potential adversary.

Preparation of the facility:

  1. Use of ambient lighting with an emphasis on the entrance and exit areas.
  2. Public direction signs for emergency exits and security rooms.
  3. An explanatory sign that explains what to do in an emergency.
  4. Keeping escape routes free of interference.
  5. The integrity of emergency doors.
  6. PA system.
  7. Ability to call emergency forces with a quick push of a button.
  8. Employee training for emergencies.
  9. Aim for at least 2 armed workers to be present, one of whom can be a security guard if one exists in the facility.
  10. Have a first aid kit and at least one employee who has been trained in primary care.

Entrance to the building:

The adversary will search and locate the opening through which it will be easiest for him to enter the facility. The adversary will prefer to enter a key facility that seems to him unsecured so as not to go through a security guard (s). In search of his preferred entrance, the adversary will observe the facility to understand whether the place is secure and will usually first examine the main entrance and therefore what he sees at the main entrance will influence his decision whether to look for another opening or another place.

A business like a club must create a situation where the main entrance to it seems secure and such that every person who comes to it understands that he has to go through an identification and inspection process. It follows that entry, including the security guard, must produce outward deterrence in order to succeed and keep a certain percentage away from potential quarrels and remain “only” with the brave adversaries. Only broad security thinking that will create a security system that includes a number of rings and emergency preparedness will increase the chances of success in facing the adversary who decides to try to enter the place in spite of everything. For this purpose, it is required to place more than one security guard at the entrance, similar to nightclub security guards in Israel:

The design of the entrance to the building should be in such a way as to combine placing a security guard at the front and placing physical obstacles on the way inside.

The entrance door to the building can be an obstacle and even one that cannot be passed without the use of burglary, so it is necessary to place strong and massive doors in the entrance and exit openings that will generally be closed and locked. The door will be opened solely by the security guard and will not be allowed without his intervention in order to prevent an outbreak or entry of a hazard after he has managed to overcome the security guard just as happened at a bar in California.

In my opinion, the entrance to crowded businesses and especially large clubs and restaurants should be built like an embassy entrance and include 2 doors that create a security room that produces a gradual and full control entry process or an initial corridor that will direct the entrants inside.

It is recommended to install in the security guard’s position at the entrance a device such as a distress button that will allow a message to be sent in an emergency.

Business owners who have a relatively large audience concentration must understand that they must also think about the dangers that exist from the outside, be sure to implement all relevant violent security procedures, and implement them in a full and professional manner to meet customer responsibilities and to place an effective counterattack.

The period of time from the moment the adversary begins to act until the security forces arrive at the scene of the incident is the responsibility of the owners of the place and it will determine what the consequences of the attack will be.

The amount of forces that are sent to the bar to deal with the attacker indicates how difficult and complex this task is:

Unfortunately, it seems that in most cases, the counter-actions of the business itself will not succeed in preventing the adversary who is determined to act but may also succeed in disrupting the full realization of the adversary’s intentions and thus minimizing damages.

In Israel, the Israel Police guides businesses with crowd concentrations to carry out physical and technological security operations, and even if we do not receive a clear indication that they are effective and they are sure to keep out certain adversaries who are increasingly looking for easier attack targets.

Remember, security must be maintained even in private businesses.

Close protection – Attempted assassination of a Brazilian presidential candidate

Article author: Miky Weinberg – Owner of the Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Companies.

Jair Bolsonaro is running for president of Brazil and as it appears at the election rallies he is holding, he has a great many supporters who even carry him on their shoulders with great pride.

As is well known, insecurity in general and close protection in particular, the threat can only come from one adversary who dares to try and hurt the principal while being absorbed in the large crowd of supporters and exploiting the density and noise in favor of approaching the target and performing the attack quickly and resolutely.

Three weeks ago, during a large outdoor rally, with Bolsonaro the presidential candidate being carried on the shoulders of one of his ardent supporters, an assassin suddenly emerged from the front who needed only one second to stab Bolsonaro with a knife. One stab that could have ended Bolsonaro’s life and his campaign.

The incident and the stabbing were recorded on cameras and published on the various media channels, thus allowing us to watch again what a threat in the security of principals and its realization by the adversary looks like:

Closer photo and in slow motion:

In an event, it is possible to understand how the chosen action of the adversary in which he uses the knife as a means of harming the principal during an open event, without examination and screening of the audience, is difficult to identify in advance, requires the adversary to reach the principal, requires a short and simple action with one hand and can be extremely lethal.

There is a very great difficulty in detecting an injury with a knife because you do not hear noise and it is almost impossible to detect the act of stabbing and sometimes even the stab yourself. The only sign that something has happened is the behavior of the person being stabbed.

I do not know what is the policy of the close protection unit in Brazil regarding the level of security around presidential candidates, but it is clear that this event strengthens all units in the world that secure candidates during the election campaign to prevent and thwart any damage to democracy.

Candidate Bolsonaro did not appear to be close to the incident because no guards or personal close protection specialists were identified around him and in addition, he did not appear to be wearing a protective vest. I do not know the reasons for this situation and despite this, I say with full confidence that he is placing the candidate at the highest level of danger in front of the potential adversary. It is possible that the candidate himself decided to give up security and the protective vest for his own reasons and thus condemned himself to be exposed to the existing threats. The situation is reminiscent of the late Rehavam Zeevi’s opposition to security and the price he, his family and we paid for it – the late Rehavam Zeevi was murdered in the Hyatt Hotel in Jerusalem while staying without close protection specialists created as a result of his unwillingness to be provided with security.

Even if the candidate Bolsonaro was closely secured, the task of defending him in the event against the existing threats in such a situation was still very difficult. Event characteristics of this type, emphasize the assumption of working in close protection that the lowest level of security should be carried out by two close protection specialists.

Pictures of the candidate carried on the shoulders of one of the supporters with the rest of the crowd crowded around and you can see a man with sunglasses who seems to have a police badge on his shirt:

A close protection specialist by him or herself will not be able to give a full response to the threats and therefore will most likely not be able to identify the adversary approaching the principal and will not be able to prevent the stabbing from taking place in front. Adding a pair of close protection specialists who will go to the front will significantly increase the response against personal injury, although the task will still require the close protection specialists to work with full concentration and great professionalism.

As stated, when the principal participates in a mass event with no security at all, there is nothing that will prevent the adversary from carrying out his or her plot.

The moment of the stab:

The candidate’s evacuation actions by the audience:

Luckily for candidate Bolsonaro, the stabbing hit an area that did not cause death and aided in his quick evacuation to the hospital and the treatment he received, his life was saved and he recovered and returned to the campaign:

In close protection, the principal can oppose security and take actions that will make it difficult for the security unit responsible for his security but he must know that in such decisions he puts himself in danger of injury and even life-threatening events.

Remember that security must be maintained even when it is inconvenient and does not always serve the interests of the principal