Article author: Miky Weinberg – Tarantula Technologies Ltd and Octagon Security Ltd Company’s owner.
It seems that the President of the United States, Donald Trump, is breaking records for assassination attempts against a sitting president.
The first attempt occurred on July 13, 2024, near the city of Butler, Pennsylvania, when the assailant fired at the president with a long weapon.
The second attempt took place on September 15, 2024. The assailant was found hiding with a rifle in the bushes at the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida, and was shot by a Secret Service agent.
The third attempt occurred on April 25, 2026, during an event for White House correspondents held at the Hilton Hotel in Washington. Donald Trump stated after narrowly escaping another assassination attempt that being president in the United States is a dangerous job, even very dangerous.
In the first assassination attempt, the president narrowly escaped by what can only be described as a miraculous event, akin to the hand of God telling him to turn his head just in time as the bullet fired at him approached, resulting in only a minor injury to his right ear. In the second attempt, the president was saved thanks to the vigilance of a Secret Service agent who spotted the assailant hiding in the bushes armed with a rifle and neutralized him before he could fire at the president.
Did the president again escape by a miracle in the current attempt, or was it due to the work and performance of the Secret Service agents who secured him at the event?
What is known about the assassination attempt?
Cole Thomas Allen, a 31-year-old American, a teacher by profession from California with a master’s degree who previously worked at NASA, learned about the event from a publication regarding the president’s attendance on March 2. Cole Allen documented his journey to Washington, gathered preliminary information, and booked a room at the hotel before the event began. About 40 minutes after the event started, when President Trump and his wife were inside the hall, sitting on stage, the public entry on the floor above ended, and it appeared that the logistics team had begun dismantling the magnetometer gates. A Secret Service agent and a police officer stood at the back line of the public entry to continue securing the entrance. The officer appeared to be at the ready, facing forward, while the agent seemed bored, moving within his position. Cole Thomas, armed with a hunting rifle and other weapons, was recorded walking through the hotel corridors with a long coat that concealed his weapons. He arrived at the last door leading to the public entry, removed his coat, and prepared to burst in. Just before this, he noticed an agent with a dog approaching the door and waited until the agent left. The moment the agent exited, Cole Allen bolted through the security screening area, passing through one of the magnetometer gates, aiming to reach the hall and harm government officials and the president. He shot the first officer standing before him immediately after exiting the magnetometer, continued running, and was neutralized and captured by Secret Service agents. From the moment of the breach and hearing shots fired in the event hall, the security teams assigned to the president, vice president, and government officials began evacuation procedures from the hall to a safe location.
Footage of the assassination attempt – the FBI released documentation of the assailant before and during the attack:
Presidential Security at an Event:
The Secret Service, as well as other personal security units, is required to secure the individuals under its responsibility—foremost among them the President of the United States—during their participation in events with a crowd, both indoors and outdoors.
The Mission: To secure the President during his participation in the event in order to prevent and thwart any harm to him, and to allow him to attend the event as planned.
To accomplish this mission, the Secret Service conducts operational planning that considers the event location, timing, crowd characteristics, the President’s positioning during the event, and more, responding to all relevant threats against the President. The operational planning is carried out by the designated security operation commander, who determines the size of the secured perimeter, the security layers, and what each layer will include in terms of personnel and technological and physical measures. The implementation of the security plan is carried out by a Secret Service event force, reinforced by police forces and special units such as intervention teams.
Based on reports and video documentation, it can be understood that the event planning included an outer security layer for the hotel, a security layer on the floor above the event (which primarily included the crowd entry and screening area), and a security layer inside the hall where the event took place. In security, each layer must operate to detect the adversary within its sector to prevent them from approaching the President and successfully executing an assassination plot.
Securing an event at a hotel also includes preliminary actions such as sweeps to locate pre-planted weapons or explosives, vetting all staff and service providers, reviewing the list of participants, and checking the hotel guest list to identify signs that may indicate the presence of a potential adversary.
Planning was conducted for the event, so how is it possible that the assassin managed to surprise the security apparatus?
The assassin overcame the outer security layer by renting a hotel room like any other guest. In this way, he managed to bring various types of weapons into the hotel—a long rifle, a handgun, and knives—and, during the execution phase, avoided the need to enter the hotel through the outer security perimeter.
Can an American citizen working as a teacher be considered suspicious in a hotel like the Hilton Washington? What signs could mark him as a suspect?
The vetting of the hotel guest list is conducted based on several parameters that cannot be disclosed, but if they appear, it is a sign that the guest may be a potential adversary who must be checked in their room.
I do not have the necessary information to know if the Secret Service checked the guest list; therefore, I assume they do perform such checks, and it is possible that the assassin’s data did not flag him as an anomaly, so no room search was conducted. If the Secret Service does not perform such checks, it represents a major professional gap in the President’s security level.
Factually, the assassin was not detected during the preliminary operations, which allowed him to prepare for the assassination attempt in his room. The assassin left his room armed with the weapons he brought, went down to the floor where the crowd entry and security screening area was located—which was already in the process of logistical teardown. Upon reaching the floor, he began running rapidly, passing through a magnetometer gate, and shot a police officer who identified him. The officer, who stood before him with a handgun, survived thanks to his protective vest. The assassin was ultimately stopped by an agent standing in his path before the stairs leading to the event hall, where the President, the First Lady, and several government officials were located. Clearly, the assassin’s goal was to quickly cover the distance to the hall, using his weapons to strike anyone attempting to stop him, enter the event hall, and open fire to hit as many officials as possible, and perhaps even the President himself.
Did the Secret Service succeed in thwarting the assassination attempt?
The answer is yes. The Secret Service managed to prevent the assassin from harming the President and government officials.
Could the assassin have been neutralized at the crowd entrance? The answer is yes. Looking at the video documentation of the crowd entrance area at the moment the assassin ran through it, it is visible that the logistics team had already begun dismantling the magnetometers. At that stage, the layout did not provide a response to a “rusher,” and furthermore, no physical barriers against a forced entry were visible. While an agent and a police officer were stationed there, their role was to remain forward-facing to immediately identify anyone approaching the entrance, especially an armed individual running toward them.
As noted, the police officer was positioned correctly and was prepared, but the agent was not and was therefore completely surprised. Beginning logistical teardown before the end of the event is a grave professional error. Threats against the President persist throughout the entire duration of the event; therefore, it is mandatory to maintain the defined security level across all layers until the event concludes and the President and other protectees have departed. The Secret Service did not act correctly or professionally enough in the crowd entrance area. However, they did make a correct decision by placing the entrance area on the floor above the event hall, which lengthened the distance to the hall and effectively allowed the assassin to be stopped just before the stairs, while providing the security teams inside the hall with a relatively long reaction time.
How is it possible that the assassin was not hit by gunfire from the agents and officers?
In my opinion, the security forces who saw the assassin rushing in—located in an area surrounded by other agents and officers—refrained from firing due to the fear of a “blue on blue” (friendly fire) incident.
What happened in the hall during the assassin’s breach on the floor above?
As mentioned, the event in the hall began approximately 40 minutes before the assassin broke in, while the President and the First Lady were seated on the stage, and the other participants were seated at tables located throughout the hall. Video documentation of those moments shows that the crowd, the President, the First Lady, and the participants heard unusual noises from outside the hall; some understood they were gunshots, while others thought it was something else. Following the incident, the President stated that the First Lady immediately understood something was wrong and hurried to crouch under the table.
The Vice President’s close protection agent rushed to evacuate him from the stage to a safe location. In contrast, the President’s close protection detail quickly reached the stage, positioned themselves in front and behind him, and appeared to be trying to determine the source of the gunfire: Was it from an assassin inside the hall, or indeed from outside? The team delayed for a relatively long time and appeared very hesitant; only when an intervention team arrived at the stage did they decide to evacuate the President. During the evacuation, while still on stage, the President was seen falling to his knees and rising back up with the help of the team of agents surrounding him.
In my professional opinion, the decision-making of the President’s security detail at this stage was flawed and resulted in the President and the First Lady remaining on stage for too long. The decision-making was inconsistent with the situation known to the team at that moment. The team knew gunshots were heard outside the hall and had no visual contact with the assassin; this should have triggered an immediate evacuation of the President and the First Lady from the stage, rather than waiting to locate the assassin.
In dignitary protection (EP), when securing a protectee in a hall and a shooting incident begins with an assassin inside the hall, the required response is to lower the protectee under a table or behind a podium, with a clear division of roles between the evacuation force and the combat force. However, when the incident occurs outside the hall, and there is no visible adversary, the response must be the immediate evacuation of the protectee off the stage and subsequently out of the facility (the hotel). In the first assassination attempt in Pennsylvania, the President’s close detail also struggled during the evacuation phase—could it be that Secret Service agents have a professional gap in executing a proper evacuation of a protectee? I hope not.
There was another concerning professional gap for the President’s detail and other agents: almost none of them drew their weapons despite hearing gunshots. This decision directly contradicts the combat doctrine of personal security details, which dictates that from the moment an incident begins, it is mandatory to draw and ready the firearm to be prepared to return fire against the assassin. The only ones who may choose not to draw their weapon in the initial stage are the primary close protection agent and those designated to assist with the physical evacuation. In a situation where the close protection agent decided to “cover in place” (dropping the President at the spot), he and all other close detail agents were obligated to draw their weapons.
Video documentation of the evacuation phase:
An assassination attempt that, on one hand, made him realize how dangerous it is to be a U.S. President, and on the other, highlighted how much the Secret Service must implement immediate changes to improve its prevention and thwarting capabilities. In two out of three assassination attempts, the adversary managed to attack the Secret Service’s work during the planning and implementation phases, which included significant forces on the ground. President Donald Trump fully understands that he is a target for assassination and that there will be those who dare to try to harm him again and again. Factually, the Secret Service’s level of professionalism regarding his protection requires improvement, and the sooner, the better.
“Remember, ‘security must be maintained’ “